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Robert Caspar, a French Arabist, is a member of the Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes, Tunis, Tunisia.

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Nájí Jawád al-Sá'áti is an Iraqi Muslim writer.

Zakáur Rahmán Khán Lodí, B.Sc., M.A., L.I.B., a Pakistani Muslim, is part-time Lecturer in Civil Law at the Himáyat-i Islám College, Lahore, Pakistan.

Husein Rosé, B.A., an English Muslim, is writer and author. He is interested in mysticism and has written a book on the Sufi Movement.

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Contents

A message to the youth of Islam
by the late Muhammad Iqbal

Glimpses from the life of the Prophet
by the late Khwája Kamál-ud-Dín

Black Islamic slave revolts of South America
by Dennis Walker

Philosophy and Revelation according to Avicenna (Ibn Sina)
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"Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but he is the Messenger of God and the last of the Prophets. And God has full knowledge of all things."

The Qur'an, 33:40

"There is no prophet after me" (The Prophet Muhammad)

A MESSAGE TO THE YOUTH OF ISLAM

in the language of

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MUHAMMAD IQBAL (1873-1938)

Not yet have other nations seen
What thou art truly worth:
The realm of Being has need of thee
For perfecting this earth.

If aught yet keeps this world alive,
'Tis thine impetuous zeal,
And thou shalt rise its ruling star,
And thou shalt shape its weal.

1 From the translation of Iqbal's Shikwah aur jawab-iShikwah, by the late Altaf Husa'n, (Editor, Dawn, Karachi, Pakistan).
This is no time for idle rest,  
Much yet remains undone;  
The lamp of Tauhid' needs thy touch  
To make it shame the sun!

Thou art like fragrance in the bud,  
Diffuse thyself: be free;  
Perfume the garden breeze, and fill  
The earth with scent of thee.

From dusty speck, do thou increase  
To trackless desert—man.  
From a faint breeze, a tempest grows,  
Become a hurricane!

Raise thou, through Love, all humble things  
To greatness and to fame;  
Enlighten thou the groping world  
With Dear Muhammad’s Name.

1 Tauhid means the Belief in the Unity of God

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Glimpses from the life of
The Prophet

By the late Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din

MUHAMMAD'S TRUST IN GOD

The hardships which Muhammad (peace be on him!) had to bear in his early mission were as severe as severe could be. History has recorded several instances of such men, who have been pioneers in any walk of life, having been ill-treated by their compatriots; but the persecution of Muhammad, when he called his idolatrous people, who were steeped in almost all the known vices and immoralities, to one God and to ethical and moral grandeur and purity, was unsurpassingly terrible.

He and his faithful wife Khadijah and a few other followers bore the brunt of the persecution for years. Muhammad, before the proclamation of his mission, was called al-Amin (the Trusty); but simply because he invited his people to the worship of One God his countrymen began to despise him, and tortured his few followers, whom he had to send away from Arabia. He himself went away to Ta’if in the hope of meeting better treatment at the hands of the people there, but they welcomed him with stones, and with bruises all over his body he returned. While on his way back he lay down under the shade of a tree and fell asleep, when one of his persecutors came up, and taking up his sword in his hand, woke him up. “Who will save thee now, O Muhammad, from my hands?” Without an instant’s hesitation Muhammad’s reply was, “My God.” The enemy was at once awed by this daring answer, and feeling nervous dropped the sword, which Muhammad instantaneously took up and cried, “Who will save thee now?” Poor man—he thought he had no God to save him, so he sought mercy at the hands of Muhammad. But Muhammad was not the man to allow any self-idolization. He raised up the fallen man, and said, “The same God who saved me from thy hands will save thee.” The man became a Muslim—resigned to the will of God—and Muhammad’s trust in God was rewarded.

However, in Mecca the persecution of Muhammad was ruthless. For three long years he, with his few followers, was completely ostracised in his own land, and at last his life was seriously imperilled. Fortunately, through his spiritual power he came to know the designs of his enemies just early enough to leave his house before they reached it with the intention of killing him. He had one solitary companion with him when he was fleeing to Medina pursued by his blood-thirsty enemies. He and his companion hid themselves in a cave. While there his companion heard the footsteps of the enemies who were in search of them. His companion was not like the apostles of another prophet who never cared for their master when he was in danger, in spite of his solicitations. Abu Bakr knew that it was only the life of Muhammad that was in danger—not his. But he loved Muhammad more than he loved himself; so he become anxious when he heard the footsteps of the enemies. “We are only two, and the enemies are a large number,” said he in the cave. What did Muhammad say at that time of danger, when his life was at stake? Did he cry of Eli, eli, lama sabacthani? (“O God, O God, why hast Thou forsaken me?”). Did the idea for a moment cross his mind that God, his God, the Cherisher of all the worlds, for Whose sake and Whose sake alone he was persecuted, for Whose sake and Whose sake alone he was leaving his hearth and home and was fleeing to a strange place to proclaim His Majesty and His Unity, had forsaken him? It must not be forgotten that by his proclamation of the Oneness of God...
Muhammad had lost his position, his popularity. Muhammad was by birth an aristocrat. He was personally, too, very popular. But since he had heard the call of his Creator, and invited his brethren to that call, he had lost all—his very life was threatened, so perilously threatened. His solitary companion in the cave, the venerable Abū Bakr, was anxious. The anxious words “We are only two” came to his lips. “No,” said Muhammad emphatically, “Lā tāhazan, ināllāhu ma'anā” (“Do not get disheartened; God is with us”). God was always with Muhammad. In the flash of lightning, in the peal of thunder, in his travels, in his bed, in his anxious moments, in his hours of happiness and delight always and everywhere Muhammad saw the glory of God. His God Omnipresent and Omniscient, Helpful and Loving God, was always with him. There has never breathed a soul on the face of this earth who had so much confidence in God as had Muhammad.

MUHAMMAD AND JESUS BOTH PRAYING FOR THEIR ENEMIES

Tā'if was a place at some distance from Mecca. Muhammad preached there against idolatry. The idolaters drove him out of the city. The rabble and the slaves followed; shouting and hissing, they threatened him at the very entrance. Wounded and bleeding from footsores and weary, he betook himself to prayer. And the following words found utterance in a moment of deep distress and affliction: “O Lord, I make my complaint to Thee. Out of my feebleness and the vanity of my wishes I am insignificant in the sight of men; O Thou Most Merciful! Lord of the weak, Thou art my Lord. For-sake me not. Leave me not a prey to strangers nor to my enemies. If Thou art not offended, I am safe. I seek refuge in the light of Thy countenance, by which all darkness is dispelled and peace cometh in the near and hereafter. Solve Thou my difficulties as it pleaseth Thee. Guide them in the right path; for they do not know what they do.”

Noble words and worthy of the noble speaker. Conscious of the insignificance he has been reduced to, and yet such splendid reliance on God. “If Thou art not offended I am safe.” How hopeful in his trials—not the slightest tinge of despondency, no complaint, no doubt as to his being for-saken by God, “Solve Thou my difficulties as it pleaseth Thee.”

The concluding portion of the above-quoted prayer is similar to that of Jesus, and yet they differ from each other in the main point.

“Forgive them; for they know not what they do”—Jesus.

“Guide them in the right path, for they know not what they do”—Muhammad.

Words suitting the circumstances of the speakers respectively, and coming events proved their truth. Jesus had no chance of gaining that power over his enemies in his lifetime which would enable him to show his magnanimity of soul in the form of forgiveness. He implores God to “forgive them”. Muhammad had to reach that climax; he had to forgive them himself. It was so within the knowledge of God. Besides, the words inspired on the lips of the latter are more comprehensive. They go further and include forgiveness in them. Forgiveness is only for the things past; guidance to righteousness is for the past as well as for the future, as no one can tread the path of righteousness with his past sins unforgiven. So the Prophet Muhammad not only implores for the forgiveness of past deeds, but for their future righteousness as well. The words were prophetic, and proved to be so. Muhammad came to his full power, and his oppressors whenever they came to him received treatment of unparalleled kindness.

MUHAMMAD IN POWER
(THREE REQUISITES OF FORGIVENESS)

Few persons remember their days of adversity when they come to power. But a serene and noble mind is an adamantine proof against all the vicissitudes of time. In his case change means newness of circumstance to bring forth such other noble qualities as could not be exhibited in his former state. No virtue is without its own phase and character. It demands circumstances peculiar to it for its revelation, without which no one can claim to possess it. Forgiveness, for instance, can be shown only by one who undergoes three stages of life. First, he has been in affliction and helplessly persecuted by his enemies. Secondly, he has come to full power, and his enemies are at his mercy; and lastly, they come to receive judgment for their tyranny at his hands, but they are forgiven and not punished. How can one be accredited with mercy who never had any one at his mercy. And forgiveness, like mercy, can only be shown by those who by change of circumstances find their persecutors helpless and at their mercy. With unparalleled meekness Jesus bore all the derisions of the Israelites, and showed marvellous patience in the hardest trials of life which he suffered as a martyr to the truth, and how noble of him to say while on the cross, “Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do”, Jesus could not do more than that. But Muhammad had to forgive his enemies himself. For full thirteen years he remained subject to a long series of persecutions of variegated nature. He was tortured physically and mentally, but he was always prayerful for the welfare of his foes.

It has just been remarked that the moral quality of forgiveness demands three conditions precedent for its manifestation. These conditions must be fulfilled before one can lay claim to possess this noble attribute. Jesus was persecuted, but the other two conditions remained lacking in his life. It was at the hands of the Prophet of Islam where forgiveness found its right use and occasion, when the “Lord on high with ten thousand saints” reached the gates of the “Abode of Immortality” in the person of Muhammad. The old writings were fulfilled, and the one who had fled from Mecca persecuted and tortured came back victorious. The enemies of the Prophet in Mecca had subjected him and his followers for thirteen years to a long course of trials and hardships, which surpassed in intensity and quantity the hardest trials in others’ lives. His enemies fell and found themselves at the absolute mercy of their persecuted victim. They deserved every imaginable punishment to be devised by human ingenuity, and to bring them to it was simply to meet the ends of justice and equity. Muhammad would have been quite justified if he had punished them as severely as Joshua, Ramchandra, and Krishna did when victorious over their enemies; but the great Divine moral attribute would have remained in abeyance for ever. God raised various prophets from time to time, and His various attributes were revealed in them. Muhammad was the last of the race, and all those Divine moral attributes which were still undeveloped in man found their proper epiphany in him. Forgiveness, being one of them, had its own occasion as well as its use. It found no occasion in the lifetime of Jesus, and if others had it, they did not utilize it. But Muhammad had the rare occasion and did not fail to use it. His enemies, when utterly fallen, entreated him to treat them as a noble-minded person would do. The appeal was most opportune, and made to the right man, and was readily accepted. Thus Mecca fell...
without a single drop of human blood being shed—an event unparalleled in history.

A CAPTIVE CHRISTIAN LADY AND MUHAMMAD

Muhammad was compelled to wage wars, but never a sword was drawn but as a last resort to defend human life and secure safety to it. These battles proved useful in one way: they furnished occasions for the revelation of that nobility of character in Muhammad which cannot be exhibited without them. That noble treatment which the defeated received at the hands of the Prophet worked wonders. Never a suppliant came, but he got more than he deserved or desired. After the defeat of the Tayy clan of Yemen, a band of Christian women was brought before the Prophet among the prisoners, led by Saffanah, the daughter of a widely famed Christian philanthropist known as Hitim. When the Prophet came to know of her lineage, he showed her every respect. He informed her that the generosity of her father called for the tender treatment of his daughter. “God loves those that are kind to His creatures”—so said the Prophet to the lady—and Islam aims at inculcating the higher virtues, and consequently it must recognize them wherever they exist.” So saying, the Prophet released Saffanah. But the daughter of Hitim was worthy of her father. Emboldened by the saintly appearance and kind treatment of her liberator, her self-sacrificing spirit came to the rescue of her fellow-prisoners; she refused to accept the favour if the other prisoners of her sex were to remain state prisoners. But her self-abnegation could not go unrewarded, especially at the hands of Muhammad, who always proved more than a match for the nobleness shown by others; and so the Christian lady had to invoke a long prayer upon the head of her noble deliverer, when she found all her companions liberated at her intercession. The whole company were given leave very soon, and they were dispatched to their town under a trustworthy escort.

ISLAM NEVER ENFORCED THROUGH THE SWORD

The life of the Prophet is full of such events. If the sword were drawn to force others to conversion, why were the prisoners released at the end of each war and allowed to go to their homes without being converted to Islam? Can any person refer to a single conversion which was secured through compulsion?

To wage war in defence of life and property was a duty, and cannot be treated as a crusade. Muhammad’s amazing, untiring zeal to stamp out idolatry from his country and to enforce there other reforms roused terrible opposition against him. No Arab tribe was without its idols, and to vindicate and protect the honour of their image-god every clan rose in war. This occurred when the Prophet was at Medina. Invaded on all sides by his enemies, he had every now and then to take the field or to send men to meet aggression. Sometimes victorious, sometimes defeated, every incident created an appropriate occasion for the noble Prophet to manifest different phases of his grand character. One has simply to digest and codify them, and the world will find in them laws and rules of war more humane and appropriate than could ever be imagined by the promoters of the various International peace conferences. Besides, laws coming from one believed to be a Messenger of God can command respect and obedience which can never be claimed by man-made laws. That we do stand in need of some laws with religious authority about them that should regulate war in case it should occur cannot be denied in the face of what we bitterly experience every day in the present wars. His laws were humane in their treatment of war prisoners. They protected the civil population of the enemy.

MUSLIM ETHICS OF WAR

“When you meet your enemies in the fight, comport yourselves as befits good Muslims, and remember to prove yourselves the true descendants of Ishmael. In the order and disposition of the host, and in all battles, be careful to follow your banners boldly, and be ever obedient to your leaders. Never yield to, or turn your backs on, your enemies; it is for the cause of good that you fight. You are incited by no less noble a desire than His glory; therefore, fear not to enter into the fight nor let the numbers of your foes alarm you even though excessive. If God should give you the victory, don’t abuse your advantages, and beware how you stain your swords in the blood of him who yields; neither touch ye the children, the women, nor the infirm, old men whom ye may find among your enemies. In your progress through the enemy’s land cut down no palms nor other fruit trees; destroy not the products of the earth; ravage no fields; burn no dwellings; from the stores of your enemies take only what you need for your wants. Let no destruction be made without necessity, but occupy the city of the enemy; and if there be any that may serve as an asylum to your adversaries, then do you destroy. Treat the prisoners and him who renders himself to your mercy with pity, as God shall do to you in your need; but trample down the proud and rebellious, nor fail to crush all who have broken the conditions imposed on them. Let there be no perfidy nor falsehood in your treaties with your enemies; be faithful in all things, proving yourself ever upright and noble, and maintaining your word and promise truly. Do not disturb the quiet of the monk or hermit and destroy not their abodes, but inflict the rigour of death upon all who shall refuse the conditions you may impose upon them.”

The italics are ours. That the injunctions have always been carried out to the letter is an admitted fact. Read the above and think what a world of devastation and vandalism we find in Europe to the contrary! Is not Islam the proverbial enemy of idolatry and the notorious killer of all sorts of polytheistic tendencies? Yet thousands of temples, pagodas, and shrines consecrated to gods, goddesses, and demi-gods, teeming with valuable golden and marble images and idols, have survived the most successful Muslim invasion and rule in India. The reason is not difficult to find out. Man-made laws cannot command everlasting respect; treaties are made to serve the time, and they are more honoured in the breach than in their observance, if they are not convenient. But when an ordinance receives religious authority about it or comes from a founder of a religion, its violation excites public censure. It is not a breach of a word of honour, but a sin, a sacrilege, and a blasphemy, and a student of psychology can easily comprehend the difference between the binding force of the two. "Tariq, the first invader of Spain, commanded that no offence should be offered to the peaceable and unarmed inhabitants; that only those who bore arms should be attacked; and that plunder should be confined to the field of battle and to towns carried by assault.”

JESUS PREACHED AND ANTICIPATED WAR

That war was the permanent curse or necessary asset to humanity, take it as you may, was not unknown even to Jesus. “Think not that I came to send peace on earth; I came not to send peace, but a sword.” How prophetic Jesus
was when he said: "I am come to send fire on the earth." His followers did what he himself could not do, and fire in its different forms in the hands of the Christians became a scourge to humanity. No doubt Jesus in some other mood also said: "Love your enemies and do good to them that hate you," and all that Church ingenuity and eloquence has been a simple waste in her efforts to reconcile the above two expressions of mind. Had Jesus been given a chance to appear as warrior, though he anticipated so, as appears from his record, we could have read his mind through his actions, as in the case of Muhammad. If war is a legacy of man, and he has to make a resort to it now and then, a teacher coming from God to act as a model for our guidance cannot claim perfection unless he himself has waged war, and through his example shown us the occasion, the use, and the ethics of war. We do not only read the following in the Qur’an and his sayings, better than which one cannot imagine as laws of war, but we find an eloquent commentary on them in the actions of the Prophet Muhammad:

"A1 sanction is given forth to those who, because they have suffered outrages, have taken up arms; and verily God is well able to succour them. Those who have been driven forth from their homes wrongfully, only because they say ‘Our Lord is God’. And if God had not repelled some men by others, cloisters and churches and oratories and mosques, wherein the name of God is ever commemorated, would surely have been destroyed" (The Qur’an, 22:39).

"And fight in the way of God with those who fight with you, and do not exceed the limits. Surely God does not love those who exceed the limits. And kill them wherever you find them and drive them out from whence they drove you, and persecution is severer than slaughter; and do not fight with them at the Sacred Mosque until they fight with you in it, then slay them; such is the recompense of the unbelievers. But if they desist, then surely God is Forgiving, Merciful. And fight with them until there is no persecution, and religion should be only for God. But if they desist, then there should be no hostility except against the oppressor" (The Qur’an, 2:190-193).

To kill the enemy wherever one finds him is nothing strange when a state of war exists, and yet the critics of Islam draw the most grotesque conclusions from these simple words. The verse, read together with the first, runs thus: "And fight with those who are fighting with you and kill them wherever you find them." Do the civilized nations fight with each other to spare their enemies?

From the above it may be concluded that fighting was permitted as a measure of self-defence and to put a stop to religious persecution. The enemy had first taken up arms with the object of extirpating Islam, and to repel them a resort to arms was made. Hence the first restriction to which the fighting is made subject is that the Muslims should fight only against those "who are fighting with you." This restriction further shows that women, children, and old men who could not take up arms were not to be molested. A similar exception was also made in favour of monks and hermits and the civil population. Whenever an expedition was sent against an enemy the Prophet used to say: "March in the name of God and by His aid, and by the religion of the Prophet. Do not kill an old man, who is not able to fight, nor young children nor women." Again, the Prophet said to his General Khalid: "Do not kill any woman; do not kill any labourer." The second restriction is that the Muslims should not exceed the limits of the necessity of war. Fighting for the propagation of the faith is not once mentioned in the whole of the Qur’an, and it should be noted that it is this defensive fighting which is called fighting in the way of God. To establish religious freedom, no matter in respect of what creed or persuasion, "cloisters and churches, oratories and mosques," all have equal claim on Muslim arms for defence. The excuses for which wars are undertaken in civilized countries had long existed in the days of the Prophet, but the Muslims were not allowed to fight until the very existence of Islam was in danger.

If war is as old as man, and sacred and lay history are full of belligerent events, we need some ethics of war to regulate our doings when hostilities are resumed. A warrior-prophet is needed, who by his presence on the battlefields, by his precepts and examples under contingencies of war, has left us lessons and directions to follow; and that was Muhammad.

MUHAMMAD AS A SOLDIER

Those were the days of bravery and dauntless martial spirit, especially in Arabia, when the Prophet Muhammad made his appearance. Even the female section of the Arabs were dauntless as to accompany their husbands when they went to war. To speak of bravery and courage in these belligerent days of ours is to relate stories of bygone ages. The undaunted spirit of gallantry and intrepidity is not much in requisition when the two combatants have to stand against each other at a distance of many miles apart and cannons have to decide the events of war. It is not your courageous spirit, but your purse, which brings you victory. But the days of the Prophet were different. Prowess and valour were all in all for that nation of wild and warlike people. It was to humanize them, and through them the whole world, and not to circumscribe their bravery and martial spirit, that the Prophet was raised in Arabia. His mission was to regulate, and not to thwart, nature and its gifts.

The Prophet of Islam was quite up to the high ideals of his time; he evinced a manly spirit, braving all dangers for himself and always occupying the most conspicuous position in the first and foremost ranks of his forces. On one occasion, in the Battle of Hunayn, when the Muslim army could not stand their ground and began to retreat, the undaunted courage and self-confidence of Muhammad changed the whole scene. Single-handed the Prophet spurred his mule right towards the host of the enemy with the following words on his lips: "I am the Prophet, and there is no untruth in it; I am the grandson of Muttabib." This gave fresh courage to the Muslims, who recovered themselves; and this changed the events of the war.

Can a man of selfish motives ever dare perform such tasks? Such a wonderful demonstration of indomitable and intrepid courage on the part of the Divine claimant to which the veterans of the Arab clans stood eye-witness, and which was attended with brilliant success, not only broke the martial power of the Arabs, but conquered their hearts.

A brave soldier, a dauntless veteran, and yet so meek, so loving and so kind in his dealing, not only in his family circle but with every one coming in contact with him. Study any phase of his life, domestic, private or public, and you are sure to be impressed with the highest type of tenderness.

1 This verse is the earliest revelation regarding the permission to fight and wage war.—Ed. IR.
Black Islamic slave revolts of South America
A little-known chapter of Islam’s sphere of influence

By Dennis Walker

In the first three decades of the 19th century the emerging society of Brazil was shaken repeatedly to the core by a series of Islamic uprisings amongst the black slaves. In 1801, 1809, 1813, 1826, 1827, 1828, 1830 and culminating in the great final Bahia uprising of 1835 C.E., the black man registered by armed revolution his refusal to accept either the whip or the Christianity of white Western civilization. Some idea of the constant terror in which the Portuguese landowners lived during this period (1807-1835 C.E.) of the black people they had enslaved may be had from the following petition by the white slave-owners to the governor of Bahia:

“The undersigned, considering the imminent peril in which, by reason of the frequent slave revolts, their persons and, in general, those of all the inhabitants of the Reconcavo and even perhaps of the entire province of Bahia are placed, considering that the property of each one of them is at stake, feel it an unavoidable duty to point out this situation to your Excellency, and to beg the actual placing of those detachments which your Excellency sometime ago ordered to be stationed at various points in the Reconcavo. It not being, however, the intention of the petitioners to load on to the public Treasury the entire burden, they themselves offer to seek to raise a portion of this expense by means of a subscription. The petitioners rest confident in the interest which your Excellency has always taken in the preservation of public order, and are thereby assured that you will give ear to this urgent request which they have set forth.” (Donald Pierson, Negroes in Brazil, New York, 1942 C.E., p. 40.)

These fears were not without substance. As Freyre noted,1 black discontent in Brazil had been channelled by the underground Islamic movements and institutions into an organized and widespread challenge to the whole social, religious and economic foundations of the racist system of slavery. Nago of Hausa had become a sort of lingua franca among the slaves, with Arabic as their written tongue, and the dynamic ideology of Islam quickly welded diverse tribal and racial groups into a militant and self-confident brotherhood. Thus we find the Hausa élite easily stamping their Islamic faith and Arabic culture on to the other imperfectly Islamised groups of slaves such as the Yoruba. The disadvantage of this unifying Islamic and Arabic content in the black uprisings was that it alienated those tribal groups which in Africa had resisted the expansion of the black Islamic states of sub-Saharan Africa. Brazilian whites see the black Muslim revolts as “nothing more or less than a continuation of the long and recurrent struggles of religious conquest carried on by the Mohammedan Negroes of the Sudan” (Ramos). They emphasize the loyalty of Creole blacks and mulattos to the Portuguese slavers and the reprisals that these collaborationists suffered from the freedom fighters as a result. But according to this argument, most black people were really quite happy with their Brazilian condition of slavery which was not “unusually severe”. Donald Pierson sees the revolutionaries as a minority of “unassimilated free Negroes and semi-independent slaves morally isolated from the Europeans” (p. 45), who, living in the cities and urban centres had “more leisure for brooding over grievances and perfecting schemes for revolt” against “the mild servitude” of slavery. What more natural, according to this point of view, than that “many Negroes repeatedly refused to participate in the uprisings” or that “during the period of these uprisings coloured troops were used in suppressing them” (Pierson, p. 41).

Some slaves, driven by tribal and anti-Islamic hatreds that they had brought with them from Africa, did prefer slavery to a freedom that would establish an Islamic orientated black regime. They did ferret out intelligence about planned black revolutions and act the informer against their own people. The tiny mulatto population, a result of the white slavers’ sexual exploitation of black people—also mainly supported the established order because they felt in some way different and superior to the black masses, even though the white ruling classes despised and disdained these half-breeds as combining the vices of both races.

What is objectionable about the standard white Brazilian account—echoed by Pierson—is the way it glosses over the grim facts of the brutal exploitation of black people under Brazilian slavery. It is in order to evade the fact that the Muslim uprisings represented the discontent of the masses of black people in Brazil that so much is made of the “ferociousness of disposition” of the Hausa element among the slaves. Attributing the slave revolts to a militant minority of Muslim Arabised Hausa, however, raises embarrassing questions. Why did the message of Islam which the Hausa championed, for instance, find, in a new continent completely removed from the Muslim world, and despite the official propagation of Catholicism and persecution of “Muhammadanism” such a willing audience among black people, that as late as 1905 C.E. one third of the African population of Bahia were Muslims? (Pierson, Negroes In

OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1970
Another organized, large scale and co-ordinated uprising occurred in 1826 C.E. The Portuguese had to send troops to numerous points across the country to put down an African insurrection whose leaders had chosen “a king of the blacks. When wounded and captured, this leader carried a red flag, had on his head a crown and over his shoulders an old-fashioned mantle of green velveteen on which had been embroidered a golden cock”. Fighting for a faith which they believed, and for the freedom of which they had been robbed, the black, predominantly Muslim, revolutionaries fought to the bitter end, even after defeat was certain. For example, a settlement of escaped slaves at Piraja, a few miles distant from Bahia, successfully resisted a large force of white slaver levees. “In the mistaken belief that they had to deal with a small number of Negroes, these slavers sought without reinforcements to apprehend these fugitives and lost their lives in the attempt. A detachment of soldiers was required to dislodge the Africans.”

By 1827 C.E., the Hausa spirit of Jihad had infected the Yorubas also. They rose up, setting fire to houses in the suburbs of Bahia. After sacking them, they fled into the countryside. As Pierson puts it: “A police force sent in pursuit engaged the fugitives, killing or wounding eight of their number, but met with such resistance over a period of two days skirmishing that it would itself have been wiped out had not the patrol of troops come to its rescue. The next year, following three separate revolts, slaveholders in the Reconcaaco appealed to the governor for more effective police protection.

“In 1835, the last and most serious revolt broke out, led again by Mohammadan Negroes, each of whom wore upon his person a patue or charm, presumed to protect the faithful against death in any form. Bahia was at that time the seat of the Imam or head in Brazil of all African disciples of the prophet Muhammad. Those who were resident in Rio, Ceara, and Pernambuco owed allegiance to him.” In other words, by Pierson’s admission, the black Muslim revolt of 1835 C.E., was not a local outburst, but a planned countrywide uprising for black national independence. It was a co-ordinated and preconcerted revolutionary plan that operated everywhere where black people were in Brazil. The aim of the conspiracy was to set up a queen after exterminating all the Europeans. Extensive plans were laid including the proposed participation of slaves from every part of the Reconcaaco. The conspirators chose a flag and donned as the costume of their Jihad the robes worn by them at Muslim ceremonies. The black revolutionaries carefully chose the time for their uprising—the Christian festival of Nossa senhora da Guia—when the European population would be mostly gathered outside, the main area of the houses would be deserted by their white owners, and slaves could move in and out of the city without provoking suspicion. As the chief of Bahia police put it in his subsequent report, the evidence showed “the insurrection had been plotted for a considerable period of time with absolute secrecy. Almost all the leaders know how to read and write in some unknown language, which appears to be Arabic. This is the same language which is used by the Hausas who seem to be united today with the Nagos. These Hausas are from the same tribe with which has revolted on several occasions in this province…Their leaders stir up and organize revolts.” Unfortunately, the Europeans were warned by a traitor to the black race. The large hosts of revolutionaries, who had come from all over the country, also lost contact and co-ordination. There was confusion about the exact hour for the uprising. Franklin gives us this account of the fighting: “Every precaution
including a search of the Negro quarters was taken in order to prevent the uprising. At one place the searching officials were fired on and were overcome. The Negroes then successfully stormed the jail of Ajudia and moved on to fire on several soldiers guarding the Largo de Teatro. One soldier was killed at the artillery barracks. Then they attacked several other police and army posts killing several Negroes and whites. The uprising was not put down until after the entire city of Bahia had been thoroughly terrified and many persons killed and wounded. 

Despite their massing overwhelming forces of cavalry and foot soldiers, as well as the regular police, the Portuguese scattered the revolutionaries "only after a serious struggle". In fact, all white Brazil shook with terror. Even in the capital, Rio de Janeiro, there was no illusion but that the black uprising was a challenge to the very survival of white rule in the New World. In the nearby city of Sao Salvador, in the Rio Province, restless slaves wearing plumes in their hats" had been arrested, and revealed that orders had been received from Bahia for another black uprising in the capital to take place on Ash Wednesday. As a correspondent of the Rio Jornal do Commercio put it; "business and commerce is completely at a standstill by reason of a Negro uprising, which last Sunday suddenly upset public tranquility in this city. The revolt which had been planned for a long time was very serious, but the armed forces managed to put it down." The white repression that followed the Muslim slave revolt was merciless. And yet even the white slavers could not avoid paying an indirect tribute to these black mujahids who preferred to die as free men to living as slaves. "The best testimonial to the bravery and courage of the captured Negro leaders is the fact that instead of being hanged as common criminals, they were shot with full military honours." 

AFTERMATH OF REVOLT

Gilberto Freyre notes the discipline of the revolutionaries, the absence of any looting by them and the obviously political nature of their aims. "The fact is more people who had mastered reading and writing existed in the huts of the black slaves than in the mansions of their white masters above." White strategy in the wake of the Bahia Rising was concentrated on reducing the black man from his high level of superior Islamic culture to a level where he would be more disposed to accept bondage and subjugation to the officially established Portuguese Catholic civilization as in the nature of things.

The first step to make the black man resigned to slavery was to make him a Christian. Then he would turn the other cheek to his oppressors, love his enemies, and find in the colourful ceremonies of Catholicism and the promise of bliss in the after life some consolation for the misery of the present. An effort to propagate Christianity amongst the blacks by printing catechisms in African languages was launched. Slaves were encouraged to participate in the ceremonies of the Catholic faith in the hope that Christian superstition would gradually wean them from the clarity of their Islamic faith, the violence of which the white men feared. Arabic underground schools were ruthlessly stamped out: the Portuguese knew only too well that as long as the black man understood the language of the Qur'an, the message of Christianity would never, on its own merits, make much headway. As well as combating Arabic, which was a lingua franca of black slaves, the pagan cults of animist Negroes were encouraged and systematically absorbed into the ritual of popular Christianity in Brazil to attract black converts.

In spite of a dwindling black ratio to the total population, and in spite of isolation from the Middle East and all forms of persecution that a hostile white, Christian government could devise, black Islam showed remarkable vitality in Brazil. Those black people who were forced to adopt Christianity usually chose Protestantism—a protest against the superstitions of Catholic faith that clearly shows the Islamic background of the slaves. The Muslims continued to conduct a trade with their African homeland, importing religious objects such as prayer beads. As late as 1905 C.E., one third of the African population at Bahia were Muslims, although due to the withering away of Arabic and the African languages that were a vehicle for Islam, the younger generation of blacks were not being instructed in the faith. Even in twentieth century Brazil some secret Muslim mosques operate still among black people, and the ritual of the cults which express the black sub-culture are strongly influenced by Islam. Gilberto Freyre reveals this popular black ceremony in honour of the dead at Pindé, which is obviously of Islamic origin, with long prayers, fasting, abstention from wine, the relation between the festival and the periods of the moon, the sacrifice of sheep, long white robes. Freyre relates also his own experience of entering a pagan temple in a black area—how the worshippers take off their shoes before entering and how carefully they avoid treading on an old carpet on which sits an ancient man with legs crossed like a Muslim shaykh.

In the market places of Recife, Menas and Rio, black women sell their wares. Their long, brilliant, flowing robes have a striking resemblance to the dress of the Arab and Islamic areas of Africa.

Stokely Carmichael, the leader of black power in the U.S.A., has declared that the greatest mistake Western Civilization ever committed was to build the settler societies of the New World with black slave labour. This has left powerful black minorities in America who side with the coloured peoples of the world, not with the white peoples who oppress them. These racial minorities are a fifth column, within the body of Western civilization, for the third world—Africa, Asia and Latin America—in its struggle for liberation. The first signs of the truth of his statement have emerged with the support black people in the U.S.A. have given to the Arab peoples in the struggle against Zionism.

Black nationalism is also astir in Brazil, in fact in all Latin America. When the racial explosion comes there, black people will rediscover the significance of their Islamic, Arab-oriented past.

The future developments in Latin America—in view of the revolutionary role Islam played there in the past for black people—deserve to be closely watched by the Arab and Islamic countries. They may have a major influence on the success of the aspirations of the Middle East for freedom and dignity.

SUGGESTED READING

Pierson, Donald: Negroes in Brazil: A Study of Race Contact at Bahia. New York, 1944 (2nd impression).
Philosophy and Revelation according to Avicenna (Ibn Sina)*

Translation of the Arabic Text of Avicenna’s al-Risalah al-‘adawiyyah fi ’Amr al-Ma‘ad

By Robert Caspar

The relationship between philosophy and religion has always been ambiguous. Concerning man, his origin, his nature, his destiny, and even concerning God, their objective is the same—they both aim at possessing, if they do not actually claim, the “Monopoly of Wisdom”, total wisdom. Philosophy aims at comprehending and including everything, even religion” (Lachelier), and religion tends to invade and appropriate the entire man, including the exercise of his reason. Since the dawn of our civilization, in Greece (not to mention the various forms of wisdom of the Far East), philosophy has included a “discourse about God”, a theology, a system of morals and a general guiding policy. In Stoicism, Hermetism and Gnosticism, philosophy even becomes a way of salvation.

Christian Philosophy

We first notice Christianity dissociating itself from this mere human wisdom, which had become much too accommodating, too infiltrating (Epistle to the Colossians 2:8). But it was not long before it was absorbing philosophy into itself, though not without a certain number of extrapolations (St. Justin and the Alexandrines, in the second century). With St. Augustine the “Christian philosophy” (his own term), was grafted on to the Faith, by so doing, running the risk of losing its legitimate autonomy. It was in the Middle Ages, especially with St. Thomas, that the two categories of knowledge became clearly distinguished from each other: that which is known cannot be believed if it is regarded from the same standpoint. The effect of revelation on Christian philosophy was to set up problems and dilemmas which were partially new, an external guarantee of orthodoxy, and above all a deep and thorough study of its own particular domain. According to E. Gilson and J. Maritain, this philosophy is a Christian philosophy by reason of the conditions governing its existence and practice, but it remains autonomous when seen from the point of view of reason and truth, even if its role as “servant” (and not slave) of theology—and this is not its only rôle—does not yet allow it an independent synthesis of its elements. Following this stage of equilibrium, there came schisms and cleavages, with the Nominalism of Occam, Descartes, and the “modern” philosophies. Philosophy gained its independence, though not before it had gathered up the mortal remains of its rival—religion. The various philosophies might perhaps be said to be “Christian”, in the very devalued sense that they would not be what they are without the historical phenomenon of Christianity. Faith and philosophy can co-exist in the person of the philosopher who is a believer (Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant), but this co-existence becomes less and less as he develops his research. The contemporary epoch saw the arrival of new “Christian philosophies” (Blondelism, Personalism, Existentialism), and the list is not yet complete. Nor is the discussion terminated. Some types of Christian philosophies insisted on the powerlessness of the reason to penetrate to the ultimate truth, even going so far as to challenge philosophy in its own domain (Tertullian, Pascal, Kierkegaard). Others exulted the reciprocal implications (St. Augustine, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Blondel . . .), and even glossed over the differences between the various schools (the Alexandrines, Malebranche . . .). The common point and the criterion of an authentic Christian philosophy is that it should be a true philosophy, and also that it should acknowledge a source of truth which is higher than reason, namely, revelation.

Muslim Philosophy

In Islam, the evolution of the relationship between philosophy and revelation follows a more or less similar curve, although, in part, the “problem-objective” is different.

1 See St. Thomas: Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 2, art. 4 to 2.
The Muslim religion came into being in a milieu which was devoid of philosophy in the technical sense of the word. In the course of time, in Syria and Mesopotamia, it came into contact with civilizations already well-equipped with what they had assimilated from the Greek heritage: Orthodox, Monophysite and Nestorian Christianity, Mazdaism, Manichean dualism ... After an initial period of rejection, the Caliphal authority quickly came to understand and appreciate that it was in the interest of Islam—in fact, that there was an imperative need that it be equipped with that instrument par excellence, constituted by logic and the other utilitarian sciences of Greek wisdom. And in due course the Islamic world was to witness the monumental series of translations produced by the “House of Wisdom” at Baghdad (2nd to 8th centuries).2

The effect of the irruption of this foreign element into the Muslim Empire was to unloose a veritable passion for speculation and research in all domains. And while sciences which were essentially secular came into being—branches of knowledge founded on scientific experiment, such as medicine, astronomy, geography, mathematics—most Muslims were content to use logic (Organon of the Aristotelians) in the pursuit of their objective, thought not without being influenced by it. Thus there evolved Fiqh (Religious Law), Taṣṣir (Commentary on the Qur’an), and even grammar and rhetoric. In logic Muslim theology (’Ilm al-Kalām) found its real starting point (the use of reason in the defence of dogma, the driving force behind its basic orientation (defensive apologetics)) and its success, but also the setback of the first school of theology worthy of the name: Mu’tazilism. For these bold and vigorous thinkers became infatuated with that wonderful instrument known as “philosophical reason”. In fact, they made it the criterion of the truth of revelation and came into abrupt conflict with the pietist reaction of the Traditionalists (the keen devotees of the Hadith), and the “literalists”, who were later to come into power. The Muslim community, in the first acute conflict between faith and reason, or more exactly between “fideism” and “rationalistic faith”, veered towards the first attitude and, according to the verdict of a modern Muslim, “... it perpetrated a crime against itself”.3 However, reason was by no means banished from the mental pabulum of the Muslims, and later it was to surge forth, vigorously, at the very heart of theology. What is more, it continued on its way as an important element of “Muslim philosophy” (falsafah), and it was there that the problem was again to re-appear ... the problem of the relationship between philosophy and revelation.

The origin of the conflict

At first view, it is not easy to grasp the difference between this religious philosophy and the rationalistic or “rationalising” theology of the Mu’tazilites. Both are concerned with the same things: God, the creation, the nature of man and of his knowledge, eschatology. They both use the same kind of language and, apparently, the same rational method, by using the “notions” of Greek philosophy (substance, accident, essence ...). More important still, they arrive at the same conclusions and these are, to all intents and purposes, the Qur’anic dogmas.

The question has even been raised as to whether al-Kindi (d. 783 C.E.), the first Muslim philosopher, the “philosopher of the Arabs”, was not himself a member of the Mu’tazilite school of theology.4 At least he was very near to being so.

The divergence between philosophy and theology came about progressively under the pressure of an interior logic. Firstly, the rationalistic theology of the Mu’tazilites gradually disappeared after its official condemnation by the Caliph al-Mutawakkil in 234 A.H./848 C.E. It was replaced, in the theological domain, by primitive Ash’arism, which is more or less Traditionalism faintly tinged with reason. It can be said that the most powerful trend at that time was the “Fideist” and literalist Hanbalism, according to which all use of the reason, even for the defence of faith, was an impious act (kufr).

But the rot had set in, so to speak, and its ravages could not longer be concealed. Since the time of its birth Falsafah had received, as a patrimony, a philosophy which, under the name of Aristotle, was essentially based on neo-Platonism.5 Now the inner logic of this philosophy, according to which the universe proceeds from the One by a necessary process of emanation (fajad), would lead one to admit the eternity of the world, emanated from all eternity, that God has no knowledge of separate living beings (since the only perfect knowledge is universal).6 It would also entail the admission that bodies are not resurrected, since man is a soul which is separate (mufāriqah) in its essence, existing temporarily in a body, from which it is liberated by death so that it may enjoy a state of blessedness which is entirely spiritual. Thus the resurrection of the body and the reunion with it of a soul which had been separate from it would be a punishment for that soul. But the Qur’an in reply to this challenge affirms that God created the world when there was no world. Thus the world is not eternal and will be annihilated before the final resurrection. It also declares that God knows all beings, “… even the weight of a single atom on earth and in heaven, or even of anything smaller than that”(The Qur’an, 10:61; 34:3), and that ultimately the dead will be resurrected and rewarded or punished by joys or torments which are described as being essentially tangible, corporeal, or “non-abstract”. Thus the problem which confronted those philosophers wishing to remain Muslims took the form of an alternative; they had either to revise and modify their philosophy so that it became concordant with the Qur’an, as it was understood by the Sunni orthodoxy, or to push the logic of their philosophy to its final conclusions and then try to reconcile them with the Qur’an.

The Muslim philosophers before Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā)

Al-Kindi (died about 873 C.E.), elected to remain faithful to the Qur’an, which he acknowledged to be superior to

3 A. R. Badawi recently revised and completed the previous works (since Steinschneider), written on this subject: La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde arabe, Paris, Vrin, 1968, 200 pages.


6 It is a well-known fact that the famous Theology of Aristotle is none other than the paraphrase of Enneads 4, 5 and 6 of Plotinus, and that the Liber de Causis, attributed to Aristotle under various titles, is extracted from the Elements of Theory of Proclus, a disciple of Plotinus.

7 And also because God "... knows neither others nor Himself" (Plotinus), and is in relationship with the universe ... emanated from Him ... only through the intermediary of the First (Emanated) Intelligence.

OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1970 13
philosophy. He demonstrated that God created the world *ex nihilo* and in time. He maintained, like the Qur’ān, that this first creation is a proof that after the end of the world, both the world and the bodies in it will be re-created. God, being the effective cause of the world and of all created beings, knows them by His science, which is identical with His essence (Mu’tazilite theme), which is the cause of all beings. Thus, al-Kindī succeeds in harmonizing philosophy with revelation as it is interpreted by Mu’tazilite theology, the official theology at the time of al-Kindī. But he harmonizes these themes in a different way, based on philosophical premises. No doubt this was possible for him, firstly, because the theology was Mu’tazilite, secondly, because falsafah, still in its early days, was not yet too stringent or binding on its adepts, and could be conveniently modified so as to harmonize with dogma whenever the need arose.

But this was not the case with the philosopher Fārābī (died in 950 C.E.). His theology was that of his contemporary Ash’arī, and it is far from being rational. Above all, his philosophical system, well thought out and brought together, was entirely neo-Platonist. He held that in the emonation of beings from the One, the prophet and the philosopher are both equally worthy and capable of receiving illumination from the Intellect-Agent, an emanation of the One. The only difference is that the “sage-philosopher” (al-hakim al-faylasād) receives this illumination through the medium of his acquired intellect (al-aql al-muntaqūd) whereas the prophet receives it through the medium of his own nature (bi al-firād wa al-tab) and his imagination (al-quwawah al-mutakhayyiyilah). They are simply two ways of communicating the same truth using different channels. Scholastic wisdom is “acquired” by appropriate intellectual asceticism, through the medium of reason-intelligence (’aql). Prophecy is not acquired by conscious effort; it is received by the prophet by reason of his own “nature” and in this respect—but in this respect only—is the prophet superior to the philosopher. Such prophecy is, in a certain way, allied to “imagination” and expresses itself in the form of “... symbols, enigmas, transpositions and comparisons.” Thus, the philosopher can attain to the same degree of illumination as the prophet, and can dispense with his teachings, which were meant for the masses. In fact, Fārābī adheres to and develops the logic of his philosophy without apparently being at all concerned with the recognized dogmas of the day... the world is necessarily and eternally an emanation; God; (the One) knows only the “universals” (kulliyād) existing in the world, He has no knowledge of individual beings. The body will not be resurrected, because in order that the soul may enjoy the perfect beatific state it must be separated from its body, the source of all its troubles and evils, so that it can partake of joys which are purely spiritual. It returns to become indivisibly united with the Agent-Intellect. Fārābī’s philosophy does not reject the Qur’ānic revelation, but explains it in a philosophical manner, with philosophy as a basis, and this is especially applicable to miracles and to eschatology, for which the descriptive language employed is held to be simply imaginative metaphor. The Qur’ānic revelation certainly has a social rōle to fulfil in the *Virtuous City*.

At about the same period as Fārābī, the doctor-philosopher, Zakariyyāh al-Rāzī (d. 925 C.E.), went even farther. He held philosophy to be the only road leading to the Truth. According to him, religions contradict each other, they are the source of wars; they are hostile to philosophy and are built on impostures.

**Avicenna and Revelation**

We will not deal at length here with the ensemble of the philosophy of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, d. 1037 C.E.), one of the most remarkable philosophical syntheses known to humanity. What does interest us is the attitude he adopted when the logical conclusions of his system came into conflict with the teachings of the Qur’ān, as they were understood in his day.

There were three points where a conflict was possible between falsafah and the Qur’ān, and two of these can be satisfactorily dealt with by studying falsafah somewhat closely. The creation of the world is explained by its essential “dependency”. Of necessity God alone exists (wajib al-wujud); for in Him alone is existence identical with essence. All other beings have to receive their existence from God; for with truth that this existence of the contingent world is the result of an emanation which is inevitable and necessary, and therefore eternal. But Avicenna thought he could explain the Qur’ānic term for creation (khilād) by the idea of a beginning which was absolute (‘ibād) and of essential contingency (munkin al-dhāt). Similarly, God’s knowledge of individuals (“singuars”) is explained by the knowledge which He has of them in their universal causes.

There remains the question of bodily resurrection. On this point it was not an easy matter for Avicenna to make “convenient” modifications to his philosophy, which was basically neo-Platonist. He certainly went so far as to admit that human soul receives its individuality by existing in a body, which becomes the instrument for his earthly activities. But the soul remains in itself a spiritual substance, a unity, a simple entity, and thus immortal. Death liberates it from the body and we cannot subscribe to the belief that this body is resurrected to mar and sully the beatific state of the soul, which is wholly spiritual.

We know that Ghazālī (d. 1111 C.E.) in his *Tahdīf al-falsāfah* (“The collapse of the philosophers”), and in the *Munjid*, reproached the Falsafah, and particularly Avicenna, for supporting three theories which he considered to be anathema (takfīr): the eternity of the world, that God has no knowledge of individual beings and that there is no bodily resurrection. But in those works of Avicenna known to the general public, no trace can be found of the last-mentioned “impious” theory, and some people accused

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8 In his modest work on the number of books written by Aristotle, al-Kindī makes a clear distinction between revelation, the “Divine Science” which makes its appeal to faith; and philosophy, the “science of man”, which is based on reason. See Rasā’ī’s... op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 366.
9 Rasā’ī... Vol. 1., pp. 367 and 383.
10 Rasā’ī... Vol. 1., p. 160.
11 Al-Kindī not only harmonizes his philosophy with the principal Mu’tazilite themes, but, like them, he “interprets” (tawā’īdū; the Qur’ān and the Hadith so as to make them agree with his conclusions, by having recourse to the genius of the Arabic language, and to tawā’īd of metaphor. Rasā’ī... Vol. 1., pp. 244 and 373-375. We shall see that Avicenna is not satisfied with this.
12 “Prophecy” is the most perfect state to which the imagination can rise, the highest degree that man can reach through the imagination. Kiādār al-Qādī al-Madinah al-Fādillah, ed. Nader, Beirut, Dār al-Sharq, 1968, p. 115.
13 Ibid., p. 116. See also pp. 122-126 on the Prophet as ideal head of the Virtuous City (al-Madinah al-Fādillah). Thanks to his three perfect faculties: the imagination, for the reception of revelation, the power of oratory for transmitting it and showing man the way to happiness, and physical strength for action.
17 Ibid., pp. 71-85.

THE ISLAMIC REVIEW & ARAB AFFAIRS
Ghazzalıf of “libel ing” Avicenna, of making allegations against him which were unfounded, or based only on supposition.

In fact, in his best-known works, Avicenna declared that on this point he accepted what was written in the Qur’ān, in spite of the fact that the whole of his philosophy tended towards a rejection of the belief. But a small, forgotten work, which was nevertheless known in the Middle Ages, since it was translated into Latin, was discovered a few years ago and published in a faulty and inadequate form. It has recently been re-published in a more scientific form, under the title al-Risālah al-Adawiyyah fi Amr al madīdar. This text is perfectly clear on this crucial point, man is a soul, temporarily united with a body, from which he is liberated by death. For bodies to be resurrected and become reunited with their souls becomes an absurdity; for the soul it would be “...suffering and punishment”... for the joys of the Hereafter are purely spiritual.

But in this text Avicenna also sets out to deal with the problem of the harmony (or disharmony), between philosophy and revelation. For his opponents, in order to attack his findings, would confront him with the text of the Qur’ān. He would reply by outlining a general theory of the relationship between philosophy and revelation, and this theme is worthy of quotation. The text is a rather difficult one, because of the allusion to the historical and theoretical background and the devious and “meandering” thought-content. Before attempting a full translation, I think it would be useful to make a summary of the most important points, as I understand them.

Summary of the text of Avicenna’s Risālah

Avicenna sets out to demonstrate that the arguments drawn from the Qur’ān to prove that there is a bodily resurrection are untenable. His basic contention, which he brings forward in his argument, is that the Qur’ānic revelation, like all the revelations preceding it, is addressed only to the masses, with a view to attracting them to the good and moral life. If the Qur’ān had spoken of rewards and punishments in the Hereafter, which were of a purely spiritual nature, the people, whose appetites and pleasures were earthly and mostly physical, and who were of limited intelligence, would not show much interest in the message. Thus the Qur’ān was bound to describe the future life in material and physical terms. But the philosopher who belongs to the “intelligentia”, knows quite well that they are but metaphorical descriptions, and so he has to interpret them in their spiritual sense. Only philosophy, and not the Qur’ān taken literally, can convey the real meaning of the Holy Book.

1. Revelations are intended particularly for the general people. Now, to speak about God with exactitude, we would have to go into precise technical details and subtleties which the people would not understand, and which would even be rebuffed. Thus these revealed truths should be presented to the people in an anthropomorphic form or through the medium of very general affirmations.

2. The objection is made that only through a knowledge of the peculiar genius of the Arabic language can one distinguish between those Qur’ānic passages which should be understood metaphorically, and those that are to be taken literally. Avicenna replies that this is not always such an easy matter. Sometimes the metaphorical sense is obvious, but it is not always so, in which case there is a danger of error in matters of faith, through taking metaphorical expression in their literal sense.

3. Here is another and more pertinent reply: even if we admit that all the metaphorical passages in the Qur’ān are obvious and self-evident, the fact remains that the Qur’ān does not give all the precise details necessary for a sound and wholesome conception of the Oneness of God. And these details are necessary, for without them theology would be useless (a reply ad hominem to those of his opponents who were theologians). But the Qur’ān cannot give such precise details, because if it made use of the vocabulary of theology, the people generally would understand none of it. And if the people did happen to understand it, through Divine inspiration, then henceforward prophecy and preaching would be waste of time. That is why revelations, particularly those of the Hebrews (the Torah, the Old Testament), had of necessity to be couched in the language of metaphor.

4. Thus, the fact that the Qur’ān speaks of the life hereafter in an anthropomorphic manner (material and bodily joys and sufferings) is no proof that these descriptions are literally real or accurate. For whether the future life is purely spiritual or is at the same of a corporeal nature, the Qur’ān could speak of it only in a corporeal manner, since it was addressed to people who were mostly ignorant and illiterate. But the philosopher knows that such Qur’ānic texts have no evidential value.

The text of Avicenna’s Risālah

(1) With regard to revelation, the one rule which always holds good is the following: all revelation and all religion (milālah) given (to men) through the intermediary of a prophet have as their objective “... to speak with eloquence (khittāb) to the ensemble of the people. Now in order to express the Oneness of God with fitting exactitude, we must have recourse to precise definitions. For example, we can affirm that the Creator is unique and superior to and beyond all such attributes as quantity, quality, place, time, space.

18 He admits that, when considering the Hereafter, the reason can postulate only joys and sufferings which are spiritual in nature. Joys and sufferings which are corporeal in nature can be revealed to men only through revelation, through “prophecy”, and it is reason which establishes the raison d’être (and even the need) for revelation and prophecy. See Sulaymān Dūnýah on the Preface to his work mentioned in Footnote No. 19, and also L. Gardet: La pensée... op. cit. pp. 94-95.

19 Published for the first time at Cairo, Dār al-Mu’arrif, 1949. (Author: Sulaymān Dūnýah.) This book was based on two old manuscripts which were so replete with faults that very often the text was incomprehensible. The substance of the book then reappeared in a work written by Fr. Lucchetta: Avicenna, epistola sulla vita futura, Arabic text, with Italian translation, Introduction and Notes by Francesca Lucchetta, Padua, Ed. Antenore, 1969, 238 pages comprising 111 short pages of Arabic text and 66 pages of Introduction. This new edition is based on a manuscript which is older and much more reliable than those of S. Dūnýah. The translator endeavours to deal with this difficult text as literally as is possible, and the Notes give explanations as to the meaning and the sources of the text. An excellent Latin translation of this Risālah was made by Andrea Alpago, the Venetian doctor and orientalist of the 16th century, and Francesca Lucchetta is preparing this for publication.

20 The numbers of the paragraphs of my summary are repeated in the translation of the text. The Arabic text corresponds to pp. 42 to 63 of the Lucchetta publication.

21 Khittāb: this word refers to the oratorical process, the upsurge of eloquence, peculiar to revelation. See, for example, the description given by Ibn Rushd (Averroes) of the three kinds of men, classified according to their attitude when confronted with revelation: (1) the general masses, incapable of forming any kind of interpretation (‘adwāl) and whose minds can be reached only through the art of eloquence (al-khittābihayyān); (2) those who interpret revelation logically (al-jadalīyyān) ... these are the theologians; (3) the philosophers, who know how to “demonstrate revelation apodictically (al-burdāniyyān). Fasl al-maqudd, ed. G. F. Houranī, Leyden, Brill, 1959, p. 32.
position and change. We must believe in a God who can be rightly described in the following way: He is a unique essence, who has no partner like Him, nor separate existing parts, either quantified or conceptual, who can be neither external or internal to the world, and who cannot be situated in any place where He could be indicated as being present. It is evident that one must be careful not to attempt to convey such precise details as these to the masses. For if these truths were expressed in this form to the nomad Arabs, to the Jews and to the ignorant, they would promptly reject them, and would regard the faith to which they were being called as being devoid of sense.22

"That is why the Torah was delivered (to the Hebrews) in a style which was entirely anthropomorphic.23 Similarly, we do not find in the Qurʾān any indication concerning these highly important precise 'technical' terms. When definitely giving the required detailed formulation about God, the Qurʾān makes no reference to His Oneness, although some Qurʾānic passages adopt the anthropomorphic style, in the literal sense. Other passages are free from all anthropomorphism,24 and their contents are of a very general nature; they do not enter into details or explanations. As regards anthropomorphic traditions, they are legion, but one is not obliged to accept them.25 If this is the case with regard to the Oneness of God, what will happen in the case of other articles of faith which are based on this great central principle?26

(2) "Some people may raise the following objection:27 in their vocabulary the Arabs make use of metaphors and figurative language, so that anthropomorphic expressions, such as the hand, the face, to come (to them) in the shadow of the clouds, to arrive, to depart, to laugh, modesty, anger,28 are quite acceptable and appropriate, even exact. But the way in which they are utilised and their method of expression show clearly whether they are being used in the metaphorical and figurative sense, or whether they are not being used in this sense, but literally, and the objectors in question quote examples as proof that the Arabs use these expressions in the metaphorical and figurative sense, and not literally. In fact, in the examples they quote, these expressions can be used in this way without the danger of their being equivocal or constituting an error.29

"But, in the case of the Qurʾānic expression '... in the shadow of the clouds...', they do not wait aught but that the angels should come (to them), or that thy Lord should come, or that some of the signs of thy Lord should come ..."30 according to the passage quoted above, and other similar expressions, there is no justification whatsoever for imagining that these expressions are metaphorical and figurative. And if it is that which is really meant by the text, without it being clearly indicated,31 we must admit the possibility of error, of doubt, and of false belief in cases where a person of faith would explicitly adopt the literal meaning of these expressions.

"It is true, in the case of other Qurʾānic expressions, such as '... the hand of God is above their hands...', or '... I fell short of my duty to God ...'32 these are obviously cases where use has been made of metaphorical and figurative language in the text. No Arab purist, expert in his language, no savant of the Arabic language could possibly be deceived. But he might well be mistaken in the case of the first series of Qurʾānic quotations. It must even be pointed out that, in the case of the last series of quotations, he would not have the slightest misgiving in taking them in the metaphorical sense, in the same way that, in the case of the first series, he would have no hesitation in not taking them in the metaphoric sense, and would find in them only a literal meaning.

(3) "But there are further considerations. Let us suppose (that it is evident) that all these Qurʾānic expressions are to be taken in the metaphorical sense. Where then are we to find (in the Qurʾān) the passages dealing with the Oneness of God33 which would explicitly indicate the pure unity of God, which is the essential message of this religion, the majesty34 of which is acknowledged by all the sages of the world? Where shall we find references to those subtle concepts based on the 'Science of the Divine Unity',35 for example: 'God has knowledge either through His essence, or through some science (distinct from His essence);' 'He is either unique in essence, in spite of the multiplicity of His attributes, or He can assume multiplicity ... May God be exalted, He who is absolutely free of such blasphemy;' 'His essence is localised, or it is totally exempt from all localisation?

"Thus we must choose one of two alternatives. We must either develop these concepts and establish the true doctrine concerning them, or we must relinquish such a
research is devoid of interest, and if we could, innocently and blamelessly, fall into doctrinal error, the fine flower of project and abandon all study and reflection thereon. If such the doctrine of all those who have this matter under discussion is completely useless verbiage. 30 If, on the contrary, this theological movement and study is a precept which has been accepted and adopted, it is essential that it should have been explicitly formulated by revelation. And this should have been done not in some ambiguous and obscure manner, or by mere allusion or indication, but in a perfectly clear-cut way, exhaustive and explicit. It should have been carried out in the same methodical way as that used in any other expose. It should have been precise, clear and comprehensible, and its concepts should have been perfectly intelligible.

"In point of fact, the 'specialists' in theology burn up their days and nights—every second of their lives—in mental gymnastics, in furushing their intelligence and sharpening their wits, in their attempts to ferret out something intelligible from these obscure conceptions. For to penetrate these conceptions, they would certainly need a modicum of enlightenment, and some explanation of the expressions used. What then could possibly have been discovered by illiterate Hebrews and nomad Arabs? Good heavens! Would God have charged a prophet with the task of presenting these subtle dogmas, in their exact meaning and implication, to the ensemble of the common people, the uncouth masses, whose imaginations rarely reached out to realities other than purely material ones? Further, would He have required the prophet to see to it that these people accepted, on the spot so to speak, without any delay whatsoever, with faith, the facts that he had presented to them? Again, would God have charged him with the task of educating such men to the point where they would be able to intelligently study these concepts? If such were the case, then God would have been placing on the shoulders of this prophet an insupportable burden, and one completely beyond the capacity of any human. Unless such 'people' 57 had been endowed with some kind of Divine privilege, with some superior power and heavenly inspiration. But in that case both the intermediary role of the Prophet and the transmission of the Message would have been equally useless.

"Again, supposing we admit that the Arabic text (the Qur'an) had been revealed according to the meaning which the Arabs give to their vocabulary, and in accordance with their practice of giving to their language a figurative and metaphorical meaning. What then will these objectors have to say about the Hebrew scriptures which, from beginning to end, are pure anthropomorphism? And let no one say that these Scriptures have been entirely falsified! How could an entire Scripture have been falsified, a Scripture which was diffused among countless peoples, whose countries are at considerable distances from each other, and whose aspirations and ideals are so different? For we are referring to Jews and Christians, and these two communities are hostile to each other. 58

"From all these considerations it would appear that the revelations were made in order to 'speak' (khitab) to the people of that which they could understand, while that which they could not at first understand was brought within the range of their imagination by the use of figurative descriptions and anthropomorphic expressions. If it had been otherwise the revelations would have been utterly useless.

(4) "How then could anyone bring forward the literal interpretation of the Qur'anic revelation and present it as proof in such a discussion (the nature of the life Hereafter)? For if we admit that the realities of the Beyond are purely spiritual, incorporeal, and their real nature difficult to conceive through the intelligence alone, then there is only one way in which revelations can call men to partake of such spiritual joys, and warn them of chastisement (which is also non-corporeal), and that is by awakening their deeper imaginations. And this is to be done, not by attempting to demonstrate, but by expressing them in all kinds of symbolical or pictorial representations, which can be readily understood by the common people, by the 'man in the street'. Now the existence of one thing cannot be proof of the non-existence of another thing, if, where the other thing is not the one which, theoretically, we supposed it to be, the first thing remains unchanged. 39

"And all this in order to demonstrate to anyone who would like to be regarded as a member of the elite, and not one of the common people, that the literal meaning of revelations has no evidential value whatsoever in matters of this kind."

AVICENNA'S RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

This text, taken by itself, would not be adequate or ample enough to give a definition of the relationship between philosophy and revelation, as seen by Avicenna. Other texts have done this quite excellently. 40 It is generally agreed that Avicenna was a sincere believer, even if his conduct was not always above reproach. His philosophy was of a deeply religious nature. Not only did the Qur'anic revelation furnish him with one part of this spiritual quest—his religious problem—but above all, his philosophy (his 'aqidyyat, his theodicy (ilahiyat), are profoundly penetrated with religious inspiration and culminate in a mystique. It is a mystique which is doubtless philosophical and "natural", but one which is real. He is the worthy successor of his master Plotinus, whom he had never met, since the latter had lived and taught seven centuries before.

36 The reference here is to theology and theologians who were, in fact, the ones who raised the objections. (See Footnote 27.)
37 The Arabic text shows only one pronoun, "Hd", which should logically mean the Prophet, who is being discussed in the preceding sentence. But in that case, the logical "thought-reasoning", which had already become difficult, would become unintelligible, and contrary to Avicenna's teaching about prophecy. On the other hand, if the pronoun in question refers to the people, we know that Avicenna considered it quite possible for man to raise himself up, by his own efforts, to the level enjoyed automatically by the Prophet by reason of his own "special nature". From that moment he has no longer any personal need of prophecy or revelation.
38 This is an interesting comment by Avicenna regarding the much-discussed question of tahir (falsification of the pre-Qur'anic Scriptures). A whole series of Muslim writers, dating from the Traditionalist Dārīm (8th century C.E.) to M. 'Abd al (19th century C.E.), and including Ghazzali and Ibn Khaldun, are of opinion that the actual text of these Scriptures has not been falsified, but that their meaning has been wrongly interpreted.
39 This is the standard axiom used in formal logic when opposing one judgment by another. It means that revelation, whether Qur'anic or otherwise, can speak of spiritual truths or realities only in "material" metaphors. Therefore, whether these realities are purely spiritual, or whether they are also corporeal and material, the Qur'an always speaks of them as though they were corporeal, in one case as in the other. Thus we are unable to support any argument against the purely spiritual nature of these rewards and chastisements.
But there are other deeply interesting facets to the religious philosophy of Avicenna. No doubt the orientation of his studies was profoundly philosophical. His guiding light throughout was reason, and his principles were those he had received from the Greek tradition, already somewhat modified by al-Kindî and Fârâbî. But in his ilahiyyat, he made every effort to come to terms with the themes promulgated in the Qur'anic revelation, thus modifying and enhancing his philosophy. The most celebrated and the most valuable example of this is his definition of Divine Transcendence, by which he was led to evaluate, very appropriately, the distinction between essence and existence, one of the highest acquisitions of universal philosophy. On one vital point he rejects Plotinus (and Fârâbî)—he affirms the personal survival of the soul, so important a matter vis-à-vis the Day of Judgment, and the strictly individual retribution as affirmed in the Qur'ân. And we have pointed out how he strives to elucidate the concepts of creation, of God's knowledge of individuals, even though the actual trend of his philosophy tends to affirm the contrary. Thus we see that revelation exerts an influence which is not only an external one, by reason of the intellectual problems which arise therefrom, and its orthodox rules, but which is also internal, because, to a certain limited extent, it guides and controls the progress and development of Avicenna's theme, which is essentially philosophical. But for all that it is not a system of theology, because its inspiration remains based, fundamentally, on philosophical reason, whereas all theology, although it makes use of reason, begins with revelation, and it is revelation which remains its guiding light throughout. From this point of view, and this point of view only, one might be tempted to go further than L. Gardet, who defined the philosophy of Avicenna, and that of the other Falsâfiyât, as "...a philosophy of Greek inspiration, Arab or Persian expression, and Muslim influences," and to regard it as an authentic "Muslim philosophy." But the text which we have presented, translated and re-located to the ensemble of the problem of the future life, seems to constitute a decisive check to this attempt at conciliation, and to reveal serious implications. It is certain that, from the moment that man is defined as being a soul, which as, of necessity, emanated from God, and is not substantially or permanently united with a body, which is useful to him, but which limits or circumscribes his soul, we can conceive of the beatific state only as the liberation from that body and the partaking of joys which are purely spiritual in nature. And this theme of Avicenna is by no means a secondary one, but an essential element of his ontology, which he develops in the form of a very precise type of anthropology and from there to intellectual ethics and mysticism.

Philosophy and Revelation

In view of the above considerations, how are we now able to accept the resurrection of the body, which seems to be emphatically affirmed by the Qur'ân? One immediate reply to this question might well be that of al-Kindî and the other Falsâfiyât: that the Qur'ânic text should be interpreted allegorically (tâ`wil). The conflict would then lie between a literal interpretation, the one held by the Hanbâlî and Ash'arîte theologians of his day, and an allegorical interpretation, the one favoured by the Mu'tazilite theologians and the Falsâfiyât. Generally speaking, this is the interpretation favoured by Avicenna. Thus, the conflict is not between philosophy and revelation, but between two different interpretations of that revelation. So that the issue—and it is a weighty one—is to determine who is the authority in Islam competent to decide which is the authentic interpretation of revelation.

But, in our text, Avicenna definitely refuses to argue from these points of view. He says that even if we could perceive clearly when the style of the Qur'ân is metaphorical and when it is not, revelation is inadequate to express the truth about God. For this we need philosophy (or at least a very philosophical theology).

Speaking a little more radically, revelation and philosophy appeal to two different types of mind, and they trace two different paths towards Truth. Revelation is God's word transmitted by the Prophet, and is meant for uneducated or even illiterate people, people whose appetites and tendencies are definitely materialistic. Revelation should hold before them an ideal which is suitable and appropriate to their degree of evolution, a tangible, "non-abstract" ideal, so to speak, while at the same time care should be taken to ensure that spiritual realities are not presented in exact, precise terms. Revelation must not become a channel for educating the masses, and this is really the criterion which decides the truth of a revelation, its Divine origin. The philosophers admit the need for this rôle, but for this rôle only, this holding up of an ideal before the people. Fârâbî had already laid emphasis on this "social" mission of the Prophet, the natural head of the Virtuous City. But the philosopher has nothing to learn from the prophet about his own personal and private belief. As a member of the Virtuous City, he shares in the beliefs and the rites of the community of revelation. But his knowledge about God and the future life comes to him from his philosophy, which is more accurate and more precise than the knowledge which he obtains from revelation.

It is not simply a question of spiritual pride, of the feeling of mental or moral superiority over the common

41 This point is emphasized by Ahmad Amin in discussing the Mu'tazilites on the one hand, and the Falsâfiyât on the other, although their interpretations, especially those of al-Kindî, frequently coincide or support each other: "the Falsâfiyât were first of all philosophers, and men of religion afterwards. They were concerned with religion only where their philosophic speculation came into conflict with it, and when this happened they strove to harmonize the two. The Mu'tazilites, on the contrary, were above all men of religion...philosophy played a secondary role." Duhâ al-Islâm, III, p. 204, quoted by L. Gardet, La pensée..., p. 206.
43 It is the same writer (L. Gardet), who raises the question as to what exactly is Muslim philosophy, when he makes allusion to the same question regarding "Christian philosophy," a topic so often discussed since 1931. It is certain that if we take as criterion the Christian philosophy as it was "established" historically in the 13th century, and as it has been defined by E. Gibson and J. Maritain, we might perhaps concede that, in both cases, the definition could be extended to include all philosophic systems which, in their progressive development, are guided by the desire to respect the dogmas of religion. The criterion of the "religious" character of such a philosophy would not constitute a just evaluation of its "truth" in the philosophical domain (something not easy to establish), but of its possible conciliation with dogma. See Y. Congar: La Foi et la Théologie, Paris, Desclee, 1962, pp. 177-179 and 191.
44 The Risâlah al-Adwâ'iyah is perfectly clear on this point: "Speaking realistically, man, by virtue of his real essence (andnyâ',d), is necessarily the soul (nafs)," op. cit., p. 145.
45 See Risâlah al-Adwâ'iyah (details previously quoted), pp. 73-75. In the opinion of philosophers, the anthropomorphic form of the text of a revelation is..." the best proof of its truth. If revelation were given in the form of stark, explicit truth or in some strange symbolism unknown to man, as happened in the case of the Mazdaites and the Manichaeans, that would be the surest proof that it was false and that it lacked Divine (heavenly) authority". continued on page 21
A comparative study of Shakespearian and Arabic Grammar

Many familiar notes between Shakespearian and Arabic grammar

By Dr. Safa A. Khulusi

According to E. A. Abbot in his *A Shakespearian Grammar* (Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 1966, pp. 9-10), "(a) Clearness was preferred to grammatical correctness, and (b) brevity both to correctness and clearness. Hence it was common to place words in the order in which they came uppermost in the mind without much regard to syntax, and the result was a forcible and perfectly unambiguous but ungrammatical sentence."

Whatever the explanation may be, it is possible that Shakespeare came under the influence of Arabic style, and it was due to his influence that this style became prevalent throughout the Elizabethan Age, and it was only in the Victorian Age that the English language managed to free itself from such an influence and adopt a style of its own.

Arabic idiom, like the Elizabethan, is more vigorous and terse than present day English. The words and expressions are overburdened with meaning. One construction may take the place of another to give zest and flavour to the speech. That is why the golden Age of English poetry is over, because the language now is more exact and logical, after the adoption of the idea of "division of labour" to the various idioms. Such is not the case with Arabic. Hence it is far closer to Elizabethan than modern English.

It was during the unsettled Elizabethan period that Arabic influence was felt most.

There was stern subordination of grammar to terseness and naturalness of expression, giving ultimately liveliness and wakefulness to Shakespearian English that are wanting in the grammatical monotony of today. It was a wakeful as compared to a sleepy language, to put it in Shakespearian idiom.
SOME EXAMPLES OF GRAMMATICAL POINTS OF RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN SHAKESPEARIAN AND ARABIC GRAMMAR

We do not claim that we are going to exhaust all the grammatical points of resemblance between Shakespearian and Arabic grammar, but here are some of the striking ones:

(1) Adjectives used as adverbs:
    Shakespeare says: “Which the false man does easy.”
    Macb. II, 3:143.
    An Arab would say: “alladhí ya'maluhú al-rajulu gayr al-mukhlis sahlan.”

(2) Adjectives compounded: This is done very freely in Arabic. It could be a pure adjective or an adjective combined with another used adverbially, or the first being a kind of adverb qualifying the second.
    Ar.: “khisban-tariyya.”

(3) Adjectives have both an active and a passive meaning:
    Sh.: “As ‘twere a careless trifle,” Macbeth I, 4:11.
    Ar.: “kámá law kána tafáhátan ‘adinatád lák-iktiráth (act.),
    or la yúktaárath lahá (pass.).

(4) Adjectives signifying effect used to signify the cause:
    Sh.: “Oppress’d with two weak evils, age and hunger.” A.Y.L. ii, 7:132.
    Ar.: “Qad idhahadahú, sh-sharrrán ad-dá’difán, ash-shaykhkúhátu wal-iz-jú.”

(5) Superlative: The superlative inflection, just as in Latin and some modern European languages, is sometimes used to signify “very” with no idea of excess:
    Sh.: “A little ere the mightiest Julius fell,” Hamlet i, 1:114.
    Ar.: “Qablá an yasquta Yuliosul-ádhám biqáilí.”

(6) The Possessive Adjectives: They are combined with nouns like the French monsieur:
    Sh.: “Dear my lord.”
    Ar.: “Sayyidi l-ázíz.”
    But in Arabic the qualifying adjective follows both the possessive adjective and the noun qualified.

(7) Self: Used in the adjectival meaning “same”, which is exactly what happens in Arabic:
    Sh.: “One self king.”
    Ar.: “Nafs al-malík.”
    The use of “self” in Shakespeare is as common as in Arabic.

(8) Adverbs: In the strict sense of the word there are few adverbs in Arabic. Instead nouns and adjectives are used in specially constructed phrases to serve the same purpose. The same observation is applicable to Shakespeare.
    He seems to be particularly fond of the Arabic adverb ánán, of which the English equivalent is anon:
    Sh.: “Still and anon,” K.J. IV, 1:47.
    Ar.: “qablan wa ánán.”

The word “still” was used in Elizabethan times to mean, “the previous moment”.

(9) The frequent omission of THE before a noun already defined by another especially in prepositional phrases. In Arabic it is a strict rule to drop the definite article al (the) from a noun in the possessive case, i.e. by an implied English (of).
    Sh.: “In number of our friends,” J.C. iii, 1:216.
    Ar.: “Fi ̀dádádi asdiqá’iná.”
    Ar.: “Mundhu waftáti ummí al-ázizáh.”
    Ar.: “Fi ‘aqibí dhálíka tahaddáhú.”
    Sh.: “In absence of thy friend,” T.G. of V. i, 1:59.
    Ar.: “Fi Ghíyábi sadíqik.”
    Ar.: “Min ajíl sharaří biládińá.”
    Ar.: “Shaklu jamálikí fi lawhi qalbí.”
    Sh.: “Some beauty peep’d through lattice of year’d age.” L.C. st.ii.
    Ar.: “Atála ba’dú, l-jamálí min mushabbaki náfídhihtí sh-shaykhkúhah.”
    Sh.: “In cardle of the rude imperious surge,” 2 Hen. IV iii, 1:20.
    Ar.: “Fi mahdi al-tughyán al-imbrátorí.”
    Sh.: “Proving from world’s minority their right,” R. of L.
    Ar.: “Mubáríháná min bayni aqállíyát al-álamí haqqáhum.”
    Sh.: “On most part of their fleet,” Othello, ii, 1:24.
    Ar.: “‘Alá mu’dámi l-ustúlí.”

We have deliberately given a long list of examples, because this is one of the basic rules in Arabic, and it has been extensively used by Shakespeare.

(10) The use of “the” in the possessive sense: This is obtainable both in Arabic and French.
    Sh.: “The king is angry; see, he bites the lip,” Rich. III, iv, 2:27.
    Ar.: “al-Malku ghádibun: unzur, innáhu ya’addú al-shafáh.”

(11) The use of “the” before some abstract nouns:
    Sh.: “Where they feared the death, they have borne life away,” Hen. V, iv, 1:81; Rich. III, 1, 2.179; ii, 3:55.
    Ar.: “Haythumá kháfú ’l-mawta, ab’adá ‘l-Haydáta.”

(12) The Which: In French, we have lequel, but not lequi, whereas in Arabic the relative pronoun is always defined. Shakespeare stands halfway in between. He is nearer to Arabic than French. He gives us the which and the whom, which latter is unique in Shakespeare.
    Sh.: “The better part of valour is discretion; in the which better part I have saved my life,” 1 Hen. IV, v, 4:125.

THE ISLAMIC REVIEW & ARAB AFFAIRS

This verse of Shakespeare, however, is reminiscent of a similar one by the Arab poet laureate, al-Mutanabbî, who says (metre: al-Kâmîl): al-ra‘yu qabla Shajâ‘ati‘sh-shujâ‘înî, Huwa awwalan wa hiya‘l-mahal ‘uth-thânî.

(Discretion comes before the value of brave men.
It stands first; valour comes next.)

(13) The excessive use of the conjunction “And”:
Arabic, like Shakespearean English, is very fond of the conjunction “And”: It is at times more of a decorative than grammatical function; so it is given different names in different positions, but virtually it is always the same. You can start an essay or even a whole book with a wâw (And). At times, such as wâw is called al-wâw al-zâ‘idah, the redundant wâw or wâw hashw al-kawâzinaj (The wâw that is inserted like almonds in thick syrup.)

The same phenomenon is noticeable in Shakespeare.
The following examples will lend support to our claim:
Sh.: “Will the king hear this piece of work?”
Pol.: “And the queen too,” Hamlet, iii, 2:53.
Pol.: “wa‘l-malikah kadhâlik.”

You can in Arabic, just as in modern English, put the word “yes” before the conjunction, in this instance, but that is unnecessary. It is even more eloquent, if it is dropped. The “yes”, however, is implied, because this kind of conjunction is found in answers, in the sense “yes, and” or “exactly, and.”

“And” is also found in this emphatic sense after ejaculatory words, e.g. faith, sooth, alas, etc.
Sh.: “Faith, and so we should,” 1 Hen. IV, iv, 1:52.
Ad.: “Qasaman, wa kadhâlikah yajibu ‘alaynâ!”

“And” may likewise express emphatic interrogations, e.g.
Sh.: “Alas! and would you take the letter of her?”
A.W., iii, 4:1.
Ar.: “Asafâh! wa hal sa-tâ‘khudhu risâlatâhâ?”

According to Ben Jonson, “And, in the beginning of a sentence, serveth for admiration”. A scholar like Tawfiq Wahbi, however, thinks that an excess of wâws is like so many flies scattered all over an Arabic page.

A similar attitude of earlier scholars gave rise to an important subject in Arabic Rhetoric, viz., al-Wasîl wa‘l-Fasd (The Use And Omission of Conjunctions). Nevertheless, it did not stop the Arabs’ lavish love for the wâw.

Shakespeare, at times, uses And for “also”, “both”, “even” or “so”:
Sh.: “I almost die for food, and let me have it!”
A.Y.L., ii, 7:104.
Ar.: “Akâfu amûtu min ajli‘t-ta‘âmi, fa’mnahnî iyyâh!”
Here, to all intents, a phrase like “I request you” or “beseech you” is elided, because it is understood.

Philosophy and Revelation according to Avicenna
continued from page 18

people, which would indeed be a serious matter. It is the consequence of a certain attitude towards the very nature of prophecy and philosophy, a conception linked to the soul and centre of Avicenna’s philosophy—the graduated emanation of all beings from the primordial One. The prophet is superior to the philosopher in the sense that he is “by nature” in contact with the Intellect-Agent, identified by Avicenna as the Angel of Revelation, a degree of being essential to the Divine plan. For his part, the philosopher, through his intellectual discipline, can reach to that same level, and he also can receive illumination from the Intellect-Agent. This illumination will meet all his needs and will become the criterion enabling him to discern the meaning of revelation.

Avicenna was certainly a religious philosopher, and even a “believer”, in the theist sense. But it does seem that he “believed” more in his philosophy than in the God of revelation, in the “...living God, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob” (Pascal), and that he did not believe “...in God, through God”, revealing Himself through His Word. It is all a question of what is meant by the word “faith” or “belief”.

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OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1970
A journey to Spain
Toledo*
Part II

By Naji Jawad al-Sa’ati

It is indeed a mythical city. It is built on two large hills linked together by two stone bridges that date back from the time of the Romans. The Tagus runs underneath getting narrower and narrower, meandering amidst the rocks, but it perseveres with obstinacy until it reaches Barcelona to pour into the Mediterranean.

The city was an historical stage for the Romans, Goths and Arabs. Indeed, it was the first step for Arab expansion when Count Julian, the Governor of Ceuta, urged the Arabs to cross the straits and conquer the country.

A strange story, linked with the Count’s request, was related to us by our guide. He said that when Count Julian sent his pretty daughter Floranda to Toledo to be brought up in the Royal Gothic Palace, in the way princesses were brought up, according to the custom of the time, Prince Roderick, who became later a king, tried to rape her. Floranda the unsophisticated, innocent girl had to flee Toledo. Her father was away in Ceuta, so was her fiancé, Prince Alphonso, who was sent away by Roderick, on a military errand, to keep him away from Toledo so that beautiful Floranda might remain alone with her old nurse.

On hearing of the news, the unfortunate father decided to avenge his tarnished honour.

Now, the Arabs were in Tangier where they were ruling with equity and justice. Julian saw in them the savours he sought. So he contacted them and joined their ranks, enticing them to occupy Toledo; for its people were utterly disgusted with the cruelty and injustice of their rulers.

Consequently, Músá Ibn Nusayr, the Umayyad Governor of North Africa, ordered his freed men and Commander of his army to conquer Spain. Táriq was more than a match for the enterprise. He crossed over to Lisán al-Jabal (the Tongue of the Mountain), which was later to commemorate his name as Jabal Táriq or Gibraltar. This was the starting-point of the Great March towards the conquest of Andalusia. Roderick was defeated and died of wounds he received in the decisive battle, whilst Táriq continued his march until the doors of Toledo were flung open to him. He sent the news of his victory to Músá who followed suit. In Barcelona, however, Músá decided to go, together with his lieutenant, Táriq, to north Africa, leaving his son ‘Abd al-’Aziz as Viceroy in the newly conquered territory, choosing Cordoba as his capital.

When the tidings of the great triumph reached the Caliph al-Walid, he was on his death-bed, but requested to see his victorious generals in Damascus, before breathing his last.

Sulaymán, the heir-apparent, who wished to get all the booty the two generals had brought along with them to the dying Caliph, wrote asking them to slow their pace so that he would get everything for himself along with the throne. But they refused his request and reached Damascus a few days before the death of the Caliph.

On coming to the throne, Sulaymán had Músá arrested and deported to Medina where he died penniless, because the Caliph confiscated all his property. He also had his son, ‘Abd al-’Aziz, assassinated in one of the streets of Cordoba.

Táriq, his lieutenant, had no better fate than his master.

On my way to Toledo, I was wondering while the wheels of our car were obstinately struggling with the rough mountainous road, how our grandfathers, with their primitive means of transport, poor maps and scanty provisions, were able to reach it and conquer this naturally well-fortified city.

I came of my own free will, as a peaceful tourist with nothing to fear and in the most comfortable manner; yet I was feeling awe-struck and homesick. How, then, did those brave heroes manage to overcome all those hardships, seen and unseen?

How right is our contemporary poet al-Jawáhirî, when he says:

"O Umm 'Awf! How do you know what fate has in store For us? How do we know?
How and where our lifelong journey will relax its reins,
And when our anchors will be cast ashore?"

I strolled along the narrow lanes of Toledo. The

* Translated by Dr. S. A. Khulûsî.
1 It was the capital of the Goths in Spain: a flourishing city with castle, churches and monasteries, hence, a centre for both religion and politics.
2 The Goths were Germanic tribes that migrated from upper India to Europe in search of pastures and livelihood. They crossed Europe to Spain where they established a Gothic state until the Islamic Conquest in 93 A.H./711 C.E., when the great Berber hero Táriq Ibn Ziyâd put an end to it.
3 Ceuta is an African town protruding into the sea and overlooking the straits of Gibraltar.
4 He usurped the throne from King Ghaytasha, a relative of Count Julian. Hence, his hatred of Roderick!
windows of its projecting head-rooms were well-decorated with vases of wet, tender flowers. An Andalusian girl was tending them. The Eastern touch was everywhere, even in the commercial quarter. Oriental Mosaics and Arabesques were enveloping the walls of the cafés and restaurants. Even the small shops were suggesting to me that I was either in an Iraqi, Egyptian or Syrian town.

One of the striking facts about the city is that the Toledans are still well-famed for their industry of swords and gold ornaments, which they apparently inherited from their Arab ancestors.

The guide took us anxiously to a simple, primitive factory, where workmen still using the hammer and anvil, and decorating, with their expert hands, metals with threads of pure gold and silver.

Our next step was directed towards Alcazar. The definite article alone is enough to indicate its Arabic origin. During my stay in Spain, I heard many similar words, e.g. Alhambra (al-Hamra), i.e. the red one; Almazar (al-Mazār), i.e. the shrine; Indamar (‘Arūd Dāmir), i.e. the Spring of Dāmir; Alroza (al-Rawda), i.e. the garden; Axaaro (al-Sharaj), i.e. the over-looking spot, or verandah.... and many other words.

We made our way for the old magnificent Alcazar built on a rocky rock, overlooking the river Tagus, opposite the stone bridge. No specific date of its erection is given with certainty. It is said that it was a huge Roman castle renewed by the Gothic kings. The Arabs rebuilt it. At the time of the Muslims it became the main headquarters of the Governor. After the Reconquest, it became the residence of the Spanish kings. Fernando and Isabella had it redecorated. It acquired a special renown during the Spanish Civil War in 1936 C.E. A great part of it was demolished in military action. The Spaniards, who are so anxious to keep the relics of the past intact as a means for the growth and development of tourism in the country, had it repaired, preserving all its original outlook and characteristics.

Reaching Alcazar, we were shown the galleries and the spacious parlours. One of them, overlooking the valley, contained two motor cycles that were converted into grinding mills during the Civil War in order to provide the besieged soldiers with bread. There were also old rifles, grenades and worn military equipment that were used by the rebels in that grievous war. Next, the guide took us into an adjoining room and pointed to a couple of paintings in natural size: one of them of a Spanish field marshal in his military uniform and stern looks, and the other of a young man in a white shirt, with dishevelled hair and bronze-like chest, surrounded by soldiers who had collared him violently. “Read the posters hanging between the two pictures,” said the guide, “they are in several languages. They record the telephone talk between the general of the besieged garrison and his young son, captured by the besieging army. They are asking him to tell his father that they would shoot him if he does not surrender the castle. The father’s answer is: ‘Turn your face to God, my Son, and tell them my father would not surrender!’”. Hardly had the guide finished his explanation, when I discovered the Arabic translation of this sensational conversation.

The guide then took us around narrating the story of the castle and the secret of its immortality, and telling us all the historical events that it had witnessed, which reminded me of the following Andalusian verses:

“What a castle is it that the Pleiades are far below its dignity?
Sweet are its springs, palatable are the sources.
Morning light has spread a garment of commendments over it.
The banners of happiness are fluttering thereon.
The goblets in its palm
Are like pure pearls with molten gold.”

Leaving Alcazar, I saw a mobile shop on the back of an ass. There was a jumble of ceramics and earthenware loaded chaotically. Tourists would choose their souvenirs from them. I took a snap of it and hurried to join the group in the narrow lanes. We were taken to a glamorous, Oriental-style house. Standing in the middle of the open courtyard,
The decline, once started, could never be arrested in the Muslim history of Spain. The fifteenth Christian century (ninth Muslim century) saw the termination of the brilliant Muslim rule of almost eight centuries in Spain.

I felt I was in one of the old historical houses of Baghdad.

"If the house could talk, it would give us fascinating items of news," but it did not speak. The guide spoke instead:

"This house was built by a Jewish inhabitant of Toledo. He was an affluent merchant of the city. He had the house built for his own residence on an eastern style. Similarly, he had a synagogue erected in imitation of Muslim mosques in so far as the plan, style, decoration and windows were concerned." I noticed some Hebrew inscriptions on the front wall of the Eastern Wing.

Both the House and the Synagogue were deserted by the Spaniards, the secret lying in the fact that the people wanted the Jews either to get integrated with the rest of the community or depart. They chose the latter. Seville and Cordoba followed suit in this matter. There remains nothing of the Jews in this country save their Oriental houses and synagogues that are characterized by a spirit of isolation like their owners. They are preserved by the Spaniards for their historicity and because of the narrow lanes which cut off the scorching hot sun of Spain.

"This house," added the guide, "was bought by the well-famed painter El Greco, whose name suggests that he was of Greek extraction. He left for Venice where he worked for a long time with Michael Angelo. On feeling that his efforts were not being appreciated as they should be, he emigrated to Spain where he was welcomed with open arms. Consequently he settled down in Toledo and married one of its beauties.

"This house is now a Museum holding all El Greco's relics and paintings which he made in Spain. They represent a transitional phase in his life that has its own salient features; for on leaving Italy, he was so disgusted and rebellious that he abandoned all that he had learnt over there. He reverted to the Greek art that is characterized by spiritualism and mysticism, whereas the art of his master, Michael Angelo, is characterized by realism which found its expression in artistically strong bodies and prominent muscles full of vitality and youth. The strange aspect of this artist is the fact that he continued to paint and paint solely from memory that was based on a genius ever so fertile."

In another room we visited, there were pictures he painted after losing his sight. We were amazed at his creative power, notwithstanding that the paintings had glaring colours, expressive of his deep grief and his anxiety for a powerful sight.

Before leaving El Greco's house, we saw on the wall of the passage a large copy of a painting which we had already seen at St. Thomas Church. Both are good paintings depicting "The Death of Count Orkzar".

On both sides of the passage there were long benches of bricks in the Baghdadi fashion.

Next we went to a large church built in the shape of a cross. In each of its four sides there was a long passage which met with the rest in a large hall in the centre. It took 260 years to build. On passing through the first passage, we saw paintings by El Greco, most of which were characterized by spirituality and holiness. The second passage contained paintings by Goya, the painter who devoted all his artistic energies to depicting the hopes and fears of his nation that loved and glorified him. A special large painting claimed my attention. It represented Jesus Christ with all the poor people around him seeking his benison. You can read their cares and worries on their perplexed looks. You can almost feel the heat of the sun which had sent its golden rays from a high corner of the picture to touch the feet of Jesus Christ.

We then made our way to the Reception Hall whose large wooden doors were so designed and decorated in the Muslim stye and surrounded with a frame finely etched, that the whole thing resembled a Persian carpet.

The Treasure Room was the next one we were taken to. It is actually a small room with a well-locked iron door. It derives its name from the fact that it holds thousands of grams of gold, silver and precious stones. Most of the treasure was brought from America by Christopher Columbus, whose name is mentioned here with pride and reverence. Among other things, I noticed the sword with which the Spanish king reconquered Toledo. It was laid in a large glass case surrounded with the precious stones and
ornaments of gold and silver to remind one of the golden Arab rule whose scintillating lustre has vanished for ever. The whole atmosphere recalled Abd al-Baqi’ al-Randi’s \(5\) ode. It echoed and re-echoed in my ears verse after verse:

Once things are complete and perfect, they tend to diminish.

So no one should be deceived with happy luxurious life. Thus are the affairs of man, just as thou hast witnessed: Whoever is happy for a while must needs be unhappy. For a long while afterwards. This world of ours keeps no one for ever. And no state of affairs remains the same. The Andalusian Peninsula is afflicted with a calamity. For which no consolation can be sought. The two formidable Arabian mountains: Uhud and Thahlan.

Have gone to pieces out of sorrow!

On the whole, the Spanish people admit that their history knew no other rulers that loved freedom and justice as the Arabs: for they granted the conquered nations their freedom of thought and religion. They converted the extensive lands and properties of the nobility and clergy into smaller ones to help a large section of the community. They relieved the middle class of their heavy burden of taxation, only levying poll-tax on non-Muslims and land-tax on Muslims. They upheld the idea of the liberation of slaves and the amelioration of their condition, making them independent peasants working under the guidance of the Muslims. There was no racial discrimination. No distinction between Arabs and Spaniards, men or women. I still remember the gist of Trend’s saying in T.W. Arnold’s The Legacy of Islam. He maintains that women enjoyed greater freedom, appreciation and respect under the Arab Umayyads than under the Abbasids in Baghdad.

Through the wisdom and just rule of the Arabs, special significance was given to civilized life in Toledo that entered the arena of history in 711 C.E., the year of its acquisition by the Muslims, becoming almost nothing after their withdrawal. The Spanish kings who made it their capital afterwards offered little either to humanity or civilization. Perhaps El Greco, through his artistic talent, offered much more than they did; for he bestowed on Toledo an artistic atmosphere that was full of life and humanitarian sentiments.

The fall of Toledo has an interesting episode which I ought to relate here in brief:

It is said that Alphonso VI (al-Adhfonsh, in Arabic), after he had run away from his brother Sancho, took refuge with al-Mam’un Ibn Dhi al-Nun, the King of Toledo. He was welcomed by him. They both became great friends. So they used to go together hunting. And, one day, as they were in one of the suburban gardens of Toledo, Alphonso had a siesta in the shade of a large tree, whilst al-Mam’un sat aside chatting with his courtiers. Among other things, they discussed the question of Toledo’s natural formidable- ness and protection, and how it stood above the slope of a deep ravine. Almost all the experts present agreed that it could not be taken easily. Just one of them disagreed asserting that, though it could not be taken by the sword, it could be reduced to submission through starvation and that the enemy could simply overrun its outskirts and cut the lines of communication and provisions, forcing its inhabitants to surrender.

Alphonso was half-awake when this statement was made. He kept it in mind. On being raised to the throne of Castile, he put it into practice. He laid siege to Toledo for several years, devastating its outskirts and cutting all lines of provisioning until the Toledans were starved and had to open their gates to the conqueror.

Toledo fallen, the Spaniards were sitting heavily on the throat of all the Muslims in Andalusia; for Toledo was the heart of Spain.

How right was Ibn al-‘Assal when he wept at the fall of Toledo and warned the Andalusian Muslims thus: “Urge forth your riding beasts, O Andalusians! For further stay herein is a blunder. An old cloth is worn out from the edges But the garment of the Peninsula is torn from the centre.”

Hence, its fall heralded many great events that were expected by sages and wise men. One of those was prompted to say:

How could lips enjoy a smile, after thy loss.

Seeing that Muslim ports are frowning with gloom. The infidels have ransacked the sacred land of Toledo. Aye, this is shocking news!

For it was well-protected, charming, difficult to reach, Hard to attain. Its inhabitants were all driven out Cruelly to their dark destination. It had faith and knowledge, Even their flickering remnants are still shining. Its mosques have been converted into churches. What Muslim heart could approve of this without going mad?

If we say that that is a Divine punishment Are we, the rest of us, out of the chastising hand of the Almighty? We who have over-indulged in blasphemy and evil deeds?

It is enough grief for us to think of the comment of the people.

When they say: “Where shall we turn or wherefore to go?

Shall we abandon our homes and flee our land, Whilist we have no land across the sea?”

Life has become unbearable, nay, there is no life, Give up your wonder and perplexity; for there is no saviour.

The great hordes are of no avail, if there be no becoming patience. Is there no man with a sound judgement, and with whom we can take Refuge from what we fear?

The significance of Toledo dwindled the moment the Arabs withdrew from it, leaving it just a city of glowing memories.

Today, it is only an ancient town. The Arabian monuments there are still in eternal struggle with time. They stand sulky brooding over the glorious past, giving in the meantime the whole city a touristic stamp that brings millions of pesetas, each year, from millions of tourists, coming from all over the world, attracted by faded glory and prompted by curiosity, to see what legacy the Arabs have left in the way of civilization and architecture.

“Such are our monuments that point to our deeds. So look at them after we have departed and gone.”

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5 The poet is Abd al-Baqi’ Sadih Ibn Sharif al-Randi, the last of the Andalusian poets. He flourished towards the end of the Arab rule in Granada.

6 Al-Maqari asserts in Najat al-Thab that the first Andalusian city the Spanish reconquered was Toledo, which they wrested from Ibn Dhi al-Nun.
A study of the status of the Married Woman in Roman Law, English Common Law, Church Law and Islamic Law

By Zaka'ur Rahman Khan Lodi

Two types of contrasting yet contemporaneous marriage relations in early Roman law

In the history of early Roman Law, two types of contrasting yet contemporaneous marriage relations are clearly discernible. In religious marriages called manus marriages, the manus or hand power of the patria potestas upon the woman was transferred to the husband, and the legal effect was that the personality and property of the wife drowned in that of her husband. On the other hand, in temporal marriages, the marriage was free from any superimposed ceremony. It was a civil contract, pure and simple, based on the consent of the parties, and there was absolute equality of the conjugal partners. The wife in such a marriage was absolutely free from the control of her husband, and remained unfettered as if she was never married. The civil marriages in Rome became more popular, though divorces were frequent.

Similar to early Rome, it is interesting to note in the legal history of England, the co-existence of civil marriages, and common law marriages. The English Common Law marriage bears strong resemblance to the Rome spiritual or manus marriage, due to what is termed the doctrine of unity of legal personality, by which the marriage contract had the effect of merging the legal entity and antenuptial property of the wife in her husband.

The English Common Law on marriage

The English Common Law doctrine of unity of the legal personality of spouses is ancient and has been reiterated by old commentators of high authority. Bracton enunciated: *vir et uxor sunt quasi una persona* (*De Legibus*). Coke declares: “The husband and wife are one person in the law” (*Institutes I*, 112a). In the words of Blackstone the doctrine is stated:

By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated or consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing; and is therefore called in our law French a *feme covert* . . . and her condition during the marriage is called her coverture.” (*Commentaries* (1765), Vol. 1, p. 442.)

Though doubts have been cast, there is authority for the view that the origin of the above Common Law doctrine is Testamentary (see: Glanville Williams, 10 *Modern Law Review*, page 16). The Old Testament ordains:

“. . . and they shall be one flesh” (Genesis, 2:24).

The New Testament says:

“And they twain shall become one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh.”

“What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder” (St. Mark, 10:8,9; *also* St. Matthew, 19:6).

**In Islam the legal capacity of the woman is kept intact**

In Islam, the legal capacity is the essential concomitant of dignity of a human being. In a Muslim marriage there is mutuality in consortium, and the wife has rights against the husband, similar to husband’s rights against her. In the Qur’an, 2:228, it is laid down:

*Women have rights (against men) similar to those (of men against them) according to well known rules of equity.*

According to Lush, the Common Law inequality of marital partners flows from the legal fiction that

“The wife is under the coverture and protection of the husband, but the husband is not under the coverture or protection of the wife” (Lush: *Husband and Wife*, 3rd Edn., p. 13).

There is no place for such a concept in Islamic Law, because the Qur’an, 2:107, ordains

*They (your wives) are (your) garments and you are their garments.*

In the above context, it is now proposed to examine some aspects of the status of a Muslim wife.
According to Blackstone

“Upon this principle, of an (sic) union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties and disabilities that either of them acquire by the marriage” (Commentaries, 1,442).

LEGAL CAPACITY IN EARLY ROMAN LAW (MANUS MARRIAGE) AND THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW

As referred to above in early Roman Law ( manus mariages) and the English Common Law as well as in Roman-Dutch law, the marriage tie caused a capituts diminutio of the wife. She discontinued to be a persona standi in judicio in her own right, and could not sue or be sued without her husband being implicated in the judicial proceedings. In contracts, the wife had no independent right to contract as a principal. She was, therefore, deemed to contract as the agent of her husband. The principal interested in the contract was the husband who, therefore, ought to sue or be sued. With respect to delicts (civil wrongs) committed against the wife, the husband was again primarily interested, because by Common Law he was the owner of her choses in action. As regards delicts committed by the wife prior to or during the coverture, the husband was the necessary co-defendant, because he was ultimately to bear the pecuniary burden of the decree.

As to the spouses inter se, all antenuptial contracts between them were discharged on marriage. Spouses could not contract with each other, because no one can contract with himself. According to Coke

“A feme covert cannot take anything of the gift of her husband” (Co.Litt., 3a).

The other inescapable absurdity of the English Common Law doctrine of unity of husband and wife was that either spouse suffered the civil disability to sue the other for wrongs committed during the wedlock. Civil wrongs to person, property and reputation were irredeemable inter se. As no cause of action was deemed to arise during the subsistence of coverture, none survived after separation.

Islamic Law is rational. The marriage contract does not affect the wife’s legal capacity in any manner as aforesaid, except that she has no legal capacity to contract a second marriage while possessed of the status of a wife of the first husband.

Lush in his treatise observes

“The rule of unity . . . still prevails as a rule in those matters wherein it was established at Common Law and has not been abrogated by statute. The rule at the present day lifts its head hydra-like and is on occasions applied with surprising results” ( Husband and Wife, 4th Edn., first chapter).

J. Blackburn commenting on Phillips v. Barnet (1876) 1 QBD 436(439), maintains as follows:

“The reason, therefore, why the wife cannot sue the husband for beating her must be because they are one and the same person, and the same reason exists in criminal law, where a woman cannot be convicted of larceny, though she has in fact carried away her husband’s goods . . . Then, does the dissolution of marriage by divorce make that a cause of action which was not so before? I do not see why it should.”

As the crime of conspiracy requires at least two criminals, therefore, the spouses inter se could not conspire in the eye of law. As an illustration may be cited, the case entitled Rex v. McKeechie (1925): Gazette L.R. 484 (New Zealand), where the conviction of a husband and wife for the offence of conspiracy to induce the prosecutrix to commit carnal conversation with the accused husband was quashed on the Common Law rule of unity of the person of the spouses. The reflection of the doctrine has been found in America (see: Dawson v. U.S., 10 Fed(2d) 106(CCA 9th, 1926); Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 Pa County Ct. 65(1901)). One spouse could not in Common Law steal the matrimonial property due to unity of possession. Surely such a law was beneficial to the receiver of stolen property. In Queen v. Kenny (1877-2, QBD 307), it was held that a wife’s paramour who had received goods stolen by her could not be convicted. In contract, a Muslim wife can be held guilty of stealing her husband property (see: R. v. Khato Bai (1869)6 Bom. H.C.R. 9; Nichhhabai Fraggii v. Issue Khan Hai Abdulla Khan: 1866-2 Bom.H.C.R. 297). In Malaysia a Muslim woman was convicted of criminal breach of trust in respect of property belonging to her husband (Re Ketuno Bibi 1956, Malaysian Law Journal 166); and a Muslim husband was convicted of attempting to cheat his wife with respect to the latter’s property (Nuruddin v. Siti Aminah—1929, S.S.L.R. 146).

The absurdities of the English Common Law doctrine are further illustrated by Wennhak v. Morgan (1888-20 QBD 635), wherein it was held that the uttering of defamation by a husband to his wife is no publication, because publication in civil law requires communication to at least one other person. Legal incapacity of the spouses at Common Law to be competent witnesses for or against each other in civil or criminal proceedings was “principally because of the union of person” as stated by Blackstone in his Commentaries. J. Lush similarly pointed out thus in (1876) 1 QBD 436(440):

“And it is laid down that if a husband is together with others charged with a crime, the wife cannot give evidence even against the others.”

In Islamic Law, the judicia dei of Li‘ân (the Qur‘an 24:6-9), where the spouses are competent witnesses against each other in a charge of adultery is a pointer to their being competent witnesses in civil or criminal proceedings.

PROPERTY RELATIONS IN THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW AND THE ISLAMIC LAW

The Common Law marriage had the effect of conferring absolute ownership on the husband of his wife’s movable property and earnings. The life interest of her immovable property vested in the husband and she could not alienate it without his concurrence. Even a betrothed woman’s alienation of property without her fiancé’s consent was held to be voidable by the doctrine of fraud on marital rights of the husband. In effect, on marriage, the wife’s property was a compulsory gift to husband and is analogous to the Roman dos. This concept had other incidental legal effects to be presently discussed. Holdsworth writes

“Marriage is a gift of the wife’s chattels to her husband. It is only fair, therefore, that the husband who takes the benefit should bear the liability. Hence the husband could be made liable in a joint action for his wife’s antenuptial debts and torts. But the debt or tort is his wife’s; and the liability, therefore, only attaches

OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1970

27
to him *qua* husband. Therefore, if she dies, he ceases to be liable; and if he dies, this liability does not attach to his creditors" (A History of English Law (1966), Vol. III, p. 531).

In the same vein, Blackstone has said

“If the wife be indebted before marriage, the husband is bound afterwards to pay the debt; for he has adopted her and her circumstances together” (Comm. I, p. 443).

Therefore, due to the doctrine of unity of personality, both the spouses became poorer inasmuch as the wife lost her separate estate by her compulsory gift analogous to *dos* to the husband, and the husband became liable for all her antenuptial and postnuptial liabilities—both contractual and violations of law.

**Islamic marriage law does not affect wife’s property**

Islamic Law is beneficial to the wife, because she has a right of access to husband’s property during wedlock, but there is no corresponding right of the husband to wife’s property. Further, the essential consequence of marriage contract is the compulsory gift of *dower* proceeding from the husband to the wife. This is in contradistinction of what is obtained in a *manus* marriage and a marriage under the English Common Law. The Qur’an lays stress on the gift of dower to the wife in these terms:

*Excepting these (women already married) all others are lawful provided you seek (them in marriage) with gifts from your property desiring chastity not lust (4:24). (Lawful unto you in marriage) are (not only) chaste women who are believers, but chaste women among The People of the Book revealed before your time, when you give them their due dowers, and desire chastity, not debauchery open or clandestine (4:5).*

Therefore, if a Muslim marriage is contracted on the express condition that there will be no dower, then still by operation of law the wife will be entitled to a reasonable and customary dower. The purpose of Islamic Law is that the wife should enter the matrimonial home with her distinct estate.

**Prima facie** (but subject to any matrimonial contract), the property régime between the Muslim spouses is separation of property and the marriage bond does not affect the property relations between the spouses, each of them retaining his or her property and all rights, liabilities incident thereto, without dependence on the other. The separate régime of property can be culled from the following pronouncements of the Qur’an:

*To orphans restore their property (when they reach their age, nor substitute (your) worthless things for (their) good ones; and devour not their substance (by mixing it up) with your own. For this is indeed a great sin (4:2).*  
*If you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans (girls) (by taking them in marriage), you may (from others) marry . . . (4:3).*

It may here be apposite to mention that in the Swiss Civil Code (1907), it is provided that unless otherwise agreed upon in a marriage contract, the property relations between the spouses are to be governed by a system of combination of property. The Turkish Civil Code (1926) adopted almost the whole of the Swiss Civil Code, but one of the notable departures was in property relations between the spouses. A property régime of separation of estates was provided, each spouse having the right of administration and usufruct of his or her property, though by marriage contract another régime could be mutually agreed upon. In Pakistan, there is no provision regarding property régime in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961), but in The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act (1939) of Indo-Pakistan, a separate property régime is recognized inasmuch as one of the statutory grounds available to the wife for the dissolution of her marriage is

“That the husband treats her with cruelty, that is to say, (d) disposes of her property or prevents her exercising her legal rights over it . . . (Vide, S.2 (viii) (d)).

**MAINTENANCE**

The English Common Law duty of husband to maintain reasonably the wife was founded on wife’s financial position, because the marriage tie automatically transferred to him the ownership of wife’s antenuptial movable property, earnings, and the administration and usufruct of her immovable property. In sharp contrast, the Islamic Law recognises the wife’s right of maintenance without regard to her own financial position. The Qur’an prescribes thus

*Let the man of means spend (on her) according to his (ostensible and potential) means, and the man whose resources are restricted let him spend according to what God has given him (65:7).*  
*Because they (men) spend out of their property (for women) (4:34).*  
*The mothers shall suckle their offspring for two whole years if the father decides to complete the term. But he shall bear the cost of their food and clothing on equitable terms (2:232).*

At the English Common Law, the wife was deprived of her contractual capacity and, therefore, that law recognized deserted wife’s right to pledge her husband’s credit to procure necessities of life, as an agent of necessity. The husband being the principal could almost frustrate this right by showing that at the material time she was residing in the matrimonial home, or that he did not so authorise her, or maybe by a prior notice to those with whom she may transact. In the Islamic Law the wife’s right is secured on a firm footing, because her right to pledge the husband’s credit is founded on the basic law and is not precarious hinged on any concept of fictitious agency. Here it may be pointed out that according to early Hanafi jurists, the maintenance of wife was in the nature of *gratuity*, and was not recoverable except when there was a specific agreement between the spouses or determined by decree of the *Qādi*. In opposition to this view, *Ṣafī* jurists considered maintenance as a *debt* on husband and his estate, and past arrears are recoverable as a legal right even in the absence of a specific agreement or Court’s decree. The latter view was preferred by the Lahore High Court in Sardar Muhammad v. Nasima Bibi (Pakistan Legal Decision, 1966, Lahore, p. 703). After a review of the authorities on Islamic Law, the learned Division Bench held that

“The maintenance of a wife is the bounden duty of a husband, irrespective of his minority, illness or imprisonment or the richness of the wife, so much so that the obligation devolves on the father of a minor husband with a right of recovery against him when he is in a position to repay the amount . . .” (Emphasis added).
The above view is fortified in the judgement by making a reference to Caliph 'Umar, who had then written to his army officers in distant countries, that the Muslim soldiers who were away from their wives should be ordered either to pay maintenance to their wives or divorce them, and in the latter course, they should also remit arrears of past maintenance. This order could not be interpreted to mean that in the other alternative of not divorcing their wives the past maintenance was forfeited.

At the English Common Law the dissolution, or annulment of marriage extinguished the husband's obligation for maintenance. In Islamic Law, the legal right of wife to maintenance continues during the period of waiting ('iddah) consequent upon divorce (virgin divorce excepted) or death of the husband. The Qur'anic Ordinances lay down

For divorced women maintenance (should be provided) on a reasonable (scale). That is a duty on the righteous (2:241).

Those of you who approach death and leave widows should bequeath for their widows a year's maintenance and residence . . . (2:240).

DISTINCTION BETWEEN MARRIAGE CONTRACT AND STATUS

In England, to alleviate the hardship caused by the Roman Catholic doctrine of indissolubility of marriage, the ecclesiastical courts granted judicial separation of spouses on limited grounds of adultery, cruelty, etc. This was termed divorce a mensa et thoro. Its effect was merely to relieve the complaining spouse to reside with the other, and left the marriage contract or status unaffected. The judicially separated spouses, therefore, could not enter into fresh marriage with another. Subsequently, divorce a vinculo matrimonii (which dissolved the marriage contract and status) could only be granted by a private Act of Parliament in particular cases. The divorce a vinculo matrimonii through Courts was first introduced in England by Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857. Divorce simpliciter divorce a mensa et thoro) still continues by the aforesaid Act under the changed terminology of judicial separation. If the spouses proprio motu resume cohabitation, the Court discharges the decree nisi of judicial separation. If, however, the reinstatement fails, the spouse who obtained decree nisi for judicial separation may further apply to the Court for the grant of a decree absolute, which when passed forthwith dissolves the marriage contract and status of the spouses. This procedure has resemblance with the talâq al-Sunnâh in Islam, which allows a three months' period of deliberation for the spouses before the divorce irrevocable.

In Islamic family law a distinction can be made out between contract ('aqîd), status (hayâhiyyah) and legal capacity (ahlîyyah). A marriage contract, though it depends on the volition of the parties, confers status of being married, by operation of law. Status is the condition of a person of belonging to a particular class of persons whom personal law assigns certain peculiar capacities or incapacities or both. Status is to be distinguished from legal capacity, the latter being the ability to exercise rights and to discharge obligations appurtenant to that status. The legal capacity of a Sunni woman marry a Shi'ah husband, or of a Shi'ah woman marrying a Sunni husband continues to be governed by the law to which she was subject at the time of her marriage. She does not become subject to the school of law of her husband, because there is no unity of legal personality of Muslim spouses. Although legal capacity follows status,
The Persian poet Nizami (d. 1909 C.E.)

The writings of Nizami are of importance for an understanding of the development of Islamic Culture

A description of his *Khamsah*

By Husein Refe

In the mid-eleventh century, the power of the Seljuk rulers of Persia, who had invaded the country as Turkmen nomads only a century before and created a mighty empire, was waning in the face of threats from other aggressors. Most dangerous were the Qara Khitai, a branch of the Western Liao of Northern China, but originally a Mongol people. They invaded Transoxiana and inflicted on the Seljuk army the most severe set-back the Muslims had ever received in Central Asia. As these Tartars advanced, they drove before them the Ghuzz tribesmen who occupied the pastures of Transoxiana; these invaded from across the Oxus into Khurasan, as the Seljuks had done in the time of Toghril Beg. Now they asked his great-grandson Sanjar for permission to settle in the region of Balkh. Like the early Seljuks, these nomads had little understanding of the nature of a sedentary society, and they wrought great havoc on all sides, even briefly capturing the Sultan.

Meanwhile, a new dynasty had arisen in Khiva to the North. These were the Khwarazmshahs, Turkish vassals of the Seljuks who revolted and enlarged a kingdom at their expense. In the early 13th century, the ruler 'Ala'uddin Muhammad was to provoke the onslaught of Genghis Khan and his Mongol hordes which wrought unparalleled destruction in Persia, as they did everywhere they went. The ease with which they occupied the region was largely due to the shortsighted policies of this Khwarazmshah. The Assassins and Crusaders were adding to the confusion in the region.

It was during this troubled period that the poet Nizámí was born, though he was living far from these disturbances, in the South Caucasian town of Ganjeh, later named Elizabetpol and then Kirovabad, today in Soviet Azerbaijan. In those days, it was a part of Persia, though the waves of Turkish nomads that came through it led to colonization and eventual predominance of the Turkish language. Even in Tabriz, today the chief city in North-West Persia, Azerbaijan Turkish remains the chief language spoken. Soviet authorities were eventually to claim that Nizámí was himself a Turk. This seems unjustified, although he married a Turkish wife, and probably spoke fluent Turkish. Available evidence indicates his having been of Iráqi origin. His mother was a Kurd. Not much is known of Nizámí's life, and much of the information has been extracted from the autobiographical hints in his poems. He may be said to have lived between about 1135 and 1209 C.E., although these dates are rather speculative, and no two authorities seem to favour the same ones. At the time of his birth, Seljuk authority was not very effective in this border province where feudal conditions prevailed. A school of poetry developed here with intense vitality and certain local individualistic traits. Nizámí was destined to become the greatest of its representatives.

We know that he was orphaned when young, that he only once left Ganjeh, despite his wide culture, and that this was travel but a short distance at the command of a Seljuk prince. A tombstone said to indicate his death in 1209 appears of dubious authenticity, though it has been made into a place of pilgrimage. Nizámí had three wives, none of whom lived very long after the marriage. He was most fond of the Turkish slave-girl Afáq, whom he married in 1173 C.E., having received her as a gift from the ruler of Darband. His tender feelings for her were commemorated in the love epic, *Khusrav and Shirín*.1 By Afáq he had a son named Muhammad.

Nizámí was early attracted to mysticism, which appealed to many minds in those unsettled times. Under changing social conditions, Persian poetry had discarded the heroic style of Firdausí for more romantic themes. This is already evident in the works of the Ghaznavid poet 'Unsuri, though it was Saná'í who first treated of mystical subjects in his epics in the years immediately before the birth of Nizámí. Saná'í's main work, the *Garden of Truth*, profoundly impressed Nizámí and directly inspired his own first great epic. While Nizámí's thought is deeply penetrated with spiritual wisdom, he is nevertheless renowned as an exponent of romantic epics, a development typical of the Seljuk era. Many critics regard him as the greatest poet of Persia after Firdausí, com-

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1 In it he tells us how she was swept away in the flower of her youth like a rose in the wind.
poser of the Book of Kings. We see, however, an interesting evolution from Firdausi; for Nizâmi's work has a more lyrical quality and emphasizes the individual rather than the heroic ideal. Islamic influences in this frontier region took deeper root as society became increasingly urbanized. This is apparent in the great number of Arabic words and expressions that found their way into the Persian language; in Firdausi's poetry a century earlier, they had been the exception rather than the rule.

The importance of Nizâmi's writings in the study of the development of Islamic culture

The new religion brought with it a teaching of human equality that gave at least theoretical dignity to the life of the individual. Literature had formerly been the prerogative of court circles. That it was still inaccessible to the common man is evident from the intellectual obscurities in which Nizâmi loves to clothe his thoughts; nevertheless, he was introducing contemporary, rather than classical, words, often little removed from the colloquial of his environment. He would also remind rulers of their duties to the people under their care; the true poet with a message was no longer the fawning sycophant who was ever ready to prostitute his art to immortalize any tyrant willing to grant him a generous stipend. For many centuries, panegyrics were still to provide talented poets with handsome sustenance, but Nizâmi was not one of these. When he dedicated his poems to a ruler, it was as a courtesy rather than a means of self-enrichment, and each of his major epics was in honour of a different regional prince or in answer to a request. Intensely individualistic, striking out along new paths rather than slavishly copying his predecessors, though born in a nation of plagiarists, Nizâmi was to influence and inspire later poets for centuries; among his own imitators were many first-rate masters of the art. Miniaturists would also take themes from his epics as subjects for their art, decorating manuscripts with fine illuminations. Not only the Persians, but also the Turks imitated him from Istanbul to Herat, wherever Persian and Turkish were spoken or studied. Thus the writings of Nizâmi are of importance for an understanding of the subsequent development of Islamic culture.

In an age when every writer sung the joys of the wine, Nizâmi was distinguished by sobriety. An advocate of monogamy in a society that accorded full recognition to polygamy, he was characterized by great tolerance of those beliefs differed from his own. His breadth of vision accepted the unity of humanity beyond the superficial adherence to mutually antagonistic causes. Nizâmi's poetry reflects the qualities of an enlightened soul with a corresponding intuitive grasp of cosmic principles. Consequently he was chiefly preoccupied with eternal values and made use of romance as a platform for the dissemination of spiritual truths.

Mystical teachings have never been broadcast publicly to the profane, and this fact may have some connection with the large number of technical and philosophical allusions that make his works often incomprehensible without a key. Excessive display of ornament was, however, a typical Persian weakness in an age that encouraged artificiality in poetry. Nizâmi's fame rests chiefly on his five main epics, which we shall consider separately in historical order. The collection is known as a Khamsah, or quintet, each being composed in a different metre. It consists of about 27,000 couplets. This original arrangement was adopted by many later poets and became a test of their skill in the art. The greatest of Nizâmi's followers in the field was the Perso-Indian poet Amir Khusraw, and in fact, the fashion was particularly favoured in India.

The Makhzan al-Asrâr

Nizâmi's first epic was the Makhzan al-Asrâr, or Treasury of Secrets. As a tribute to his eminence, many later poets prefaced their own epics by the first line of this composition. It must have been written at some time between 1175 and 1185 C.E., the critics being notoriously at odds on such points. There are 20 discourses, totalling between 1,200 and 2,200 couplets, and the poem is a compendium of religious maxims with a mystical colouring. This is the only one of the five epics that is not narrative in style, and Nazâmi acknowledges in it his debt to Sanâ'i's Garden of Truth, written about 45 years earlier. Such didactic poems in rhyming couplets, made up of an alternation of mystical teachings and illustrative anecdotes, are known as masnavâis. Sanâ'i and Nizâmi were the pioneers of this form which reached its culmination in the following century in the Masnavi of Jalâl-ud-Dîn Rûmî, a work so highly esteemed that it is often referred to as "the Qur'ân of the Persians". Rûmî himself acknowledges that he was merely a follower along the trail blazed by these two predecessors.

The Makhzan is a faithful mirror of human nature, with its dichotomy of bestial and angelic impulses. "Every line of his Treasury of Mysteries is a living witness to his absolute certainty that piety, devotion, humility and self-forgetfulness are the four corner-stones of total annihilation, which in turn is necessary for unification with God and the foundation of the edifice of eternal life" (G. H. Darâb: Makhzanol Asrâr of Nizâmi). That this was not a popular work may readily be understood from its profusion of abstruse metaphors and involved allusions. Nevertheless, it was the favourite epic of the manuscript illustrators. It is written in the endecasyllabic sarî metre, which together with the ramal, is the conventional rhythm for the treatment of philosophical themes (ū u -/ u - u -/ u -). The poem was dedicated to Sultan Bahârâmshah of Arzanjan, who rewarded the composer with 5,000 dinârs and five mules. He is possibly the same ruler of Darband that presented him with his favourite wife.

This slave-girl, Afâq, who must have died soon afterwards, probably inspired the next epic, the love story of Khusrâw and Shîrîn, an immortal theme to be later treated by countless Persian poets, the most important of whom is Nâmî. This poet (who flourished at the 15th century Timurid court of Herat) is often called the last representative of Persia's classical age.

Nizâmi's second epic was apparently issued in three separate versions, each in honour of a different prince. It was composed during the five years following the Makhzan. The poem is indebted to another love story, that of Vis and Raman, lovers whose hardships stemmed from the bride's ritual impurity on her wedding-night, a grave taboo in both Zoroastrian and Islamic tradition. Shîrîn's hardships were of a different nature, and in the elegy on the death of this Armenian heroine, Nizâmi makes it clear that he has used this old Caucasian theme, known to both Firdausi and Tabârî, as a prop for the poignant reality of his own bereavement. Shîrîn, the heroine, becomes for this very reason the most realistic prototype of a woman in the whole of Persian poetry, and an ideal of romantic chastity unique in the literature of Islam.

The poem describes the sufferings of a princess both before and after marriage. Despite the mutual love of Khusrâw and Shîrîn, destiny always impeded their union, especially as she was adamant on having all or nothing. A rival for her affections was the engineer Farhâd, to whom
she assigned the Herculean task of cutting a tunnel through Mt. Bihistún, as proof of his devotion. While he was engaged on this task, Khusraw sent him a false message that Shirín had died, and in his crazed grief Farhād plunged headlong into an abyss. Although the lovers married after further hardships, Khusraw was subsequently murdered and Shirín stabbed herself to death beside his corpse.

For this poem, Ābū Ja‘far of Azerbaijan, one of the rulers to whom it was dedicated, presented Nizāmī with the small village of Hamdunjān. The work consists of some 6,500 couplets and is written in the metre called Ḥazaj-i Musaddas-i Maqṣār-i Mahzūl (u − − /u − − /u − − /u − −).

Laylā and Majnūn

Nizāmī’s next poem was an even more popular love-story of the Islamic world, Laylā and Majnūn, of Arabic origin. I quote from my article “The Romance Story of Laylā and Majnūn” (The Islamic Review for January 1970), to which the reader interested in the course of the theme through the various literatures of the Muslim world is referred.

“Undoubtedly, legends of the tragic couple must have circulated widely and persistently; for five centuries later we find an Azerbaijani (or Azeri) provincial ruler on the shores of the Caspian Sea at Baku, and on the frontier of the Christian world, commanding a noted poet to compose an epic about the lovers... This local ruler was Abū Muzaffar Akhtsīn, the Shirvanshār, or ruler of Shirvan province. The poet whom he commissioned to produce the work is known to history by his takhallus, or pseudonym, of Nizāmī... Originally, Nizāmī was rather unwilling to undertake the task, feeling that the story was far too sketchy to provide material for an epic of substance. It is all the more remarkable that he was able to make of such limited material a poem destined to find so many imitations.

Poetry was truly the passion of Nizāmī’s life, and he composed this work quickly, at the rate of over a thousand couplets a month, there being about 4,600 in all. Somewhat petulantly, he relates in the poem:

These more than 4,000 verses were recited in four months; had other work been eschewed, 14 nights would have sufficed.”

When he wrote it, he was 47 years old. Since it is originally an Arab tale, Nizāmī gives it a conventional desert setting among the simple Bedouin; not surprisingly, the protagonists are utterly Persian in spirit. The metre Nizāmī chose for the poem was the Ḥazaj-i musaddas (− u/ u − u − u − u /). In his treatment of this Islamic prototype of hopeless romantic love, he discourses widely in his preamble on such subjects as the poetical ascension. The basic account of the lovers is as follows:

“Qays is born to the chief of the Banū ‘Amir, after he has prayed for a son. During his early school-days, the boy meets Laylā, a girl of the same tribe. They fall in love at first sight and their constant striving to be together leads to gossip. Laylā is taken away, whereupon Qays loses his reason and receives the name of Majnūn (‘the possessed’). His father then asks for the girl’s hand in marriage on his behalf, but is rejected on account of his son’s mental derangement. Then he advises Majnūn to make a pilgrimage to the Ka‘bah to beg for Divine assistance to help him forget his passion; the boy makes the journey, but asks God rather to strengthen his love. He wanders around reciting poetry, some of which is conveyed to his beloved. Laylā reciprocates by composing her own poems and throwing them out into the street, whence they are brought to Majnūn. Meanwhile, a rich suitor presents himself, and the parents gladly betroth her procrastinating, however, on the grounds that she is ill. When her lover learns that she is to be wed, his paroxysms of despair lead him to abandon human habitations and run naked with the wild beasts in the wilderness.

“Laylā has meanwhile been married off and her husband has died. Unable to bear the situation, not long after she passes away. Majnūn visits her grave, retires for a while to the desert, but cannot remain away long. Back at the grave, he prays for death and promptly collapses and expires. For a year, his death remains unknown owing to the wild beasts roaming around the spot and guarding his remains. The tribe at last find the corpse and bury it next to that of Laylā. The grave becomes a centre of pilgrimage for lovers, whose prayers are magically granted. Both in the grave and in Paradise, the lovers at last attain the union so long denied them.”

The poem was composed around 1190 C.E., and the metre is the shortest in the language. Jāmī was to use the same one when he produced his version much later, since this is traditionally the metre for love poetry. The theme represents a break with social convention and constancy in the face of opposition, with willingness to suffer for an ideal. Nizāmī was the first to versify it in Persian.

The Haft Paykar; The Siyāsät Nāme

 Authorities differ as to which of the remaining epics we are to regard chronologically as next, since the poet appears to have been repolishing one of them while at work on the other. At all events, the Haft Paykar, usually translated “Seven Princesses”, was written about 1197 C.E. at the request of ʿAlāʾuddīn Aqṣūnqur of Marāghah, who did not specify the subject of the epic. It is also sometimes referred to as “The Tale of Bahram Gūr”; or as “The Seven Domes”, since a dome or pavilion was composed for each princess. The story is that the Persian King Bahram, who reigned in pre-Islamic times from 421 to 439 C.E., suddenly came across seven portraits of beautiful women, each from a separate clime. These included Chinese, Hindu and Byzantine princesses, giving Nizāmī an excuse to digress on a war with China. He admits that he consulted the historian Tabārī for some historical details of the king’s life. However, the mythical element predominates, and Bahram finally marries all the women. They are rather colourless beauties, being in reality mere symbols of the seven cosmic principles, with their traditional correspondences, including the planets, colours and days of the week. There is plenty of scope for mystical allegory in what is considered the poet’s greatest work. It is more readable than many of his other compositions, since each girl relates a story, while the involved imagery does not interfere unduly with the unfolding of the narrative. Also Nizāmī was now aged and no longer so concerned to display his knowledge. One of the accounts contains a Dantesque description of wanderings among the demons. Basically the book is an allegory of human life and of the septuple cosmic influences to which mankind is subject. In addition, Nizāmī takes advantage of the opportunity to express more forcefully than elsewhere his ideas on love. The story of the shepherd who hunged his sheep-dog for treacherously consortling with a female wolf re-appears in the Siyāsät Nāme, or the Political Testament, of the great Seljuk vizier Nizām al-Mulk, which must have been composed at about the same time as this work. The incident warned the king to beware of leaving his ministers unsupervised. Other events in Bahram’s life include his youth among the Arabs, and wrestling with lions to prove his worth against a rival candidate for the crown. At the end of the story, the king vanishes without trace into a cave. The poem is written
in the festive khaļif metre (u – u –/u – u –/u u –).

The Iskandar Nāme

Finally, there comes the Iskandar Nāme or the epic of Alexander. This celebrates the hero Alexander of Macedon, who subjected Persia and established the Seleucid dynasty there. In Muslim hagiography, however, he became confused with an unknown prophet referred to in the Qur’ān, and his life history was inextricably intertwined with legend. For this subject, Nizāmī chose the mutaqābir metre (u –/u –/u –/u –), which Firdausī used in the Shāhnāmah. It is typical of the heroic epic, but is also the metre used by Sa’dī for the expression of his wise maxims and anecdotes in the Būstān. This epic is divided into two parts, and Nizāmī appears to have been occupied with it from about 1190 to 1200 C.E. As the metre hints, Nizāmī was perhaps at first making a conscious bid to match himself against the Shāhnāmah. The initial version was dedicated to Izzuddin Mas’ūd of Mosul, who died in 1193 C.E. The second version is in two parts, which portray Alexander respectively as a conquering warrior and a sage; this quality is in no way inconsistent with the Muslim mind, since the Prophet Muhammad distinguished himself in both areas, and Alexander (or Iskander) was thought to have been a prophet too. As a sage, he is a fitting mouthpiece for the subject of good government, with which the epic also deals. The two parts are known as the Sharaif-nāmah and the Iqbal-nāmah, and the final work honoured the Atābeg Nasratuddin Abū Bakr. As Nizāmī died very early in the 13th century, this is the product of his twilight years. He was by then little concerned with the historicity of his materials, and there are anachronisms in the historical portion. One odd legend that has crept into the epic is the story of the ass’s ears of King Mīdas, now attributed to Iskandar, possibly because the Prophet, with whom he is traditionally identified, is called in the Qur’ān the possessor of the two horns. This Greek ruler had long been of special interest to the Persians, since he had been the first foreigner to destroy some of the Zoroastrian sanctuaries. He therefore appears in Islamic literature as both villain and prophet, as may be seen from the Book of Kings. Nizāmī’s Alexander, however, only fights to help others.

This poem has 10,500 couplets and completes the Epics. We may note that Nizāmī also had some fame as a lyric poet, though his writings in this field have almost all been lost. There are 56 surviving ghazals, two qit’ahs or fragments, and nine rubā’is, apart from 30 additional ghazals of questionable authenticity. Available evidence does show Nizāmī to have been a master of the ghazal. If we are to credit the notoriously unreliable biographer of Persian poets Daulatshah, there were formerly about 20,000 lyrical couplets. Apart from these, at least one epic by Nizāmī has also disappeared, as it is known that he composed one on Vis and Raman.

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OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1970
"Verily the religion with God is Islam" (The Qur'an, 3:19)

Democracy:

Greek, Roman and Islamic concepts

Islam's call of "All men are equal in the sight of God", challenged the traditions & customs of Arabia, and defied the Roman & Greek Faiths & Cultures, shaking them to their very foundations.

By Muhammad 'Ali 'Alloubah Pasha

Democracy has been an oft-repeated subject of discussion, and of late even more lively debated. It was discussed after the First World War, at the sessions of the League of Nations; it was discussed during and after the last World War and at the time when the United Nations Organization was established. Today both the powerful and the weak nations sing the song of democracy.

It was in the beginning of this century that people in Eastern countries began to refer to the term Democracy. In origin, however, the word is neither Arabic, Saracen nor Eastern. What does it connote?

Since the word has entered into the standard vocabulary of the Arabic and the Eastern languages, I think it would be proper to study the term as it is understood by the people, its significance and the manner in which it should be understood and put into effect.

EARLY HISTORY

We are told by historians that there lived in Asia Minor certain Greek tribes which, later on, migrated to the peninsula which was subsequently named after them and in which they settled down, each tribe occupying an area separated from each other by mountains and valleys. Contacts between them were, therefore, difficult, except through the sea routes of the Mediterranean. For in those days travelling was not easily possible. Every tribe had thus to be self-contained and independent.

As a result, many cities sprang up in the peninsula, each independent and separate. They were called Polis, i.e. a township or a city—a word which is being used even by us nowadays to signify a new town or a city, such as "Heliopolis" (Helio—the sun; polis—city) which is situated near Cairo.

Since every city in Greece was separate, at a distance from the other, and since the population of the cities was small, hardly exceeding 1,500 persons, intercourse between these various townships was difficult. But man is a social creature and the inhabitants of these cities felt that they should co-operate in the management of their cities and evolve an institution for administration suited the views of the citizens of every city. The administration, therefore, varied in accordance with the power that was; the chief or the ruler governed the city, and the people in turn elected the ruler. Their ideal method of election was that the few adults among the citizens gathered at a fixed place and chose those whom they considered fit to undertake the government of the city. They would choose their judges, executive personnel, security police and all the personnel needed for the administration. These would remain in power for a specified period, one year for instance, after which another meeting was held to choose suitable rulers for the government of the country.

This shows that the Government of that country was based on direct election by all the people, and that the authority rested with the people who were free to choose their own representative at the time of election every year. And this they considered democratic rule.

The word "Democracy" is a compound noun consisting of two words—Demos—people, Kratos—authority. The "people's authority" in those days restricted the power of their rulers.

This kind of rule did not prevent the existence at various places of other institutions. A city may be ruled by one strong man or by a number of powerful men who collaborated with each other in running the government. As a result there emerged different constitutions for various towns. There were also powerful legislators of whom we may mention Lycurgus, who framed in the 9th century B.C., legislations for Spartus, and Solon, the greatest legislator who framed many institutions for Athens in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.

FORMS OF RULE ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE

There were as many constitutions as the number of cities and townships. There were also many problems, enmities and wars. Philosophers made their appearance and came to serve their country and people. Amongst those
philosophers was Socrates who contented himself with criticism and dialogue, but who did not record his philosophy. Then there was his student, Plato (5th and 4th century B.C.), who adopted practical methods for the service of his country and who incorporated his ideas in such books as the Republic and Laws. His ideas aimed on the whole at putting the charge of the government in the hands of philosophers whom he considered more efficient than others in the management of the country's affairs. In the Republic, he explains his well-known theories, including the theory that all children should be taken away from their parents and be brought up on the same lines, and be trained from early childhood, to be children of their country rather than children of their parents.

Then came Aristotle, Plato's student, in the 4th century B.C. He examined the Greek constitutions in the light of knowledge and experience and subjected his studies to logic and practical experience at the same time. He found that there were many constitutions, but that they all related to only six institutions. He considered, therefore, that government institutions could not go beyond any institution other than these patterns. But these institutions were not at all useful; some of them were bad and defective. Three of them only he considered good and the other three defective.

AUTOCRACY

The first good institution he examined was the one based on Autocracy, that is, the rule of a proper type of individual, king or otherwise. He should be guided by his conscience, take the advice of his competent citizens and then organize the state and rule the country after ensuring fairness and justice, and securing the interest of his country. Against this autocratic rule there is the rule of a Tyrant who utterly disregards the wishes of his people, denies their will, and, through his despotic, whimsical and satanic approach, oppresses them, fritters away their resources in his own and his dynasty's interest. This is the bad rule which is in opposition to the government of good individuals.

ARISTOCRACY

The second good form of government is the rule of Aristocracy. This does not mean the rule of the rich and the wealthy people, but it means the rule of the efficient and competent people. They are the nobles and dignitaries who co-operate in the management of the country's affairs and who, through their intellectual merits and wealth, defend the country, rule it in the best manner, strive in its service and undertake expenditure on the army and on all that it required for equipment and ammunition—and while doing all that they seek nothing but the furtherance of their people's interest and prosperity. As opposed to this, there is a bad type of government which Aristotle calls the "Oligarchy," that is, the rule of a minority who ascends to power without having the efficiency and the capability required for the management of a good government. For instance, a group of businessmen, and it may be mentioned here that the Greeks were businessmen in the true sense of the word, or a section of agriculturists or both may find their way to wealth and influence, and seize power with the intention of serving their own ends at the expense of the people.

DEMOCRACY

The third good form which Aristotle prefers to any other form is the democratic rule, wherein authority rests with the people: for it is the people who decide the shape of government and choose their rulers. Just as in the case of the small Greek cities where the adults used to gather and elect their rulers and the form of their Government, so when the people grow in number, they elect instead their representatives to act for them; and these deputies choose the rulers and decide the method of government. As against this good type of government, there is a defective type which is in no way less harmful than the other two defective types mentioned above, if not more harmful, and that is Demagogy or the rule of the mob or the masses, wherein a deceitful upstart may succeed in shaking the people's faith, and through false promises may secure their votes after which he turns out to be a despot, ruling in the name of the people. Such type of men are usually elected by mobs and masses, which are equal in number and which do not understand the duties towards the country and among whom there are a few individuals who, to seek personal advantages and having no regard to fairness and justice, care not to understand these duties.

ARISTOTLE FAVOURS A GOVERNMENT OF THE SELECT FEW

Three defects in Aristotle's concept of Democracy

It appears to me that Aristotle wanted the interest of the country to be entrusted to a government which came into power on the demand of a respectable and genuine public opinion. If, however, public opinion was liable to be duped or ignorance dominated the minds of the people, then their opinion could not be considered respectable and genuine. He says that the result of a referendum or a plebiscite in such case is bound to be a calamity as far as the multitude of people are concerned. He, therefore, thinks that the will of only the free thinking and genuine people should be respected and should be considered as the best influence commanding the best rule. It is this type of government which is known today as democracy.

We may now ask: "Was this Greek democracy, which Aristotle preferred to any other form of institution, free from defect and drawbacks?" The answer is: "No, Greek democracy did have certain defects which should not escape notice."

The first of such defects is the existence of slavery, which even Aristotle and other Greek thinkers supported. For he thinks that people are not equal and should not have equal rights and obligations. In his opinion, the people should be divided into two classes, the free people and the serf or the slaves. These, he thinks, are not fit to participate in the government or for that matter in the election of the rulers, because their position is like that of animals whose only duty is to serve their free masters who own them. They have none of the rights of the citizens, and Aristotle goes one step further when he says that it would be better for the slaves themselves to remain so, occupying the position given to them by God and Nature, so that they may serve their country as animals do.

The second defect is that Aristotle's conception of democracy does not give women any right, their job in life being the service of their males and submission to them. Women, according to Aristotle, must remain shut up in the home performing their domestic duties, rearing their children. Thus their lives are a dull mechanical routine from which they cannot break away. They cannot even have the chance to think of equality with men or take part in the government of their country. The result of this attitude towards women was that they were treated as a mere object of enjoyment.

The third defect is that it permitted aggression, conquest.
and war, taking into consideration as it did only the rights and interests of free Greek citizens. It, therefore, encouraged aggression, conquest and imperialism, which later on led to many wars and to the perpetuation of slavery.

GREEK DEMOCRACY ENSURES FREEDOM ONLY FOR THE FREE

Greek democracy can thus be summarised as an institution which ensures freedom for only the free citizens of Greece; it is a democracy confined to Greece and to the Greek people and not to all humanity as conceived by us today.

With the passing of the years the Greek Empire disintegrated; the Roman Empire rose to power and took the place of the former. Various forms of governments mentioned above followed one another; at certain times there prevailed the Autocratic rule; other times there was the rule of a Tyrant, the Aristocratic rule and the Oligarchy. At certain other periods there was the Democratic rule as well as the Demagogic.

These forms of institutions were practised during the Roman Empire one after the other until disintegration set in when the Empire was invaded from the North and the West; and conquered from the South and the East. It then fell shattered into pieces.

When one studies this stage of disintegration, one cannot fail to realise that as a matter of fact good government is not so much based on institutions as on high ethics and true and unadulterated national sense. For nations rise on the strength of morals rather than on the strength of their institutions.

THE DARK AGES IN THE WEST

After these long intervals the European nations witnessed long periods when oppression prevailed, people's morals deteriorated and various ills became rampant. The people suffered untold calamities and persecution; wherein rulers snatched away whatever they could of other people's possessions, exploited them to secure their own ends and to satisfy their ambitions. There were the feudal states, the kingship and quasi-kingship, the princelhood and the semi-princehood. In this dark age the people were not given any respite and they had to suffer from poverty, ignorance, oppression and systematic annihilation.

Cultures had degraded and the great heritage left by the reformers of earlier generations had vanished until the time when there came certain reformers who sought to save humanity at the risk of their own lives. Of these reformers there were philosophers, poets, writers and legislators.

A few centuries ago the Seigniors in England started a movement against oppression and autocracy, and their movement led to the declaration in the year 1215 C.E. of what is known as the Magna Carta and later the Oxford Declaration. This great charter was the foundation-stone of political freedom which has prevailed in England ever since.

Generation after generation, reformers rose to guide the people to the path of freedom and sound legislation. Evidence of these reformers or attempts at reforms are found in Montesquieu's The Spirit of Laws, and Jean Jacques Rousseau's Le Contra Social, and other works of politicians, economists and social thinkers. The call for reform went on till the time when the great French Revolution broke out, in the year 1789 C.E. in the cause of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. It was followed in other European countries by a series of revolutions for the attainment of the same aims.

Yet these revolutionary tendencies could not prevent reactionary movements from coming into existence in Europe before and after the French Revolution. Among the leaders of such reaction were people like the Italian statesmen Machiavelli (d. 1527 C.E.), who wrote many books, among them The Prince, with the intention of undermining the morals of the people and preparing them to accept willingly the suppression and humiliation of the despotic rulers. Later on, another type of such reactionary writers appeared on the scene, such as Nietzsche, the German philosopher who rose to prominence in the 19th century and preached racial discrimination and the supremacy of one race over other races of humanity.

The earlier movements aimed on the whole at the establishment of democracy and the people strove to attain its ideals, though in the narrow national sense in which they understood it, till the Second World War when the people intensified their struggle for the achievement of a broader democracy and greater freedom.

* * *

When I referred to Aristotle's division of various patterns of institutions, I pointed out that it was a logical and correct division, though one which, such as Montesquieu, preferred another division in which he included the Republic, probably thinking that this represented true democracy. But I think that such a division is not correct; for we see today that there are certain countries which, though being ruled by individuals or kings, are more democratic than certain republics. For instance, the President of the United States has more authority than that of the King of England; for the Ministers are responsible to him and not to the Parliament as is the case in England. The effect of the democratic principle in the latter is, therefore, much stronger than in the former. What really matters in a democratic rule is that the people should, through their representatives, be the source of all authority, whether the higher authority is entrusted to the King, sovereign or the president of a republic.

QUESTIONS

But what we find in this latest stage of our democratic institution? Do we find that democracy has marched forward, or is it still following the same lines of the Greek democracy which we no longer accept as a practical and a fit institution? Did it take root and establish itself or is it still stumbling and wavering? I leave this question to be answered by those who read and consider the following questions:

Is ours a universal democracy or is it still a local democracy?

Is slavery completely prohibited or does it still exist in one form or the other even amongst civilized nations?

Did we eliminate racial discrimination, colour bar, religious differences or are we still hostile to each other?

Do nations deal with each other on the basis of equality, brotherhood, and love, or is injustice and oppression still the lot of the coloured peoples and certain communities?

Did the powerful nations come to the help of the weak, assist them to progress in the path of culture and civilization or is conquest, expansion, colonization and oppression still the main motive of the powerful? Many a well placed man would tell us that imperialism and despotism have both vanished with the passage of the last century and that the world today has substituted that infamous practice with the idea of
close co-operation in various walks of life. *But is that true?*

Did this principle really materialise or are the people still living as their predecessors were living and were ruled by the law of the jungle and by the conception of might being right, during the long past centuries?

I put these questions to every thinking man and he may answer them for himself.

* * * * *

THE WORD DEMOCRACY IS FOREIGN TO THE ARABIC LANGUAGE

The word “Democracy” is foreign to the Arabic language and that it did not come into common use in Arab countries until early this century. For during the early days of Islam, the Arabs had not come under the impact of the Greek culture until the Abbasid period, when they began rendering the Greek learnings into Arabic.

And if during this period (when the major Greek works were being translated into Arabic), the Arabs had learnt anything about democracy, then, that must have been confined to the narrow circle of the learned who rendered these books into Arabic themselves or had some contacts with the latter. For then, the word was not commonly used among the people, nor was it used to signify the present day meaning. Apropos this, we should also point out that when translations of Greek works were first undertaken in the third century of Hijrah (9th century C.E.), it was in the form of literal renderings, as the translators would stick to the words rather than to their context. For instance, the word (‘Ilm al-tablīyyah) physics was used in Arabic simply as it was used by the Greeks to signify what we call today metaphysics (mitafṣīṣa) or in Arabic ‘ilm mā ṣawāda al-tablīyyah. (Bolīqa) or Politics for (al-siyāsah) and (dimqarāt) for Democracy and so on. It thus remained in usage just like any other Arabized word, or a proper noun, being known only to those who had used it in pursuit of knowledge, and was, therefore, confined to the few learned who interested themselves in social and political studies of the Greek culture; like his predecessors, the average Arab of those days knew little or nothing about Greek thoughts or about these Arabized terms.

But this does not mean the Arabs were ignorant of the significance or the principles which were involved in the term, just because they did not happen to know the Greek word. On the contrary, the Arabs were instinctively freedom loving people; they were “democratic” by nature and by the force of their environment, and we shall see later the extent of the “democratic” character which Islam assumed in its general and broad principles, in its legislation and in the way it shaped the practical life of its followers.

The Prophet Muhammad called the people to eschew idolatory and to worship the One God instead of many gods and to follow the path of truth and virtue. He did so in a country where idolatory, paganism and ignorance prevailed; where oppression, loot and pillage were widespread, where people used to resort to raid and looting, to drinking and gambling and to all sorts of evils such as the taking of pride in tribal connections or family distinctions.

ISLAM’S CALL OF “ALL ARE EQUAL IN THE SIGHT OF GOD” AND PRE-ISLAMIC ARABIA

The Hijaz, where the Prophet began to call his people to the worship of the One God, was an arid country with barren deserts, mountains and dry valleys, conditions which did not attract foreign invaders and conquerors, with its people enjoying the freedom of movement and of action, conducting their affairs in the manner they liked and dominated as they were by discriminatory tribe distinction, fanaticism and idol worship.

On the northern fringes of this arid desert there existed in those days two great empires—the Eastern Roman and the Persian; the Red Sea on the west and desert on the east and Yemen in the south were, however, of no significance at that time.

As far as the administration and the political set-up were concerned, Persia was under the autocratic rule of an individual despot whose will was law. As for the Eastern Roman Empire, it had an emperor as the head of the State, and its own legislation, the most important of which were those framed by Justinian (in the 6th century C.E.).

But in spite of these legislations and laws which were framed by Justinian and other emperors before him, the Eastern Roman Empire was at that time rapidly disintegrating. Maladministration, corruption and nepotism prevailed and led to weakness and, eventually, to its total collapse.

The Arabs, on the other hand, were, as pointed out earlier, dominated by their tribal traditions and customs which were based on whims and selfishness.

It was during this era that the Prophet Muhammad rose to call for the unity of God, which is the essence of Islam and which simply meant that God is One—

“Say, God is One, the only God, to whom no child is born, nor is He Himself born to anyone, nor has He any relationship with any one” (The Qur’an, 105:1-4),

emphasizing, however, that he was only an ordinary human being, God’s messenger, that except when God permits, he could neither harm nor benefit himself, nor could he mediate for others and that he was simply a human being inspired by God:

“My, I am human like any one of you and am being inspired that your God is verily one” (The Qur’an, 18:110).

There are no barriers between God and the human being. There can, therefore, be no mediation or medium, and the way to Him is open to all human beings and any one can approach Him through his good deeds, but not through his family descent, tribal connections or through saints and divines. Confession, repentance or contrition should be made only to God; for in Islam there is no priesthood, hermitage or any other system which encourages the retirement and abstention from life and its enjoyment.

With this conception, Muhammad succeeded in destroying the idols of the pagan such as the idols of “Lāt” and “‘Uzzah and Manāt and Hubal”. He put an end to idol worship, and in the cause of these high ideals which inspired human intellect, he risked his own life and had to face cruel treatment not only from the people of Mecca, but also from his own kith and kin, and even from his closest relatives; for they connived against him and banded themselves together to kill him and put an end to his teachings. But God saved him from their intrigues and evil intentions.

In spite of all their intrigues and mischief, Muhammad did not falter. He stood firm and even when they grew more aggressive and mischievous, he would only repeat his prayer:

“Please God, guide my people to the proper path; for they know not what they do.”
A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF WHAT MUHAMMAD ACHIEVED

Muhammad proclaimed and emphasized that all people are equal; there is no difference between a Hashimites and a non-Hashmite, between an Arab and a non-Arab, between white and coloured people and between the high and low. All are equal in the sight of God. There is no distinction but that which is acquired through piety and good deeds.

"O Mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female and made you into nations and tribes, that you know each other. Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you, and God has full knowledge and is well acquainted" (The Qur'an, 49:11).

"And, an Arab is not superior to a non-Arab except through piety" (Muhammad).

Now, it is not amazing to see such a liberal but profound movement rising amongst people who were so backward, so ignorant and so overridden by tribal fanaticism and primitive distinctions—people who took pride in their ancestral connections and high family descent, and who boasted even about their number and strength. Is it not amazing to see the same backward, fanatical, intolerant people rise all at once and proclaim that all people are equal and that there can be no distinction between one and another except on the ground of achievements and the services one renders to the society?

The guiding spirit of the great movement was Muhammad, the man who rose to that height not through the help of his own people or because of his contemporary environment, but through Divine inspiration. His was the great spirit which was to guide humanity to the most cherishable aims sought by noble souls.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS

He secured for the women their rights, ensured their position as dignified human beings, and of equal status with men. He thus restored to them all their rights. They were free to possess movable and immovable property, to buy, to sell, to gift, to donate, to bequeath, and to practise all rights in the manner they liked. In short, they got the same rights as men, including the right to study and educate themselves, and none of these rights can be suspended on marriage. For a woman in Islam can even keep her own property separate from that of her husband's and manage it the way she likes. She is also free to appoint whomsoever she likes as agent, even without the permission or the approval of her husband.

He respected the freedom of conscience and did not coerce anybody to embrace this or that faith.

"There is no coercion in religion; righteousness is now distinguished from transgression" (The Qur'an, 2:256).

He did not allow wars to be the means of coercing people to embrace the new faith, but allowed it to be a lawful defensive measure for oneself and one's faith, and to clear the way for propagating the teachings through wisdom and wise counsel.

"Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not be aggressive; for God does not like aggressors (The Qur'an, 2:190).

and

"God does not prevent you from doing favour and justice to those who do not fight and throw you out of your homes; for God loves the just" (The Qur'an, 60:8), and

"Say, the truth comes from your God, and it is for you to believe or disbelieve it" (The Qur'an, 15:29).

THE RIGHT CAUSE

He placed people of learning in such a high place that he called them ahl al-Dhikr, i.e. authorities who were consulted about methods regarding which people differed and whose counsel was taken by both the rulers and ruled. He was so much favourably inclined towards the spreading of knowledge among the people that after the battle of Badr, he offered to set free any literate prisoners who undertook to teach ten Muslim children how to read and write. He did so at a time when Islam stood in the greatest need of learned men and cash assets.

THE ELDERS

He introduced the principle of Shura, i.e. consultation and exchange of views by elders before major decisions affecting general interests were taken, laying down the broad basis and the high and practical principles which suited all parts of the world. Apart from this and some other main principles, he left complete initiative to human intellect and enterprise for all time to come. The Qur'an states:

"Their (Muslims) affairs are conducted by consultations among themselves" (The Qur'an, 42:38), and

"Consult them (or take their views) in all matters" (The Qur'an, 3:139).

He also enjoined that they, as well as those in power, should be obeyed unless their orders went against the injunctions of God.

"Ye should obey God, the Prophet and those in power amongst you" (The Qur'an, 3:32).

The hadith also has it that

"Obedience and compliance are one's duty in regard to matters which one likes or dislikes, unless one is ordered to transgress; for then, there should be neither obedience nor compliance;" and

"Obedience is verily meant for good causes" (Muhammad).

These high ideals stimulated human minds and offered the chance to women and to slaves to rise and take their place in society. They imposed a universal equality among all human races, so that there were no differences between man and man simply because he happened to belong to a certain race or to follow a certain religion or because of his colour. Islam has thus established a universal democracy, quite different from that parochial democracy which existed in certain Greek cities referred to earlier.

A striking example of Islam's equality between human beings is demonstrated by the following authentic story about the Prophet. Hearing Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī addressing his Negro servant, "O thou son of the black," the Prophet was exasperated and remarked.
“Beware, the son of the white is no superior to the son of the black, except in piety and good deeds.”

Then take the speech which he delivered following his last pilgrimage, and how on this occasion he laid the foundations of the constitution that was to be followed by Muslims after him.

“O people! Your God is one and your origin is one; for all of you belong to Adam and Adam was created of dust. The most honourable among you is he who is most pious. An Arab is no superior to a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab to an Arab, nor a white to a coloured man nor a coloured man to a white, but through piety.”

Having delivered his message faithfully by informing the people of the unity of God and of the unity of the human race, his mission in this life came to an end, and he then departed, leaving to the world that great legacy which has continued to enlighten men for so many centuries.

It is a legacy of which there is no parallel among the legacies of man. It challenged the traditions and customs which had prevailed in the Hijaz and uprooted them; it defied the Roman and the Greek faiths and cultures and shook them to their very foundations, as these were not progressive enough to prohibit slavery and remove distinction between man and man.

When the Prophet departed, he was succeeded by Abü Bakr, his great and faithful friend, who was the first to embrace Islam, and who on account of this suffered great hardship and sacrificed all his wealth in the service of the new Faith.

Abü Bakr was selected as Caliph through election (by the chiefs of various tribes and communities). He was selected after heated discussions and was chosen unanimously by all the people. On this occasion he addressed the Muslims and put before them the programme which he was to follow while conducting their affairs. He reaffirmed that the government would be based on the system of Shūrā (consultations); that, as for himself, he was one of them, and like any other human being he was not infallible and that he, therefore, needed the advice of his Muslim brethren to guide and to enlighten him.

He spoke to them thus,

“O people! Though I have been selected as your Chief, I am no better than any one of you. If you find me doing the right thing you should support me, but if you find me doing wrong then you should correct me. You should obey me as far as my orders are in conjunction with God’s teachings, but if I break His injunctions, then you should disobey.”

He also stated,

“I am following the rules and am not inventing. If I am right, then you should follow me, but if I am wrong, then you should correct me.”

Such was the line communicated by Abü Bakr while governing the Muslims and he faithfully followed it till his death.

His successor was ‘Umar, in accordance with the will of Abü Bakr, which was approved and upheld by all Muslims. When he was thus chosen, he stated in an address:

“If you find me committing any wrong, then you should right it with the sharp edge of your swords. It is your duty to speak your minds, and it is my duty to listen to you.”

**PEACEFUL PERSUISION**

Islam had already laid down broad principles for the way in which the people were to be governed and for the basis of government, but most of these principles were general in nature, being based on high ethics, justice, virtue and the freedom of man. It was for this reason that the Government was instituted on the principle of Shūrā, which really meant that will of the people should prevail. But the Shūrā was not defined in details, and Muslims were, therefore, left free to choose whatever form of rule they thought fit, considering their existing conditions, environment, trends of happenings around them and their general interests as a community.

So, regarding this aspect and indeed regarding many other aspects, the principles of Islam are so broad and so flexible, that they allow the introduction of any innovation that may be dictated by circumstances. No better course could have ever been. For whereas the Muslims were left free to choose the form of government they liked, they were not allowed to change or modify the ethical and moral principles, so that they may not deviate from their straight path through wrong interpretation or through ignorance and caprice.

These high morals and supreme principles of Islam were the secret of its being so widespread and so deeply established. A mere glance at the map of the Muslim world as it is today would convince anyone of the truth of this statement.

Take the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent for instance, which has 120 million Muslims. You find Islam is spread over vast areas, and has been spreading even after the fall of the Moghul Empire, when Muslims ceased to rule the land. There are 120 million in Indonesia and the Pacific Islands, about 50 or more million in China, and many millions in Central Africa. It did not spread to these areas by force or compulsion, but by virtue of its broad principles and by the kindly approach with which Muslims preached their religion as it was enjoined by the Qurʾān, which states:

“Call (the people) to the path of God through wisdom and good counsel and argue gracefully” (The Qurʾān, 16:125).

**ISLAM LAYS DOWN ONLY BROAD PRINCIPLES FOR RUNNING THE AFFAIRS OF THE STATE**

I said earlier that Islam laid down only the broad principles of its teaching, leaving the details to be settled and worked out by the learned in accordance with the Qurʾān.

“Ask the learned men who are amongst you if you do not know.”

Accordingly, and with a view to preserving the spirit of Islam and to ensuring more elaborate practice of its principles, there existed certain schools which adopted two more bases. Besides the Qurʾān and the Hadith for legislation, there are deduction and unanimity (or decision taken by the people concerned in complete agreement), so that if there occurred a case which did not come under the direct rule of the Qurʾān or the Sunnah (or the Prophet’s practice), the Muslims would find a reasonable solution for it through deduction.

Thus, there came into being the different Muslim schools of thought, and though different from each other, all these schools aim at the achievement of good deeds and noble ends, and do not mean to break the basic principles of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah. For essentially they submit to the Divine and eternal injunctions as does the Sunnah.
itself. The Muslims are, therefore, instructed by the Prophet that all that is said to be his practice should be examined in the light of the Qur'an; if it agrees with its principles then it should be upheld or else it should be left and discarded. The principle of Shurā, for instance, is the general basis which they were ordered to apply in running the affairs of the state. But, its definition and details were left to the Muslims themselves to frame in the manner it suits their existing social life.

It was, therefore, admissible for Muslims to have a parliament side by side with the Head of the State. It is also permissible to have in addition to the house of deputies, other organizations which supervise the work of the latter and examine its decisions, so that these may be made sound and free from defects and inaccuracies.

The Muslim community may also apply the views of the learned to restrict the election of their representatives to only those whom they think competent in social and political activities, or if they did not have any objection, may make the election free and unrestricted, so that the people may choose whomsoever they liked.

Regarding all these matters and many others, Islam did not enter into details, but left them to be decided by the people in accordance with the dictates of their conscience, of their Faith and of the basic principles of Islam which demanded of Muslims to be just, kind, compassionate, respectful of the individual and common rights and interests.

Islam also did not define the institution known as Caliphate, Imārah, or Imāmah, but left Muslims free to choose the form of rule they liked. They thus chose the head of their State and called him a Caliph (or successor), which was a mere linguistic appellation to denote the position which he occupied. After the first Caliph 'Umar came and was rightly called the successor of God's Prophet, yet the appellation was simply a linguistic one. For, when the Muslims found it too long, they changed it into "the Chief of the Faithful", and the use of this title continued even though neither the Qur'an nor the Prophet's Practice made any provision for it, which shows that the form of rule was considered by Islam as a matter of secondary importance.

Thus the Muslims have, therefore, been allowed to give the head of the State any title they deem suitable, such as Head of State, President, Governor, Amir, Sultan, King, Caliph, Shan or Emperor.

Islam did not restrict the usage of such appellations and titles; they are simply left to be chosen by the Muslims themselves. There are no restrictions, but those regarding the basic principles which enjoin that the chief of the State should be constitutional, that the people should be the source of the autonomy, that the authority of the people should submit to none but the injunctions of the Religion and that this authority should be derived from the spirit of Islam so that there prevail amongst the people, peace and tranquillity, love and kindness, so that there may be better understanding and closer co-operation, and so that the poor may be relieved and the sick treated; for indeed the poor have a well founded claim to the state revenue and the wealth of the rich.

These are the broad principles whose application was put not only under the control of one's own conscience and of the prevailing laws, but also under the supervision of the Supreme power of God who knows our deeds and our intentions.

* * * * *

Muslims may choose the form of rule they like; they may even restrict the application of the principle of shurā; they may choose from amongst the learned amongst whomsoever they think fit for the service of God, religion and of the state. For their environments may differ and their conditions and outlook vary. They may do all that with no other restrictions than those laid down by the principles to which we have referred earlier.
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