TAQDIR
AND
PREDESTINATION

BY

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LAHORE, INDIA
1934

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Qadar* and Taqdir, according to Raghib, mean the
making manifest of the measure (Ar.:kamiyya)
of a thing, or simply, measure. In the
words of the same authority God's taqdir
of things is in two ways, by granting qudra, i.e., power,
or by making them in a particular measure and in a par-
ticular manner as wisdom requires. An example of this is given
in the taqdir of the date-stone out of which it is the palm only
that grows, not an apple or olive tree, or in the taqdir of the
sperma of man out of which grows only man, not any
other animal. Taqdir is therefore the law or measure which
is working in the universe in the whole of creation, and this

* The word qadżâ is generally associated with qadar, and in common parlance qadżâ wa qadar of God are spoken of together. But while qadar means Divine measure of things, qadżâ according to Raghib means the
deciding of an affair whether it be by word or by deed. It is further stated
to be of two kinds, either as relating to man or as relating to God. An ex-
ample of the qadżâ of God in word is 17:4 where qadżainâ (present plural
pretitite form of qadżâ) means, according to Raghib, we made known to
them and revealed to them a decisive revelation: “And We made known
(Ar.:qadżainâ) to the children of Israel in the book, Certainly you will make
mischief in the land twice.” So also in 15:66 which runs thus: “And We
revealed (Ar.: Qadżainâ) to him this affair that the roots of these shall be
cut off in the morning.” In both these places qadżâ means the making
known of a Divine order by way of prophecy. An example of deciding of an affair by deed is 40:20 where God’s judging of an affair is called
His qadżâ: “And Allah judges with the truth”, or 41:12, etc., where the
creation of heavens is spoken of: “So He ordained them seven heavens.”
Referring to the distinction between qadżâ and qadar, Raghib says that
qadar is the measure while qadżâ is the decision or bringing it into action.
Thus when the Caliph ‘Umar ordered Abu ‘Ubaida to give up a plague-
stricken place, to which ‘Umar refused to go, and to remove his troops to
a healthier spot, he was met with the objection: “Dost thou fly from
the qadżâ of Allah” i.e. from what God has ordered. ‘Umar’s reply was:
“I fly from the qadżâ of Allah to the qadar of Allah.” What he
meant evidently was that if God had brought about plague by His qadżâ
in one place, another place was free from it, and it was His qadar, i.e. a
Divine Law, that they should betake themselves to a place of safety
(Raghib). Qadżâ is therefore only the ordering of a thing to come to pass
while qadar signifies the creating of things subject to certain laws,
is exactly the sense in which this word is used in the Holy Quran. For example, the Holy Quran speaks of a *taqdir* for each and every thing that has been created:

"Glorify the name of thy Lord, the most High, Who creates, then makes complete, and Who makes things according to a measure (Ar: *qaddara* from *taqdir*), then guides them to their goal" (87: 1–3).

"Who created everything, then ordained for it a measure (Ar. *taqdir*)" (25:2).

"Surely We have created everything according to a measure (Ar. *qadar*)" (54:49).

"And the sun runs on to a term appointed for it; that is the law (Ar. *taqdir*) of the Mighty, the Knowing. And as for the moon We have ordained (Ar. *qaddarnā* from *taqdir*) stages" (36: 38, 39).

The law according to which foods, provisions and other things are provided in the earth is also called a *taqdir* of God and so also the law according to which rain falls on the earth and the law according to which night and day follow each other:

"And He made in it mountains above its surface and He blessed therein and made (Ar. *qaddara*) therein its foods" (41: 10).

"And there is not a thing but with Us are the treasuries of it, and We do not send it down but in a known measure (Ar. *qadar*)" (15: 21).

"And We send down water from the cloud according to a measure (Ar. *qadar*)" (23: 18; 44: 11).

"And God has appointed a measure (Ar. *yugaddir* from *taqdir*) of the night and the day" (73: 20).

Though man is included in the creation and his *taqdir* is therefore the same as the *taqdir* of the whole creation, he is also separately spoken of as having a *taqdir* similar to the law
of growth and development of other things:

"Of what thing did He create him? Of a small life-germ He created him; then He made him according to a measure (Ar. qaddara·hū from taqdir)" (80:18, 19).

All these verses establish clearly that taqdir in the language of the Holy Quran, as according to lexicologists, is the universal law of God operating as much in the case of man as in the rest of nature, a law extending to the sun, the moon, the stars, the earth and the heavens and all that exists in them. This universal law is fully explained in the two short verses of ch. 87: "Who creates, then makes complete, and Who makes according to a measure, then guides." Four things are mentioned regarding everything created including man, its khalq or creation, its taswiya or completion, its taqdir or measure, and its hidaya or guidance to its goal. The law of life as witnessed in nature is exactly the law described here. Everything is created so as to finally attain to its completion, this completion is brought about according to a law or a measure within which everything works by Divine guidance. Thus the taqdir of everything is the law or the measure of its growth and development. While one seed will grow into a blade of grass, another will grow into a huge tree; notwithstanding its growth and development one life-germ would hardly be seen with a microscope while another will grow into a huge animal. Everything has its own line of development and so has man, and his taqdir therefore is not different in nature from the taqdir of other things.

It is therefore clear that taqdir as meaning the absolute decree of good and evil by God, an idea with which the word is now indissolubly connected by popular mind as well as by thinking writers, is neither known to the Holy Quran*, nor

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* There is only one occasion in the Holy Quran on which a derivative of taqdir is used to indicate the fate of a person. Speaking of the wife of Lot, the Holy Quran says: "We ordained that she shall be of those who remain behind." (15:60; 27:57). But even here it does not mean that God had ordained that she should be a doer of evil. There is mention
even to Arabic lexicology. The doctrine of predestination is of later growth, and seems to have been the result of the clash of Islam with Persian religious thought. The doctrine that there are two Creators, a creator of good and a creator of evil, had become the central doctrine of the Magian religion, just as Trinity had become the central doctrine of the Christian religion. The religion of Islam taught the purest monotheism, and it was probably in controverting the dualistic doctrine of the Magian religion that the discussion arose whether or not God was the creator of evil. These discussions grew very hot and many side-issues sprang up. All this is due only to a misunderstanding of the nature of good and evil. God created man with certain powers which he could exercise under certain limitations, and it is the exercise of these powers in one way or another that produces good or evil. For instance, God has gifted man with the power of speech which he can use either to do good to humanity or to cause evil to it, either to tell a truth and say a good word, or to utter falsehood and slander. Similarly, man has been endowed with numerous other powers which may be used either for good or for evil. Hence the controversy whether God was the creator of good and evil arose simply out of a misconception of the nature of good and evil. The same act would be a virtue on one occasion and evil on another. A blow struck in self-defence or in defence of a helpless man is a virtue, and a blow struck aggressively is a vice. Hence evil is also called *sulm* which means according to lexicologists, the placing of a thing in a place other than that which is meant for it, either by falling short or by excess or by deviation from its time or its place (Raghib). Thus the use of a power in the right manner or at the right moment or in the right place is a virtue, and its use in a wrong manner or at a wrong moment or at the wrong place is a vice. The Holy Quran, therefore, has not dealt with the question of the creation of good and evil at all. It speaks

here of an ordinance which holds good in the case of all evil-doers that they should suffer the evil consequences of what they have done; she was not one of the faithful but a disbeliever, so that when Divine punishment overtook the evil-doers, she was ordained to be with them.
of the creation of the heavens and the earth and all that is in them; it speaks of the creation of man; it speaks of endowing him with certain faculties and granting him certain powers; it tells us that he can use these powers and faculties within certain limitations just as all other created things are placed within certain limitations—and the limitations of each kind are its taqā‘ir. But in the Holy Quran, there is no mention of a taqā‘ir which means either the creation of good and evil deeds or an absolute decree of good and evil by God.

The following verse is sometime quoted as showing that God is the Creator of the actions of man: ‘And God has created you and what you make’ (37:96). The Arabic word for you make is ta‘malūn from ‘amī which means both doing and making. So the words are sometimes taken as meaning what you do instead of what you make, and from this it is concluded that God is the Creator of the actions of man and as these actions are good as well as bad, therefore God is the Creator of the evil deeds of man. The context however shows that mā ta‘malūn here means what you make and not what you do, and the verse in question does not speak of the good and evil deeds of man but of the idols and stones which were worshipped. Vv. 91-93 speak of Abraham’s breaking the idols; v. 94 says that when the people saw their idols broken, they advanced towards him; vv. 95, 96 contain Abraham’s arguments against idol-worship; “What! do you worship what you hew out? And God has created you and what you make”. Now the concluding words what you make clearly refer to the idols which they made, and the argument is clear that what was hewed out by man’s own hands could not be a God, God being the creator of man as well as of the stones which were made into idols. This is the meaning given in Ruh-ul-Ma‘ani. According to some commentators, the words are interrogatory: “And God has created you, and what is it that you do”?

It may however be added that God is recognized by the Holy Quran as the first and ultimate cause of all things.
But this does not mean that He is the creator of the deeds of man. He has no doubt created man; He has also created the circumstances under which he lives and acts; but still He has endowed man with a discretion to choose how to act, which he can exercise under certain limitations, just as all his other powers and faculties are exercised under limitations and only in accordance with certain laws. Thus in the Holy Quran: "The truth is from your Lord; so let him who please accept (it) and let him who please reject (it)" (18:29). And as he can exercise his discretion or his will in doing a thing or not doing it, he is responsible for his own deeds and is made to suffer the consequences.*

A great deal of misunderstanding exists as to the relation of the Divine will to the will of man. All the faculties with which man has been endowed have emanated from the great Divine attributes. Yet all human attributes are imperfect and can be exercised only under certain limitations and to a certain extent. God is all-seeing and all-hearing; man also sees and hears but these attributes in him bear no comparison to the Divine

* The useless controversy as to whether God was or was not the creator of man’s deeds divided the Muslim world at one time into three camps. The Jabriyya held that God was the creator of man’s deeds whether good or evil and man was entirely powerless in the matter. He moved as the Divine hand moved him, having neither the choice, nor the power nor the will to swerve a hair’s breadth from what God had decreed. Another party went to the other extreme holding that man being the creator of his own actions had full control over them. This was the view adopted later on by the Mu’tazila whose founder was Wasiil Ibn ‘Ata. Their argument was that it was impossible that God should first compel a man to do a thing and then punish him for it. The general body of the Muslims held that both these were extreme views. But in chalking out an intermediate course they adopted a position which was not very clear. They held that faith was the via media between jabar and qadar but to effect a reconciliation between these two extreme views they introduced the theory of kash which means acquisition. The gist of this theory was “that man is neither absolutely compelled, nor an absolutely free agent” (Klein’s Religion of Islam, p. 109). So far the position was logical, but further discussions led the holders of this view to the absurd position that he was only outwardly free, being inwardly forced. It is true that man’s will works under certain limitations, qadar or taqdir of God, but it is not true that the Divine will compels him to take a certain course. There may be a hundred and one causes of his decision in a particular case, and his responsibility may vary according to those circumstances but still the choice is his and so is the responsibility.
attributes of seeing and hearing, being only imperfect and miniature images of the perfect and infinite attributes of the Divine Being, as the reflecting mirror of human nature is itself imperfect and finite. For the very same reason, man's exercise of these attributes is also subject to certain limitations and laws. The same is the case with man's knowledge of things, with man's exercise of power over things and his exercise of his will in relation to things. All these are subject to limitations and laws. Man's will stands in the same relation to the Divine will as his other attributes to the attributes of the Divine Being. He can exercise it under limitations and laws, and there is a very large variety of circumstances which determine his choice in each case. Yet it is not true that the choice to exercise it has been taken away from him, and the fact is that notwithstanding all the limitations he is free to exercise his will, and therefore though he may not be responsible to the same extent for anything done in all cases, and a variety of circumstances would determine the extent of his responsibility, being very small, almost negligible, in some cases, and very great in others, yet he is a free agent and responsible for what he does.

I now take the Quranic verses bearing on this subject. The argument that man does an evil deed because God wills it so is put into the mouth of the opponents of the Holy Prophet on several occasions. Take the following for instance: "The polytheists will say: If Allah had pleased, we would not have associated aught with Him, nor our fathers, nor would we have forbidden to ourselves anything; even so did those before them reject until they tasted Our punishment. Say, Have you any knowledge so you should bring it forth to us? You only follow a conjecture and you only tell lies. Say, Then Allah's is the conclusive argument. If He had (so) willed, He would have guided you all" (6:149, 150). The polytheists' contention here is that what they do is in accordance with the will of God, and this is condemned as a mere conjecture and a lie. And as against it, two arguments are adduced. The first is that previous
people were punished when they persisted in their evil courses; if what they did was because God had so willed it, He would not have punished them for it. The second is that God had never said so through any of His prophets: “Have you any knowledge with you so you should bring it forth to us.” And in the verse that follows, the argument is carried further: “If He had willed, He would have guided you all”. The conclusion is clear. If it were the Divine will that people should be compelled to one course, that would have been the course of guidance. But men are not compelled to accept even the right way; much less could they be compelled to follow the wrong course. The Divine will is expressed through prophets who are raised to point out what is good and what is evil, and the choice is given to man to follow the one or the other. That is clearly laid down: “Surely We have shown him the way, he may accept or reject” (76 : 3). And again: “The truth is from your Lord, so let him who please believe and let him who please disbelieve” (18 : 29). The Divine will is therefore exercised in the raising of prophets and pointing out the courses of good and evil, and human will is exercised in the choice of one course or another. It is this very law that is given expression to at the end of ch. 76: “Surely this is a reminder, so whoever pleases takes to his Lord a way. And you do not please except that Allah please” (76 : 29, 30). And again to the same effect: “It is naught but a reminder for the nations, for him among you who pleases to go straight, and you do not please except that Allah please, the Lord of the worlds” (81 : 27-29). It will be seen that in both these places, the Holy Quran is spoken of as having been revealed for the upliftment of man, yet, it is added, only he will derive benefit from it who chooses to go straight or take a way to his Lord, i.e. exercises his will in the right direction. Thus man is left to make his choice after God has sent down a revelation, and the will of man to make a choice is thus exercised only after the will of God has been exercised in the sending down of a revelation. If God had not pleased to reveal the reminder, man’s choice would have been
nowhere. This is what is meant by the words you do not please except that Allah please, i.e. if God had not pleased to send a revelation, man would not have been able to make his choice of good or evil*.

The doctrine of predestination, or the decreeing of a good course for one man and an evil course for another, thus finds no support from the Holy Quran which plainly gives to man the choice to follow one way or the other. But, it is said, the doctrine of the decreeing of good and evil follows from the doctrine of the foreknowledge of God. If God knows what will happen in the future, whether a particular man will follow a good

* The western critics of Islam, who are not in the habit of giving any serious thought to the Holy Quran, have hastily formed the opinion that the Holy Prophet was an opportunist, and that the Holy Quran makes contradictory statements, preaching free will now and laying stress on predestination then. Thus Macdonald writes in the Encyclopaedia of Islam under qadar: “The contradictory statements of the Quran on free will and predestination show that Muhammad was an opportunist preacher and politician, and not a systematic theologian.” The same view has been expressed by Sell: “The quotations made from the Quran in the last few pages will have shown that whilst some passages seem to attribute freedom to man, and speak of his consequent responsibility, others teach a clear and distinct fatalism” (Faith of Islam, p. 338). Both these writers have not taken the trouble to study the Holy Quran for themselves and have based the above opinion simply on the fact that the contending Muslim sections have, all of them, quoted the Holy Quran in their support, as if the numerous sects of Christianity had never quoted the Bible text in support of their contradictory assertions! The verse which I have discussed here is looked upon by Sell as the “famous text” in support of predestination. Yet if a little consideration had been given to the words, the meaning could have been easily discovered. There is rather a tendency to force the conclusion of fatalism even upon plain words. I may here note some of the verses which Hughes has quoted in his Dictionary of Islam in support of the doctrine of predestination:

“All sovereignty is in the hands of God” (13 : 20); “God slew them and those shafts were God’s, not thine” (8 : 17). Now these two verses have apparently not the least bearing on predestination; the first speaks of God’s sovereignty and the second says that the defeat and slaughter of the overwhelming Quraish forces could not be brought about by the Prophet, and that it was brought about by God. Two other verses quoted by Hughes have been wrongly translated but in spite of that they do not lend any colour to the decree of good and evil: “All things have been created after fixed decree” (54 : 49); “The Lord hath created and balanced all things and hath fixed their destinies and guided them” (87 : 2).

Now the translation of qadar by fixed decree and that of qaddara by He has fixed their destinies is opposed to all Arabic lexicons. The wish of the writer has here taken the place of rules of interpretation. The other verses quoted by him have been fully discussed by me, and none of them speaks of predestination.
way or an evil way, it follows that that man must follow that particular course, for the knowledge of God cannot be untrue. Now in the first place, it must be clearly understood what God's knowledge of the future means. The fact is that the future is an open book to God. The limitations of space and time which are everything to man are nothing to God. Man's knowledge of things is limited both by space and time, but to the Infinite Being the unlimited space is as it were a single point and the past and the future are like the present. God sees or knows the future as a man would know what is passing before his eyes. God's knowledge of the future therefore, though far above and far superior to man's knowledge, is like his knowledge of the present, and mere knowledge of a thing does not interfere with the choice of the agent or the doer. Hence God's foreknowledge has nothing to do with predestination.

Statements are frequently met with in the Holy Qur'an in which God is spoken of as having written down the doom of a nation or a man's term of life or an affliction. Such verses have also been misconstrued as upholding the doctrine of predestination. The misconception is due to a wrong interpretation of the word kitāb which ordinarily carries the significance of writing but has been freely used in Arabic literature and in the Holy Quran itself in a variety of senses. Raghib says: "The word kitāba carries the significance of ithbāt i.e. establishing or confirming, and taqādir i.e. measuring out and ijāb i.e. making obligatory, and farādh i.e. making incumbent and 'azm bil kitāba i.e. determination to write down". And further on, it is stated that kitāba also signifies qadżā i.e. what has been brought about to pass and also means ḥukm i.e. order, and 'ilm i.e. knowledge. Examples of these uses are given: "Allah has written (Ar. kataba) I will most certainly prevail, I and my apostles" (58:21). "Nothing will afflict us save what Allah has written down (Ar. kataba) for us" (9:51). "Say, Had you remained in your houses, those for whom slaughter was written down (Ar. kutiba) would certainly have gone forth to the places where they would be
slain” (3:150). Now in all these places there is no mention of predestination or the fixing beforehand of an evil course for the evil-doer. In the first example, the meaning is clearly this that the order or command has gone forth from Allah that the Prophet shall triumph and God’s orders must come to pass. God has written down only means that it is God’s order that such a thing should happen. It is not necessary to seek a reference to any previous writing or previous order, because the order or writing is there in these words themselves, but if necessary, the reference may be to the numerous prophecies, that are met with in the Holy Quran regarding the ultimate triumph of the Holy Prophet and which were in fact written down in a literal sense.

In the other two examples, there is mention of writing down of distress or death. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that even if by the writing down of death or distress it is meant that it was pre-ordained for them, it does not lend any support to the doctrine of predestination which means that the evil course of an evil-doer has been fixed for him beforehand and that no choice is left to him to adopt either a good or an evil course. Death or distress is due to circumstances over which man has no control, while the doing of good or evil is a matter entirely of man’s own choice according to the plain teaching of the Holy Quran. But as a matter of fact there is no mention of pre-ordaining here, for the word kataba means ordering and not pre-ordaining. In fact, kitāba means simply intending a thing sometimes, as Raghib explains: “The reason is that a thing is first intended, then spoken and then written. So intention is the beginning and writing the end, and therefore the word kitāba is used to signify mere intention which is the beginning when it is meant to emphasize it by writing”. Going back to the Holy Quran itself, while it speaks of distress being written down in one place, it speaks of it as coming with God’s permission or knowledge or order in another. Compare the following two verses: “No affliction befalls on the earth nor in your own souls but it is in a book before We bring it into existence” (57:22); “No affliction comes about but by Allah’s permission (Ar. idhn)” (64:11). The word idhn
used here means, according to Raghib, *knowledge of a thing*, where there is with it also *mash'a* or permission or order. It is clear from a comparison of these two verses that what is called *kitāba* in one place is called *idhn* in another. Thus the writing of Allah is only His knowledge or permission or order.

The Holy Book throws further light on this subject, where it makes mention of Divine intention to bring the faithful to perfection through adversities. Thus speaking of the believers in particular, it says: "And We will certainly try you with somewhat of fear and hunger and loss of property and lives and fruits; and give good news to the patient, who when a misfortune befalls them, say, We are Allah's and to Him we shall return. These are they on whom are blessings and mercy from their Lord and these are the followers of the right course" (2:155-157). The principle is laid down here that the faithful are brought to perfection through adversities and trials, because we are told that Allah intends to try the believers by means of various kinds of afflictions, and through patience in suffering, they make themselves deserving of Divine blessings and mercy. Therefore when the faithful are made to say, "Nothing will afflict us save what Allah has written down for us"(9:51), it is in reference to the Divine will as expressed above that they are made to suffer afflictions for their own perfection. God's writing down afflictions for them means therefore only that the Divine law is that they will be brought to perfection through afflictions. Similar is the significance of 3:153.

Both the verses quoted above and similar other verses speaking of the writing down of afflictions for the believers teach only that greatest lesson of life, resignation in adversities. The Muslims are taught to remain absolutely contented when they have to meet adversity or death in fulfilment of their duties. If a Muslim meets an adversity or even death, he must believe that it is by God's order, that being the real meaning of *kitāba* in such cases. That faith upholds a Muslim in adversities because he knows that out of an adversity which is by the order of the good God will undoubtedly come good. There is a message in these verses
that a Muslim must face all adversities manfully and never despair of the mercy of God.

A few words may be added in this connection on the 

\textit{la unh} \textit{mahfuz}, which is generally supposed to contain all the decrees of God in writing. The word 
\textit{la unh} means a \textit{plank} as in 54:13, and also a \textit{tablet for writing}, and \textit{mahfuz} means \textit{that which is guarded}. The expression 
\textit{la unh} \textit{mahfuz} occurs but once in the Holy Quran and there it is mentioned in connection with the guarding of the Quran itself: “Nay! it is a glorious Quran in a guarded tablet” (85:21, 22). The word 
\textit{la unh} in its plural form 
\textit{alwāh}, is used in connection with the books of Moses: “And We ordained for him in the tablets (\textit{alwāh}) admonition of every kind and clear explanation of all things” (7:145). The \textit{alwāh} of Moses and the \textit{la unh} of the Quran are the same; only in the case of the Quran, the \textit{la unh} is stated to be \textit{mahfuz} or \textit{guarded}, for which the explanation is given “that the Quran is protected against change and alteration” (Raghib). The meaning is exactly the same as is elsewhere stated about the Holy Quran: “Surely We have revealed the Reminder and We will surely be its guardian” (15:9). The significance in both cases is that no alteration shall find a way into the text of the Holy Quran and that it shall be preserved in full purity. So far as the Holy Quran is concerned, there is no mention in it of a la unh mahfuz in which the decrees of God are written. In his Dictionary of the Quran, Raghib says that “the nature of it has not been disclosed to us”. One thing is clear that God’s writing is not of the same nature as man’s writing; for man stands in need of pen, ink, and writing material which God does not. This point has elsewhere been explained in connection with the Divine attributes where it has been shown that though speaking, seeing, hearing and other deeds are ascribed to God, yet the nature of these deeds is quite different from that of man’s deeds, for God does not stand in need of means for the doing of an act while man does. The writing of God therefore does not stand in need of a tablet or ink or pen, and if a la unh mahfuz is spoken of in certain hadith, it stands only for the
great and all-comprehensive knowledge of God before which everything is as clear as a writing before man.

A very great misconception regarding the teachings of God does not the Holy Quran is that it ascribes to God the attribute of leading astray. Nothing could be further from truth. While al-Hādī or the One who guides in one of the ninety-nine names of Allah as accepted by all Muslims, al-Mudzill or the One who leads astray has never been recognised as such, nor has it ever entered the head of a Muslim to give such a name to God. If leading astray were an attribute of God as guiding certainly is, the name of al-Mudzill should have been included in the list of His names as al-Hādī is. But the Holy Quran which repeatedly says that God’s are all the excellent names could not ascribe to Him what it has plainly ascribed to the Devil, viz. the leading astray of men. This fact is conclusive so far as the leading astray of men is concerned, but there are several other considerations which lead to the same conclusion. The sinners’ own confession as repeatedly mentioned in the Holy Quran is that their great leaders misled them or that the Devil misled them. Not once do they put forward the excuse that it was God Himself Who misled them: “When they have all come up with one another into it (i.e. the fire), the last of them shall say with regard to the foremost of them: Our Lord! these led us astray, so give them a double chastisement of the fire” (7:38).

“One woe is me! would that I had not taken such a one for a friend! Certainly he led me astray from the reminder after it had come to me” (25:28-29).

“And none but the guilty led us astray” (26:99).

“And they shall say, Our Lord! surely we obeyed our leaders and our great men, so they led us astray from the path. O our Lord! give them a double chastisement and curse them with a great curse” (33:67, 68).

“And those who disbelieve shall say: Our Lord! show us those who led us astray from among the jinn and
the men that we may trample them under our feet so that they may be of the lowest” (41:29).

Now if God had really led men astray, their best excuse on the day of Judgment would have been that they did not deserve to be punished because it was God Himself Who led them astray. But not once is that excuse advanced, and it is always the guilty leaders, from among men and jinn, who are denounced by the guilty followers as having misled them. This is another conclusive argument that it is not God Who leads men astray.

In the third place, the Holy Quran is full of statements to the effect that God sends His apostles and grants revelation for the guidance of the people. The general rule laid down with regard to Divine dealing with humanity is thus laid down in the very beginning: “Surely there will come to you guidance from Me, so whoever follows My guidance, no fear shall come upon them, nor shall they grieve.” (2:38).

It is impossible that God Who is so solicitous for the guidance of man should Himself lead him astray. Guiding and leading astray are two contradictions which could not be gathered together in one being. The Holy Quran itself draws attention to this point: “And it is not attributable to Allah that He should lead people astray after He has sent them a guidance: He even makes clear to them what they should guard against” (9:115). The argument is clear. The Being Who sends guidance to a people could not lead them astray; how could it be ascribed to God that He makes men fall into evil when He sends His messengers to explain to people that they should guard against evil.

The mistaken idea that God leads people astray arises out of a misconception of the meaning of the word *idzlāl* when it is ascribed to God. The word *idzlāl* carries a variety of meanings besides *leading astray*. It would be seen that wherever *idzlāl*
is attributed to God, it is only in connection with the transgressors, the unjust and the extravagant and never in connection with the people generally:

"And as for those who disbelieve, they say: What is it that Allah means by this parable? He causes many to err (yudzillu) by it and many He leads aright by it; but He does not cause to err (yudzillu) by it any except the transgressors (fāsiqin), who break the covenant of Allah after its confirmation and cut asunder what Allah has ordered to be joined and make mischief in the land" (2:26, 27).

"Allah confirms those who believe with the sure word in this world’s life and in the hereafter and Allah causes the unjust (zalimin) to go astray (yudzillu), and Allah does what He pleases" (14:27).

"Thus does Allah cause him to err (yudzillu) who is extravagant (musrif), a doubter (murtāb)" (40:34).

I have translated idzlāl as used in the above verses as meaning leading astray, but that is not the correct meaning here. Even if this meaning is adopted, one thing is clear that God is never spoken of as leading astray people generally or the righteous; it is always the transgressors, the unjust and the extravagant, people who have themselves gone astray, who are spoken of as being led astray by God. They have adopted a way of their own choice and they have gone astray; as plainly stated elsewhere, it is their mischievous leaders who have led them astray, and therefore the word idzlāl here must carry some other significance. Raghib says:

*Idzlāl is the causative form of dālāl which according to Raghib means swerving from the straight path, and the word is applied to every swerving from the right path whether it is intentional or through forgetfulness, and whether it is very small or very great.........and hence the word is applicable to the smallest fault on the part of a man. Thus in 93:7, where the word is used about the Holy Prophet, it simply means that though in quest of it, he was yet without guidance from God, and in 12:95 it simply indicates Jacob’s great love for Joseph, and in 26:20 in the case of Moses, it indicates simply forgetfulness on Moses’ part. In 2:282, the word tadzillā is used about a female witness simply in the sense that she may forget or she may not remember (Raghib).
Idzlāl is of two kinds. The first kind is that in which dzlāl (or going astray) is the cause of idzlāl. This again may be in two ways; 1, when a thing has itself gone astray from you, as you say, adzlaltul ba‘ira the meaning of which is, I lost the camel (but according to the ordinary significance, the meaning should be, I led astray the camel which is not true in this case); and 2, when you judge a person to be in error or going astray; and in both these cases going astray on the part of the object of idzlāl is the cause of idzlāl or leading astray. The second kind is that in which idzlāl or leading astray is the cause of going astray of the object of idzlāl and it is in this way that you embellish evil to a man so that he may fall into it." In both shades of the first sense, the word idzlāl has been freely used in Arabic literature. An example of idzlāl meaning losing a thing (not leading it astray) has been given already. Many other examples are quoted in lexicons. But the word as used in the Holy Quran carries the significance of judging or finding one to be in error, and many examples of this use of the word are met with in general Arabic literature as well as in Hadith. Thus in a verse of Tarfa, the words adzallani sadīqi mean my friend judged me to be in error (Lisan-ul-Arab). And in a hadith it is said that the Holy Prophet came to a people fa-adzallahum, i.e. he found them adopting a wrong course, not following the true path (Ibn Athir). The word adzallahum does not and cannot mean that he led them astray. Ibn Athir gives further examples showing that adzallahū means he found him in error just as ahmad tu hū means I found him in a praiseworthy condition, and abkhaltu hū means I found him a niggard. It is for neglecting such common-places of Arabic literature and lexicology that a sense is put into the words of the Quran which is opposed to its plainest teachings and its basic principles. The word idzlāl is also recognized by all lexicologists to have the significance of bringing to destruction (Ibn Athir) and in this sense the word is used in the Holy Quran, as in 47: 4: "And as for those who are slain in the way of Allah, He will by no means allow their deeds to perish (Ar. yudzilla)".
Hence, since ḍāl cannot be applied to God in the sense of leading astray, and since it is always the transgressors and the extravagant whose ḍāl by God is spoken of, the only significance that can be attached to that word in this case is God's judging them to be in error or finding them in error, or in some cases, God's bringing them to destruction.

Another misconception which must be removed in this connection is that relating to God's setting seals on hearts. The misconception in this case is that it is thought that God has created some men with seals on their hearts while there are others who have been created with free and open hearts. No trace of any such distinction is met with anywhere either in the Holy Quran or in Hadith. All men are created sinless, all men are created pure, that is the express teaching of Islam. The Holy Quran says: “Then set thy face upright for religion in the right state—the nature (Ar. fitra) made by Allah in which He has made all men, there is no altering of Allah’s creation: that is the right religion” (30:30). According to this verse all men have been created in pure nature, and a hadith of the Holy Prophet which is really an explanation of this verse says: “Every child that is born conforms to fitra (i.e., human nature which is called right religion in the Holy Quran), it is his parents who make him a Jew or a Christian or a Magian” (Bukhārī 23:80). The idea that some men are born with a seal on their hearts is directly opposed to this teaching and cannot be entertained for a minute. The Holy Quran does speak of God setting seals on some hearts but it says expressly that seals are set on the hearts of the reprobate, the hardened sinners who pay no heed to the call of the Prophet. In the very beginning of the Holy Quran, it is stated: “Those who disbelieve, it being alike to them whether thou warn them or do not warn them, will not believe. Allah has set a seal upon their hearts and upon their hearing and there is a covering over their eyes” (2:7). It should be noted that though the setting of a seal is spoken of here, yet it is on the hearts
of those who have so hardened their hearts that they do not pay any heed to the Prophet's warning. They refuse to open their hearts to receive the truth, and do not lend their ears to listen to it, nor use their eyes to see the truth from falsehood. As is elsewhere stated: "They have hearts but they do not (try to) understand with them, and they have eyes but they do not (try to) see with them, and they have ears but do not (try to) hear with them; they are as cattle" (7:179). And again, they are made to say: "Our hearts are under coverings from that to which thou callest us and there is a heaviness in our ears and a veil hangs between us and thee" (41:5). It is always the reprobate whose heart is said to be sealed: "Thus does Allah set a seal over the heart of every proud, haughty one" (40:35). The fact that the cause of the seal is the sinner's own act of not heeding the warning is made clear on another occasion also: "And there are those of them who seek to listen to thee until when they go forth from thee, they say to those who have been given the knowledge: What was it that he said just now? These are they upon whose hearts Allah has set a seal and they follow their low desires" (47:16).

All these verses show clearly that God sets a seal upon the hearts of certain people as a result of their own actions. They do not listen to the Prophet's call, they give no heed to his warning, they do not try to understand what he says, and the result is that God sets a seal upon their hearts. If a person closes upon himself the doors of his house, he would naturally be in darkness. Just in the same manner, those who themselves close the doors of their hearts are visited with the natural consequence of this, the setting of a seal. The seal, therefore, being the consequence of a man's own deeds, has nothing to do with the doctrine of predestination.

I would now take some of the hadith from which pre-

Hadith and pre-

destination destination is concluded, but I would warn the reader that Hadith must be read subject to the broad principles established in the Holy Quran
and must be so interpreted that it should not clash with the Book of God, and that in case of a clash it is the hadith that must be rejected, for the words are often the words of narrators, and in such metaphysical subjects there has been a good deal of mixing up of the ideas of the narrators through a long chain of transmitters. There is a great deal of difference between hadith relating to the rules and regulations of daily life which every man could easily understand and retain in memory and hadith relating to such metaphysical subjects where the ideas of the transmitters would, sometimes quite unintentionally and sometimes on account of not clearly understanding the real concept of the words, affect the narration of the hadith, and where the change of a single word would sometimes change entirely the underlying idea.

Keeping this in mind we may consider the hadith narrated in the Book of Qadar in Bukharee, but before taking them into consideration I would take another hadith which, though not accredited by the best hadith authorities, is the stock argument of the Western writers regarding predestination in Islam. This hadith occurs in several different forms in Abu Dawood, Tirmidhi and Ahmad, and the gist of it is that when God created Adam, He also brought forth the souls of his children. The particular form of this hadith which appeals to the Western writers is that occurring in one report of Ahmad: “He said to the souls in His right hand: To paradise and I do not care, and He said to those in His left hand, To the fire and I do not care” (Mishkat, Book of Qadar). This hadith discloses such a distorted picture of Divine dealing with man that there should not be the least hesitation in its rejection. The Holy Quran says in plain words that it is for mercy that He created all men (11:119); it speaks of the Divine mercy as encompassing all things like His knowledge (40:7); it tells the most obdurate sinner not to despair of His mercy, for “Allah forgives the sins altogether” (39:53); it describes God again and again as the Most Merciful of all merciful ones (7:151; 12:64, 92; 21:83; 23:109, 118). Hadith draws a similar picture of the indescribable mercy of
God. It tells us that God wrote down when He ordered creation that "His mercy shall take precedence of His displeasure" (Bukhāre 59:1); it describes God as having divided His mercy into a hundred parts and as having sent into the world only one part, the whole of love finding expression in the created beings, including the love of a mother for her offspring, being a manifestation of that hundredth part, and the other ninety-nine parts to find expression on the day of resurrection, so that if the unbeliever knew of the whole of Divine mercy, he would not despair of going to paradise (Bukhāre 81:19; 78:19; Muslim 49:17-20); it draws a picture of the unbounded mercy of God when it speaks of the Holy Prophet seeing a mother pressing her child to her bosom and remarking to his companions, "Do you think that she can throw this child into the fire," and on their replying in the negative, added "God is much more merciful to His creatures than this woman to her child" (Bukhāre, 87:18). Could God with all this mercy which is even beyond human conception be in the same breath described as saying: "These to fire and I do not care?" Certainly these cannot be the words of the Holy Prophet. It is the error of some reporter in the long chain of the transmission of Hadith.

In the other form in which this hadith occurs in Tirmidhi, it is given as an explanation of the 172nd verse of the seventh chapter of the Holy Quran. This hadith runs as follows: "Allah created Adam and then He touched his back with His right hand and brought forth from it children, and said, These I have created for paradise and they will do the works of the inmates of paradise; again He touched his back and brought forth children and said, These I have created for the fire and they will do the works of the inmates of the fire" (Mishkat, Book of Qadar). If we read the verse of which this hadith is said to be an explanation, we will find that it has nothing in common with the verse except the idea of bringing forth offspring. The verse in question runs thus: "And when thy Lord brought forth from the children of Adam, from their backs, their descendants and
made them bear witness against their own souls: Am I not your Lord? They said, Yes! we bear witness” (7:172). It will be seen that the hadith referred to does not contain any explanation at all of the verse. And further, here it is stated that God declared the other portion to be for the fire because they would do the works of the inmates of fire. It does not at all mean that in creating men God had decreed one portion for paradise and another for the fire. It denotes only the all-comprehending knowledge of God. But the verse itself speaks of something quite different, and therefore there is not again the least doubt that this hadith is not an explanation of the Quranic verse.

The real explanation of the Quranic verse quoted above also occurs in Hadith, and undoubtedly there was some misunderstanding on the part of some narrator which misled him to give an explanation having nothing in common with the original and indeed quite opposed to the Quranic text, of which it is alleged to be an explanation. An explanation of the verse is indeed met with in Hadith but it is quite different and in accordance with what is said in the verse itself. Quoting the Quranic verse Ubayy ibn Ka'b explains it thus: “He gathered them and made them pairs, gave them forms and made them speak so that they talked. Then He took a promise and agreement from them and made them bear witness against their souls, saying, Am I not your lord? They said, Yes. He said, I call to witness against you the seven heavens and the seven earths, and I call to witness against you your father Adam, lest you say on the day of resurrection, We did not know this. Know that there is no God but I and there is no Lord but I, and do not associate anything with Me; I will surely send to you my apostles who will remind you of this My promise and this My covenant, and I will reveal to you My books. They said, we bear witness that Thou art our Lord and our God; we have no Lord besides Thee and we have no God besides Thee” (Mishkat, Book of Qadar). These are the words of Ahmad and they too are not quite free from the ideas of the transmitters, but still they have much in
common with the original, and the first hadith therefore being quite different, even opposed, to this one, must be rejected as being due to some misconception.

If we take the verse itself, we find it so clear that not only it needs no explanation, but even removes the obscurity of the so-called explanations. For it speaks plainly of the bringing forth of the children, not from the back of Adam but from the backs of “the children of Adam”. The verse therefore clearly refers to every human being as he comes into existence, and the evidence is that which is afforded by human nature itself that God is its Creator. It thus lays down the principle that every human child is born into this world with the right impress, the impress that it must bow down to God. It is the very principle which is laid down elsewhere too in the Holy Quran: “Then set thy face upright for religion in the right state—the nature made by Allah in which He has made all men; there is no altering of Allah’s creation; that is the right religion but most people do not know” (30: 30). Both these verses lay it down in clear words that every human child is born into the world in a pure state; none comes into life with the impress of hell on it. Human nature is so made that it is not compelled to follow the evil course. It is free from every tinge. Even Hadith lays it down in clear words that “every child is born in the fitra” (right state or the condition of Islam), and that it is his parents who later on “make him a Jew or a Christian or a Magian” (Bukharee 23: 80, 98). So every child is born a Muslim and if he is initiated into a wrong religion or follows a wrong course, it is not God’s action but the action of his parents or his own action. Thus both the Holy Quran and the Hadith cut at the root of the doctrine of predestination, of some men having been condemned to hell before they are born.

It is quite in consonance with this principle that Islam recognizes that all children, whether born of believing or unbelieving parents, go to paradise if they die before attaining to the age of discretion. Even if this had not been expressly stated, it would have been a foregone conclusion of the
principle laid down above on the basis of the Holy Quran and the Hadith that every child is born with a pure nature, a Muslim. But there is a clear hadith laying down that all children go to paradise. It is related that the Holy Prophet saw in a vision an old man at the foot of a large tree and around him were children, and in the vision he was told that the old man was Abraham and the children that were around him were the children who died 'ala alfitra i.e. before attaining to the age of discretion.' "At this some of the Muslims asked him: And the children of polytheists too, O messenger of Allah!" The Prophet replied: "The children of polytheists as well" (Bukharee 91:46). Being with Abraham clearly meant being in paradise; and according to the express words of the Holy Prophet, they included the children of polytheists, to say nothing of the children of the people of the Book. According to another hadith, when the Holy Prophet was questioned about the children of the polytheists, he is reported to have said: "When Allah created them He knew what they did" (Bukharee 23:93). These words have been variously interpreted, but it would be wrong to give them a significance contradicting the plain words of Bukharee 91:46. It does not at any rate mean that God knew what they would do after attaining to majority, as it is against facts. The fact is that God knew that they would die before attaining to majority, and this exactly seems to be the meaning of the words, as Fath-ul-Bari has explained. God knew that they would die in the condition in which they were born, i.e. the condition of Islam, because He knew that they would not attain to the age of discretion when they would be able to judge between right and wrong and adopt the one course or the other.

It is difficult to consider all the hadith relating to qadar in this article. I will therefore take only Bukharee, the most reliable collection of Hadith. In the first place, Bukharee does not relate a single hadith speaking of faith in qadar, and thus the question that faith in qadar is one of the fundamentals of Islam is disposed of. Faith in qadar is unknown to both the
Holy Quran and the most reliable collection of Hadith. Next I would take the various hadith which Bukharae has related in his Jam'i in the 82nd book called Qadar. Not a single hadith related in this chapter lends any support to the theory that a good or an evil course has been chalked out beforehand and is forced upon man. The hadith related here as well as in other collections generally speak either of the Divine knowledge of things or of the Divine command prevailing over all. The most well-known hadith from which predestination is concluded is the hadith speaking of an angel being in charge of the embryo. This hadith relates that "an angel is sent to the embryo, and he is commanded with four things, his sustenance and his term of life and whether he is unhappy or happy" (Bukharae 82:1). The same hadith occurring elsewhere is in the following words: "Then an angel is sent and he is commanded with four words. It is said to him; Write down his actions and his sustenance and his term of life and whether he is unhappy or happy" (Bukharae 86:6). In the first place, this hadith cuts at the root of predestination, for if everything has already been written down in a Divine decree why should an angel be sent at the time of birth to write down these things? Now as regards the writing of actions in the state of embryo, there seems to be a clear mistake, for the Holy Quran plainly speaks of angels writing down the deeds when they are done, and in this connection not one but two angels are spoken of: "When the two receivers receive, sitting on the right and the left" (50:17); "And surely there are keepers over you, honourable recorders, they know what you do" (82:10-12). But that an angel is sent in the state of embryo seems to convey only the significance that Divine knowledge of things is all-comprehensive so much so that He knows all about a man even in that embryonic state. The angel's record, as already shown, does not mean actually writing down in a book; it is only expressive of Divine knowledge. As the properties of the seed are all in the seed, so even the embryo shows what the man will develop into. No human eye can see these hidden potentialities but nothing is hidden from God.
Another hadith bearing on the subject is that which speaks of Adam's argument with Moses. Moses is reported to have said to Adam that it was his fault that caused them to get out of the garden, to which Adam replied: "Dost thou blame me for a matter which had been ordained for me before I was created" (Bukhārī 60:31). It is added in the report that Adam prevailed over Moses in argument. To draw from this hadith the conclusion that though Adam's fault was really the cause of his children being driven forth from the garden, yet he was blameless because God decreed it so, is to give in the hands of every sinner an argument that he is blameless simply because God had decreed that he should commit a sin, and thus to subvert the whole Divine scheme which makes every one responsible for his actions. A reference to the Holy Quran would show that Adam's fault was not really the cause of his children living in a particular state, for it is after forgiveness of Adam's fault that mankind are told to live in that particular state, the state of ḥubūt as it is called, which is the state of struggle with the devil. It is not actually a fall, though there is in it the liability to fall, but there is also along with it the chance to conquer and subjugate the devil and thus to rise to perfection. Man could be placed in one of the two conditions. He could be made to live either in a state in which there would be no struggle but then there would be also no chance to conquer, no hope of rising to great spiritual heights. Or he could be placed in a state of struggle in which there is the liability to fall and the chance to conquer and rise to greatness. This latter condition is called the state of ḥubūt in the

* The word ḥubūt has the same meaning as ṉuzūl (Taj-ul-'Urus) which means alighting in a particular place or a particular condition, there being, this difference that in ṉuzūl there is the idea of an honourable entry into a state (Raghib). In the Holy Quran, ḥubūt is used always in connection with Adam and his progeny living in a particular state, except on one occasion where it is used for the Israelites in the simple sense of alighting in a city or living in a settled state and resorting to agriculture. The Israelites asked Moses to pray to God that they may have "what the earth grows", "its herbs and its cucumbers" etc, and the reply is: "Enter a city (Ar. ḥaṣibūn misrān from ḥubūt), so you will have what you ask for" (2:61). It will be seen that the word habūt or ḥubūt is used here simply in the sense of entering or alighting in a place or a condition without any idea of fall or disgrace being attached to it.
Holy Quran. Adam was no doubt placed in a garden and he could be spoken of as going forth from it, but his posterity was never placed in that garden and therefore they could not be spoken of as going forth from it. No one can be spoken of as getting forth from a condition or a place in which he has never been placed. Therefore the *hubul* is quite different from getting out of the garden, and it is after forgiveness even of Adam's fault that the *hubul* of mankind is spoken of. Thus 2:36 speaks of Adam's fault; 2:37 speaks of the fault being forgiven and 2:38 speaks of the *hubul* of Adam's children. I quote the last two: “And Adam received some words from his Lord, so He turned to him mercifully, for He is the oft-returning to mercy, the Merciful. We said: Go forth (Ar. *ihbita* ) from this all, so surely there will come to you guidance from me, then whoever follows My guidance, no fear shall come upon them nor shall they grieve” (2:37, 38). Even so elsewhere; “Then his Lord chose him, so He turned to him mercifully and guided him. He said: Get forth you two therefrom, all (of you), one of you is an enemy to another. So there will surely come to you guidance from Me, then whoever follows My guidance, he shall not go astray, nor be unhappy” (20:122:123). Thus Adam’s reply to Moses was that it was not due to his fault that men had to live in a state of struggle with the devil, for such was the Divine scheme even before he was born.

I would not go into details of the rest of the hadith of Bukharee. Many of these hadith are wrongly interpreted. For instance, in one hadith it is said that when the Holy Prophet was questioned about the children of polytheists who die before attaining to the age of discretion, his reply was: “Allah knows best what they would do” (Bukharee 82:3). These words are misinterpreted as meaning that since God knew that after attaining to the age of majority they would be polytheists, therefore they would go to hell. This significance is against the very next hadith which says that all the children who die before attaining to majority are in Abraham’s lap. The meaning of the words quoted is simply this that Allah
knew that they would die in infancy and would not be guilty of any sin, and He would deal with them accordingly. Another hadith tells us of the death of a grandson of the Holy Prophet and the Holy Prophet comforting the child’s mother with the words: “Allah’s is what He takes away and Allah’s is what He gives; every one has a term of life, so let her be patient”. This hadith makes no mention at all of any decree of good and evil deeds. It speaks of a term of life, for every person in God’s knowledge has a term of life. Many other hadith of a similar nature are wrongly supposed to lend support to the doctrine of predestination. I may mention only one more. The Holy Prophet is reported to have remarked in a certain company that there was not a man but his place in fire or in paradise was written down. Thereupon a man said: “Shall we not rely then (and give up the doing of deeds), O messenger of Allah?” The Prophet said: “No: do work, for to every one it is made easy”, and then he recited the following verse: “Then as for him who gives in charity and guards against evil and accepts the good word, We will facilitate for him the easy end. And as for him who is niggardly and considers himself free from need (of Allah) and rejects the good word, We will facilitate for him the difficult end” (92:5-10). Now if any conclusion of predestination could be drawn from the words of the hadith, the verses quoted by the Holy Prophet in support of what he said negative such conclusion, for they plainly speak of two different ends for two different kinds of workers. The words of the Holy Prophet himself lead to the same conclusion, for he laid stress on works. Nor do his concluding words—to every one it is made easy—lead to any other conclusion, for the meaning is that to the worker of good the good end, and to the worker of evil the evil end, is made easy, as plainly stated in the verses quoted in support of his assertion.

I now come to the real question. It has been shown, firstly that though the Holy Quran speaks of qadar or taqdir, these words by no means carry the significance of predestination or a decree of good and evil for
man; secondly, that the qadar or taqdir which the Holy Book speaks of is of a general nature, a law prevailing in the whole of the universe, a limitation under which the whole of the creation is moving onward, and therefore qadar or taqdir has nothing to do with the good and evil deeds which are special to man; thirdly, that there is no mention at all of iman or faith in qadar or taqdir in the Holy Quran or in the most reliable hadith; and fourthly, that it is never mentioned as one of the fundamentals of religion as faith in God and His angels and His books and His apostles and a life after death is mentioned. Qadar or taqdir is spoken of simply as a Divine law prevailing in the universe just as many other laws are mentioned, and no question concerning faith in them arises. It must also be clearly understood that the fundamentals of religion are all clearly mentioned and even fully explained in the Holy Quran itself, and a thing cannot be accepted as a fundamental of Islam of which there is no mention in the Holy Book. Hadith is only a secondary source of the religion of Islam and as a matter of fact, it deals only with secondary matters of religion or its details. The great principles, the basic doctrines, must all be sought from the Holy Quran, and the Holy Quran neither mentions qadar among the fundamentals of Islam, nor even speaks of a faith in qadar. It is only in Hadith that we find mention of qadar, and even here the most reliable of all Hadith collections, the Bukharee, does not contain any hadith mentioning faith in qadar as an article of faith. Thus to both the Holy Quran and the Sahih Bukharee, faith in qadar is unknown, and therefore to speak of it as a fundamental of Islam is by no means correct.

There is one Hadith which shows that faith in qadar is of later growth. In his second book, the book of faith, Bukharee relates the following hadith from Abu Huraira: “The Holy Prophet was one day sitting outside among a number of people when there came to him a man and said, What is faith? The Holy Prophet replied, Faith is this that thou believe in Allah and His angels and His
messengers and that thou believe in life after death” (Bukharee 2:37). The hadith is a lengthy one and I have quoted only the first portion which relates to the subject of discussion. Now this same hadith is also related in Muslim through three different channels. In the first channel, the four narrators are the same as in Bukharee and the words of the hadith are also almost the same: “The Holy Prophet was one day sitting outside among a number of people when there came to him a man and said, What is faith, O Messenger of Allah? The Holy Prophet replied, That thou believe in Allah and His angels and His Book and His meeting and His messengers and that thou believe in the life after death” (Muslim 1:1). In his second channel, the first three narrators are again the same as in Bukharee and the hadith is narrated in the words quoted above. In his third channel, only the first two narrators are the same, the rest being different, and a change is introduced into the words of the hadith and the portion relating to the Prophet’s reply now assumes the following form: “That thou believe in Allah and His angels and His Book and His meeting and His messengers and that thou believe in life after death and believe in qadar, in the whole of it” (Muslim 1:1). It will be noticed that when the narrators are the same as in Bukharee (with the exception of the last narrator from whom Muslim took his words), the words of hadith are almost the same both in Bukharee and Muslim, there being only an addition of the words “and His Book”. These words have either been added by one of Muslim’s narrators as the natural result of faith in messengers of God, or they have been left out by one of Bukharee’s narrators as being included in faith in the Divine messengers. Otherwise the fundamentals of faith are exactly the same and so even the words in both narrations. Even when Muslim has only Bukharee’s three top narrators, the words of the hadith are still the same. But in the third channel, where only two top narrators of Bukharee, Abu Huraira and Abu Zar’a, are retained, the hadith is changed and quite a new element is introduced into it by the addition of faith in qadar which
the original does not contain. This shows beyond the shadow of a doubt that the words "faith in qadar" were added by the third narrator, and that these words were not spoken either by Abu Huraira or even by the next narrator Abu Zar'a, and thus there remains not the least doubt that the inclusion of faith in qadar among the fundamentals of faith is an addition of about the end of the first century of Hijra. There is no doubt that discussions about qadar arose later, and it was during these discussions that through inadvertence or otherwise some narrator put these words into the mouth of Abu Huraira.

The same hadith has again been narrated by Muslim through quite a different channel with an introductory note from the last narrator Yahya Ibn Ya'mar as follows: "The first man who held the view of qadar in Basra was Ma'bad al Juhani, so I and Humaid Ibn 'Abdur Rahman went out on a pilgrimage and we said that if we meet any companion of the Holy Prophet we will question him about what these persons say regarding qadar, and it was granted to us to meet 'Abdullah Ibn 'Umar entering the Mosque". The note then goes on to say that the narrator asked 'Abdullah "about people who say there in no qadar* and that the affair begins just now." Then the same hadith is related in different words, and the part of it under discussion runs thus: "That thou believe in Allah and His angels and His books and His messengers and the last day and that thou believe in the qadar, the good of it and the evil of it." It will be noticed that the words "His meeting" are omitted in this hadith while to the belief in qadar of Abu Huraira's

*These people are here spoken of as denying qadar but the name given to them by later theologians is Qadariya which would mean upholders of qadar. Hence it was that the Mu'tazila who later on became the upholders of this theory argued that the name Qadariya could not be applied to them but to the upholders of the doctrine of qadar. The orthodox argument on the other hand was that the Mu'tazila or their predecessors who questioned the qadar of God set up a rival qadar of man, inasmuch as they believed that man was the creator of his own deeds. But perhaps the word qadar was used by these disputants in the sense of qudra i.e. power, and the two contending parties had gone to two extremes, those who upheld the absolute power of God refusing that man had any free choice, and those who upheld the theory of the absolute power of man over his deeds. The truth lies midway between these two extreme views.
hadith are added the words *khairi hī wa sharri hī* or the good of it and the evil of it. The introductory note is too clear. Discussions were being carried on relating to *qadar*, and a party had arisen which entirely denied *qadar*. 'Abdullah Ibn 'Umar lived up to the 73rd year of the Hijra and on being questioned about the matter, he is alleged not only to have upheld *qadar* but also to have related a hadith which mentioned belief in *qadar* as one of the fundamentals of Islam. Bukhāreē has not accepted this hadith, while Muslim accepting the correctness of Bukhāreē's hadith which does not make any mention of *qadar* has shown that Ibn 'Umar's hadith cannot be relied upon, and probably the anxiety to silence the opponents had led to indiscretion on the part of some controvertialist.

Significance of *qadar* carried. The words occurring in one hadith are "that thou believe in *qadar*, in the whole of it" and in a second, "that thou believe in *qadar*, in the good of it and the evil of it." A third version, "that thou believe in *qadar* in the good of it and the evil of it, being from God" which is ordinarily met with in the books on 'aqā'id, I have not been able to trace to any hadith. It is very probable that the latter two additions were even later than the first formulation of belief in *qadar*. If we take the word *qadar* in the original sense in which it is used in the Holy Quran, a belief "in *qadar*, in the whole of it" would only mean that one must believe that everything in this universe is subject to a law and under a limitation, God alone being the controller of all. If we take the next form, "that thou believe in *qadar*, in the good of it and the evil of it," the good and the evil does by no means refer to the good or evil deeds of man, but to the good and bad circumstances under which man is placed to work out his destiny. The original words *khair* and *shar* have been freely used in the Holy Quran in this sense. I give a few examples: "Surely man is created of a hasty temperament, being greatly grieved when evil (Ar. *sharr*) afflicts him, And niggardly when good (Ar. *khair*) befalls him." (70: 19–21); "And man prays for evil (Ar. *sharr*) as he ought to pray for
good (Ar. khair) and man is ever hasty" (17: 11); “And if Allah should hasten the evil (Ar. sharr) to men as they desire the hastening on of good (Ar. khair), their doom should certainly have been decreed for them” (10: 11); “Every soul must taste of death, and We try you by evil (Ar. sharr) and good (Ar. khair) by way of probation (21: 35). In fact khair is anything which brings good and its opposite is sharr (Raghib); and khair or sharr only means doing good or doing evil when a word meaning doing is added to it, the equivalent for which is ʿaml. The good of qadar (measure or Divine limitation) and the evil of qadar therefore mean only whatever of good fortune or evil fortune comes to man. The meaning would therefore be that whatever of good or evil fortune comes to man, it must be accepted as coming from God; in other words a man must completely surrender himself to Divine will under all circumstances. This, as already shown, is one of the great lessons of life which has been taught to a Muslim.

At any rate, a belief in qadar does not mean a belief in predestination, for predestination, for which the Arabic word is jabr has never been the belief of the Muslim community. The Jabriya or believers in predestination have, on the other hand, been recognized as a heretical sect. A strict predestinarion, who believes that man has no control over his actions would deny the very basic principle of religion, the responsibility of man for his actions. The orthodox position has always been the middle one. Man has a free will but that will is exercised under certain limitations. It is only the Divine will that can be called an absolutely free will, a will under no limitations, but everything created and therefore everything human is subject to qadar, to a Divine measure of things, to limitations on it by a higher controlling power. Man is neither the possessor of absolute knowledge, nor of absolute power, nor of absolute will; all these attributes belong properly to God. Human knowledge, human power and human will are all under limitations and these limitations are placed upon him by the Divine measure which is called qadar. It is only in this sense that a Muslim can be said to have faith in qadar.